Illinois Cent Co v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois Public Utilities Commission of Illinois v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 January 1918
• Docket Number: Nos. 416,448,s. 416
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al. v. UNITED STATES et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

245 U.S. 493

38 S.Ct. 170

62 L.Ed. 425

ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

v PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al.

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al.

v. UNITED STATES et al.

Nos. 416, 448.

Argued Oct. 8 and 9, 1917.

Decided Jan. 14, 1918.

These cross-appeals present a controversy over the validity, scope and effect of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with discrimination found to result from a disparity in interstate and intrastate passenger rates. The facts and proceedings to be considered are these: The Mississippi river forms the boundary between the states of Missouri and Iowa on the west and the state of Illinois on the east. East St. Louis, in southwestern Illinois, is directly across the river from St. Louis, Mo., and Hamilton, in western Illinois, is directly across the river from Keokuk, Iowa. At both places the river is spanned by railroad bridges whereby the lines of railroad on one side are connected with those on the other. For some years prior to December 1, 1914, interstate passenger rates between St. Louis and Keokuk on the one hand and points in Illinois on the other were on a substantial parity with intrastate rates between East St. Louis and Hamilton, respectively, and points in Illinois. All were on a basis of 2 cents per mile, save that the rates to and from St. Louis and Keokuk included a bridge toll over the river. All other rates between points in Illinois were also on the same basis, any intrastate rate in excess of 2 cents per mile being prohibited by a statute of that state. On December 1, 1914, the rates between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois were increased by the carriers to 2 1/2 cents per mile, plus bridge tolls, the parity theretofore existing being thereby broken. Following this increase the Business Men's League of St. Louis, a corporate body of that city engaged in fostering its interests, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a petition against the carriers charging that the rates between St. Louis and points in Illinois were unreasonable in themselves, and, in connection with the lower intrastate rates, worked an unreasonable discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of Illinois cities, particularly East St. Louis and Chicago, and a like discrimination against interstate passenger traffic to and from St. Louis and in favor of intrastate passenger traffic to and from East St. Louis and Chicago. An association representing interests in Keokuk, Iowa, intervened and urged that any relief granted with respect to St. Louis be extended to Keokuk, so the former would not have an undue advantage over the latter. The state of Illinois, the Public Utilities Commission of that state, an association representing interests in Chicago and another association representing interests in East St. Louis, also intervened and opposed any action contemplating or requiring an increase in intrastate rates. After a hearing, in which all the parties and intervenors participated, the Interstate Commerce Commission filed a report (41 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 13) finding that the existing bridge tolls at St. Louis and Keokuk were unobjectionable, that rates between either of those cities and points in Illinois were reasonable when not in excess of 2.4 cents per mile, plus bridge tolls, and that the service, equipment and accommodations provided for intrastate passengers to and from East St. Louis, Hamilton, and Chicago, were the same as those provided for interstate passengers to and from St. Louis and Keokuk. In that report the Commission also found that the contemporaneous maintenance between East St. Louis¹ and Hamilton² respectively, and other points in Illinois, of rates on a lower basis than those maintained via the same routes between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and the same points in Illinois, bridge tolls excepted, gave an undue preference to East St. Louis and Hamilton and to intrastate passenger traffic to and from the latter points and subjected St. Louis and Keokuk and interstate passenger traffic to and from those cities to an unreasonable disadvantage; that the existing disparity in interstate and intrastate rates worked an unjust discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of Chicago in so far as the rates between St. Louis and points in Illinois approximately equidistant from those cities exceeded, by more than the bridge toll, the rates between Chicago and the same points; that the disparity worked a like discrimination against Keokuk and in favor of Chicago; and that the existence on the reasonably direct lines of the carriers in the territory between Chicago on the one hand and St. Louis and Keokuk on the other of intrastate rates on a lower basis per mile than the rates between that territory and St. Louis and Keokuk, bridge tolls excepted, operated to subject interstate traffic to an unreasonable disadvantage.

The Commission then made an order intended to result in the installation of rates not exceeding 2.4 cents per mile between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois and to remove the discrimination shown in the report; but shortly thereafter the Commission recalled that order and filed a supplemental report (41 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 503) indicating that lawful interstate rates between St. Louis and Keokuk on the one hand and Illinois point on the other could be defeated by the use of two tickets, one purchased at the interstate rate for a part of the journey and the other at the lower intrastate rate for the remainder, and therefore that the order should be so framed as to cover the rates between the intermediate points. In this connection it was said that the discrimination against interstate traffic resulting from the lower intrastate rates "would not be removed merely by an increase in the intrastate fares to and from the east bank points," and that "any contemporaneous adjustments of fares between St. Louis or Keokuk and points in Illinois, and generally within Illinois, which would permit the defeat of the St. Louis, Keokuk, East St. Louis, or any other east side city fares by methods such as described above, and which would thereby permit the continuance of the undue prejudice which we have found is suffered by St. Louis and Keokuk, and continue to burden interstate commerce," would not comply with the order about to be copied in the margin.³

In obedience to that order the carriers—of whom there were 29 took the requisite steps to establish and put in force interstate rates on a basis of 2.4 cents per mile between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois, and those rates became effective. Then believing the order required all intrastate rates in Illinois to be on a level with those interstate rates, bridge tolls excepted, the carriers proceeded to establish and put in force new rates between all points in that state on a basis of 2.4 cents per mile. This met with opposi- tion on the part of the state authorities and the carriers severally brought suits against them, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to enjoin them from interfering, by civil or criminal proceedings, or otherwise, with the establishment and maintenance of such intrastate rates under the Commission's order.

The suits were consolidated and the present appeals are from decrees dismissing the bills for want of equity and dismissing cross-bills of the state authorities for want of jurisdiction.

Messrs. Silas H. Strawn, Robert Bruce Scott, Andrew P. Humburg, W. S. horton,

Messrs. George T. Buckingham, James H. for Railroad Cos.

Messrs. George T. Buckingham, James H. Wilkerson, and Edward J. Brundage, all of Chicago, Ill., for State Public Utilities Commission.

Mr. Joseph W. Folk, of Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Solicitor General Davis, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The questions to which attention is first invited relate to the power of the District Court in the Northern District of Illinois to entertain the suits and the cross-bills, in view of the jurisdictional provision in the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219, that a suit 'to enforce, suspend or set aside, in whole or in part,' an order of the Commission relating to transportation and made upon petition may be brought only in the district 'wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties upon whose petition the order was made.'

It was objected in the District Court that the suits were brought to enforce the Commission's order and therefore could be entertained only in the Eastern district of Missouri, which embraces the residence of the party upon whose petition the order was made. But the court sustained its jurisdiction, ruling that the suits were not of the nature indicated by the objection.

In common acceptation a suit to enforce an order of the Commission is one which seeks to compel the carrier to whom the order is directed to yield obedience to its command. Nothing in the jurisdictional provision suggests that this is not what is intended, and that it is shown by the provision in section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 554, that, if an order respecting transpor ation be not obeyed by the carrier, the same may be enforced at the suit of the Commission, an injured party, or the United States, by an appropriate writ of process restraining the carrier from further disobedience and enjoining upon it due compliance with the order. A reading of both provisions leaves no room to doubt that the suit to enforce so clearly outlined in one is the suit intended by the other.

But these were not suits of that type. They were begun by the carriers, not against them, and proceeded upon the theory, not that the carriers were in default, but that they were proceeding to obey the order. What...