Cerrone v. Brown and Fresenius

• Decision Date: 20 September 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 00-7177
• Citation: 246 F.3d 194
• Parties: (2nd Cir. 2001) THOMAS C. CERRONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT L. BROWN and THOMAS M. FRESENIUS, individually and in their official capacity as members of the New York State Police, Defendants-Appellants, MICHAEL F. CAHILL, FRANCIS A. DEFRANCESCO, SALVATORE S. VALVO, RICHARD G. MORSE, DEBORAH L. KOMAR, individually and in their official capacity as members of the New York State Police, JONATHAN Z. FRIEDMAN and GERALD W. CONNOLLY, Defendants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 194

246 F.3d 194 (2nd Cir. 2001)

THOMAS C. CERRONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCOTT L. BROWN and THOMAS M. FRESENIUS, individually and in their official capacity as members of the New York State Police, Defendants-Appellants, MICHAEL F. CAHILL, FRANCIS A. DEFRANCESCO, SALVATORE S. VALVO, RICHARD G. MORSE, DEBORAH L. KOMAR, individually and in their official capacity as members of the New York State Police, JONATHAN Z. FRIEDMAN and GERALD W. CONNOLLY, Defendants.

Docket No. 00-7177

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Argued Sept. 20, 2000

Decided: April 10, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

PAUL M. COLLINS, Hinman, Straub, Pigors & Manning, P.C., Albany, N.Y. (Deirdre Roney, Lawrence H. Schaefer, of counsel, on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.

ALAN S. KAUFMAN, Chamberlain & Kaufman, Albany, N.Y. (Jeffrey Chamberlain, on the brief) for Defendants-Appellants.

Before: WALKER, Chief Judge, MINER and POOLER, Circuit Judges.

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to determine whether in 1995 the law was clearly established that a police officer must have probable cause to seize another police officer in the course of a criminal investigation. Plaintiff-appellee Thomas C. Cerrone, a New York State Police Trooper, was detained and questioned by fellow officers during a criminal investigation of a suspected cover-up of a hit-and-run accident. Cerrone sued the investigating officers, including defendants-appellants Lieutenant Scott L. Brown and Captain Thomas Fresenius of the Inspection Section of the New York State Police, and others, for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from an unreasonable seizure. On January 28, 2000, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas A. McAvoy, Chief District Judge) denied appellants' motion for summary judgment and found that issues of fact precluded finding them entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. This appeal followed.

In his complaint, Cerrone alleges that the defendants held him for questioning without probable cause. In support of their claim of qualified immunity, appellants argue that in 1995, the time of the seizure in this case, the law was not clearly established that probable cause was required to detain a police officer for questioning in the context of an investigation arising out of the performance of his official duties. In the alternative, appellants argue that if probable cause were required, the district court misapplied the standard for determining whether the defendants' conduct was nonetheless objectively reasonable -- whether they had "arguable probable cause" to justify the seizure in this case.

We hold that in 1995 the law was clearly established that a seizure of a police officer in the context of a criminal investigation required probable cause. However, because we agree with the appellants that the district court applied the wrong standard to determine whether their conduct was objectively reasonable, and failed to examine whether reasonable police officers could disagree as to the existence of probable cause given the information the arresting officers had, we vacate and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The district court has described the facts of this case in considerable detail. See Cerrone v. Cahill, 84 F. Supp. 2d 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). We summarize only those facts most relevant to this appeal.

In September 1994, the New York State Police received a letter describing a hit-and-run accident that had occurred in April or May of 1993. The letter identified the driver as one Rory Knapp and alleged that Rory Knapp's brother Timothy Knapp, a New York State Police Trooper, had assisted him in covering up the accident. The letter stated that Rory Knapp had hidden his car in Trooper Knapp's garage to avoid detection, and suggested in cryptic terms that several state troopers in the Peekskill barracks were aware of the cover-up ("the truth lies within the four walls of that barracks"). Though the letter appeared to have been authored by a man named Ed Scott, the author's identity was never verified. The letter did not mention Cerrone by name; nor did it suggest that he was involved in a cover-up.

