State v. Talbot, 20080795–CA.
| Citation | 2010 UT App 352,671 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,246 P.3d 112 |
| Decision Date | 09 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 20080795–CA.,20080795–CA. |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Mark D. TALBOT, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jeffery E. Slack, Cedar City, for Appellant.Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.Before Judges DAVIS, McHUGH, and ROTH.
¶ 1 Defendant Mark D. Talbot appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, alleging that he was subject to an unconstitutional search and seizure. Talbot also seeks reversal and a new trial, arguing that he was not provided with a critical part of the record—the jury voir dire. We affirm.
¶ 2 In March 2007, after obtaining evidence from multiple sources that Talbot was distributing methamphetamine, the Garfield County Sheriff (the Sheriff) decided to obtain a warrant to search Talbot's person, home, and vehicle. The Sheriff called a deputy (the Deputy) who was on patrol in the area and told him “what was going on and what had happened.” The Sheriff further informed the Deputy that he was in the process of obtaining a search warrant for Talbot's possessions and person and instructed the Deputy to stop and detain Talbot should the Deputy encounter him. Soon after the phone call, while on patrol, the Deputy saw Talbot driving and pulled him over. The Deputy patted Talbot down for weapons and placed him in handcuffs “for [Talbot's] and [the Deputy's] safety.” In the meantime, the Sheriff discussed the matter further with another officer who had assisted the Sheriff in taking possession of methamphetamine from a witness who said that Talbot had given him the methamphetamine. Moments after the Deputy had conducted the initial stop, the Sheriff called the Deputy and told him to arrest Talbot. When questioned as to why he did not wait for the search warrant to be issued before giving the instruction to arrest Talbot, the Sheriff explained that he already “had probable cause that ... [Talbot had] distributed methamphetamine[ ] just a few minutes ... earlier.”
¶ 3 After placing Talbot under arrest and reading him his Miranda rights, the Deputy searched Talbot's person and found methamphetamine. Other officers also found marijuana and drug paraphernalia during an impound inventory of Talbot's car. Soon afterward, a magistrate granted the search warrant, but the only additional evidence found pursuant to the search warrant was drug paraphernalia in Talbot's home.
¶ 4 Talbot was charged with distribution of a controlled substance with prior convictions, see Utah Code Ann. § 58–37–8(1) (Supp.2010),2 possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, see id. § 58–37–8(2), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, see id. § 58–37a–5(1). Prior to trial, Talbot moved to suppress the evidence that was found on his person and in his vehicle following his arrest, arguing that the evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Talbot was later convicted by a jury.
¶ 5 Talbot challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia found on his person and in his vehicle3 before the search warrant was granted, arguing that this evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. Specifically, he asserts that because the underlying arrest was invalid, the ensuing search incident to his arrest were unlawful. “In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the trial court's factual findings for clear error[,] and we review its conclusions of law for correctness.” Salt Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ¶ 5, 177 P.3d 655 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, whether the evidence was lawfully obtained and properly admitted turns on the validity of the underlying arrest. Talbot further argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury voir dire is missing from the trial transcript. We, however, do not reach this issue because Talbot has failed to supplement the record.
¶ 6 Talbot asserts that some of the evidence supporting his convictions was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 See generally U.S. Const. amend. IV (). The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (); State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 n. 3 (Utah 1996) ( the same).
¶ 7 Generally, searches conducted without the benefit of a warrant are per se unreasonable. See State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 293. An exception to this rule, however, “is a search incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause under exigent circumstances.” State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ¶ 22, 57 P.3d 1052. “A search of an arrestee's person is generally justified and supported by exigent circumstances,” which include “protect[ing] officers from weapons,” preventing escape, and preventing the concealment or destruction of evidence. Id. ¶ 22 n. 3. Talbot does not contend that the Deputy's search did not involve exigent circumstances. Rather, Talbot claims that the arrest was unconstitutional because by arresting him, the Deputy exceeded the Sheriff's instruction to simply detain him. Also pertinent to this analysis is whether the Deputy had probable cause to support Talbot's arrest. We will therefore address each of these issues in turn.
¶ 8 Talbot contends that the Deputy exceeded the authority given to him by the Sheriff, which Talbot alleges made his arrest and the ensuing search unconstitutional. Specifically, Talbot asserts that the Deputy's actions violated the Sheriff's instructions to merely detain Talbot, arguing that by detaining and handcuffing him, the Deputy “effectively plac[ed] him under arrest.” See generally State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 925 (). He points out that the trial court “found that [Talbot] was stopped while driving” and was then “searched and arrested.” 5 Talbot then argues that this violation of the Sheriff's instructions converted the Deputy's actions into an unconstitutional seizure that requires suppression of the resulting evidence. Talbot does not support this claim with any citation to case authority.
¶ 9 The Utah Supreme Court recently ruled in State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, 240 P.3d 780, that “under the Fourth Amendment, courts need not exclude evidence if it is uncovered in a search incident to a constitutionally permissible arrest, even if the arrest is not authorized by statute.” Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted) (upholding an arrest that was supported by probable cause but prohibited by state statute). In Harker, the defendant was arrested after a traffic accident for driving without insurance. See id. ¶ 2. The arresting officer did not have a warrant for the defendant's arrest, nor was he authorized by statute to arrest the defendant because the offense did not occur in the officer's presence. See id. ¶¶ 9–10 (). The officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, however, based on reasonable inferences from the statements of witnesses as well as his own observations at the scene. See id. ¶ 21. The supreme court held that “statutory authority is not required for a warrantless arrest to be considered ‘lawful’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 19 (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008)); see also id. ¶ 18 (). Rather, the supreme court concluded that “all the Constitution requires for an arrest to be ‘lawful’ is for the arrest to be based on probable cause.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 10 For purposes of this appeal, we accept Talbot's assertion that the Deputy's initial encounter with Talbot was an arrest rather than a detention. 6 Talbot makes no claim that the Deputy's inherent authority as a serving peace officer to arrest malefactors was constrained by anything other than the Sheriff's instructions and constitutional boundaries. Applying the reasoning of Harker, we conclude that so long as Talbot's arrest was justified by probable cause, the fact that the Deputy may have exceeded the instructions given to him by the Sheriff has no bearing on whether Talbot's arrest was “lawful” under the Constitution.7 If an arrest in violation of a statutory restriction does not itself raise constitutional issues, then, a fortiori, an arrest that exceeds a superior's immediate directive in a particular circumstance does not do so. Therefore, the pivotal question in determining whether Talbot's arrest was constitutional is whether the arrest was supported by probable cause.
¶ 11 On appeal, Talbot...
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