The letter sparked an investigation into the incident. Appellants Fresenius and Brown were assigned to the investigation under the supervision of defendant Inspector Michael Cahill, who is not a party to this appeal. Their investigation revealed that on April 3, 1993, a car accident had taken place as described in the letter: Rory Knapp, driving a car owned by his companion, Dawn Brissett, crossed into the wrong lane of traffic and struck Maureen Hunt's vehicle. Hunt suffered minor injuries. Brissett later told police investigators that Rory Knapp had told her about his involvement in the accident. She stated that the day after the accident, Rory Knapp hid the car beside his brother Trooper Knapp's house, leaving it there until he took it to be destroyed.

The investigators ultimately concluded that the trooper who responded to the scene and prepared an accident report, Robert Gregory, had failed to conduct a thorough investigation. Appellant Brown learned from witnesses that the victim had provided Gregory with a description of the car, a partial license plate number, and items of the perpetrator's clothing found at the accident scene. However, it was apparent from a review of Gregory's report that Gregory did not follow up on these leads; instead he wrote in his report that "further investigation revealed no new clues, leads, suspects. Operator of Vehicle 1 could offer no new information." Cerrone signed Gregory's report as a supervisor.

Margaret Murphy, a bartender at an establishment near the accident scene, told an investigator that she was friends with both Rory Knapp and Sergeant Welsh, Cerrone's direct supervisor and the State Police Officer in charge of the zone in which the Peekskill State Police Station was located. She stated that Knapp and Welsh were friends with each other and that Rory Knapp had admitted to her that after the accident he had called Welsh, who told him "not to worry about it as [he] would take care of it."

Based upon the investigation, appellant Brown concluded that it was "reasonable to believe that Sergeant Cerrone was directly implicated in the cover-up as a result of at least the following facts, which reasonably appeared to be true to the investigation team": (1) Cerrone was Station Commander at the Peekskill Station, and thus would be expected to be aware of all of the activities at the station; (2) Cerrone was on duty when the accident occurred and went to the scene; (3) to the extent that Zone Sergeant Welsh, Cerrone's direct supervisor, had assisted in the cover-up, "he could not have done it without including Cerrone"; (4) Cerrone failed to find the car involved in the accident, despite having been given a detailed description of the car and the fact that it was placed in two locations that were frequently passed by officers of the Peekskill barracks; (5) Cerrone signed the accident report prepared by Trooper Gregory, which the appellants had determined was incomplete. See Cerrone, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 331.

On January 4, 1995, appellant Brown met with defendant Gerald Connolly of the Westchester County District Attorney's Office, who is not a party to this appeal, to discuss possible criminal charges arising out of the cover-up. According to Brown, Connolly indicated to him that they "would have a stronger case if [they] were able to get an oral admission from one of the targets."

On January 17, 1995, the investigative team discussed a possible criminal case based on the alleged cover-up. On that day, the district court found, "[d]efendants decided to stop Cerrone on his way home from work, question him in connection with the April 3 accident, and determine if he would cooperate with the investigation." Id. at 332. An agent of the New York State Bureau of Criminal Investigation, Lieutenant John Edward Grant, provided the investigators with a psychological profile of Cerrone in order to assist them in conducting the planned interview. See id.

On January 19, 1995, using an unmarked police car, the defendants stopped Cerrone. They asked whether he was carrying a weapon, allegedly "placed him in the felony position, placed him in the back of an unmarked police car (where he was guarded), transported him to a hotel room, read him his Miranda rights, [and] informed him that he was the target of a criminal investigation." Id. After approximately six hours of questioning, "Cerrone was told he could leave after he agreed to take a polygraph examination, which he took the next day." Id. Cerrone was never charged with a crime.

Cerrone sued the defendant police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages based on the deprivation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Appellants Brown and Fresenius moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Appellants appeal the district court's denial of that motion.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a decision denying a government official's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. See Tellier v. Fields, 230 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 2000).

The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment because (1) the law was "clearly established" at the time of the seizure that probable cause was required to seize a police officer for the purpose of a criminal investigation; and (2) an issue of fact existed as to whether defendants' actions were "objectively reasonable" under the circumstances. See Cerrone, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 333-40.

Appellants concede for purposes of this appeal that their actions with respect to Cerrone on January 19, 1995 amounted to a "seizure" under the Fourth...