Smoot v. United Transportation Union

Decision Date01 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-4322,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,98-4322
Citation246 F.3d 633
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) KENNETH R. SMOOT,, v. UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown. No. 94-00485--Peter C. Economus, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Stephen R. Felson (argued and briefed), Felson & Felson, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Bartos, John A. Edmond (argued and briefed), Anna L. Francis, Guerrieri, Edmond & Clayman, Washington, D.C., John B. Lewis (argued and briefed), Thomas J. Piatak (briefed), Joseph J. Morford, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Norris and Clay, Circuit Judges; Rosen, District Judge*.

OPINION

Clay, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Kenneth Smoot, appeals from the district court orders granting Defendants, United Transportation Union ("UTU") and CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of conspiracy in violation of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 153, and awarding Defendants $250,000 in statutory damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, and $86,308.74 in attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Defendants' counterclaims under the Federal Wiretap Act (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. We AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for redetermination of damages.

BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History

In January of 1992, Plaintiff petitioned UTU General Chairman V.V. Elswick to represent him in a grievance action to recover thirty shares of CSX common stock which Plaintiff claimed were owed to him under a labor agreement between UTU and CSX. Elswick informed Plaintiff that he did not qualify for the shares because he was not in active service as a trainman as of November 30, 1991, a required condition, according to Elswick, for distribution of CSX shares under the labor agreement. Plaintiff appealed Elswick's determination to the UTU Board of Appeals, the union's internal appeals board. The Board of Appeals ruled that Plaintiff was entitled to the thirty shares of stock and instructed Elswick to proceed with Plaintiff's claim. Elswick removed himself from the action and appointed UTU Vice-Chairman Robert Earley to represent Plaintiff in arbitration proceedings.

On May 6, 1993, Public Law Board No. 3882 ("PLB"), a private arbitration panel created pursuant to the RLA, convened a hearing at the Baltimore, Maryland offices of CSX to consider whether Plaintiff was entitled to the distribution of CSX stock under the labor agreement. Prior to the start of the hearing, the three PLB members, Earley, as UTU representative for Plaintiff, Howard Emerick, as the Senior Director of CSX, and H. Raymond Cluster, as PLB Chair and neutral arbitrator, requested that everyone else leave the room so that they could hold an executive session. Executive sessions are held at PLB hearings to discuss pending cases, resolve procedural matters, or determine matters remaining from previous PLB hearings. Plaintiff, who had brought two tape recorders with him to record the PLB proceedings, left the recorders in the room while the executive session was held. The executive session was then recorded, unbeknownst to the PLB members, the tape of which Plaintiff listened to following the hearing. On July 15, 1993, the PLB decided that Plaintiff was not entitled to the shares of CSX stock under the labor agreement.

A. Internal Union Actions Against Earley

On December 15, 1993, Plaintiff filed internal union charges against Earley. Plaintiff wrote to K.N. Thompson, Chair of the UTU's Executive Board, presenting formal charges against Earley for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing as a union representative at the PLB hearing. On January 19, 1994, Earley was notified by the Executive Board that it would proceed with the charges brought against him by Plaintiff. A disciplinary hearing was set for March 23, 1994.

On March 28, 1994, Lance E. Ruck, a member of the UTU, filed a charge with the executive board against Earley after reviewing both tape and transcript copies of the executive session. See Earley v. Executive Bd. of the UTU, 957 F. Supp. 997, 999 (N.D. Ohio 1996). In that charge, Ruck alleged that Earley argued against the official position of the UTU in the executive session. He also alleged that Earley therefore failed to perform his duties as required by the UTU. Ruck stated that his claims against Earley were for the same wrongdoing as those alleged by Plaintiff.

B. Earley Action Against Plaintiff

On March 14, 1994, Earley filed an action against Plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland requesting declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that Plaintiff's taping of the executive session violated the Act as well as the Maryland anti-wiretapping statute, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 10-401 et seq. On March 16, 1994, Earley moved for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Plaintiff from using or disclosing the substance of the executive session tapes at a trial before the Executive Board. On March 22, 1994, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from participating in the UTU internal proceedings against Earley. See Earley v. Smoot, 846 F. Supp. 451, 454 (D. Md. 1994). Plaintiff was further ordered to refrain from using the executive session tapes except in connection with his defense against Earley's action under the Act. See Executive Board, 957 F. Supp. at 999. The district court then transferred the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Id. On October 29, 1996, the district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from using or disclosing the tape recording of the executive session, which was subsequently vacated on January 31, 1997. Id. at 1000-1002. The district court found that Plaintiff had intentionally recorded the executive session in violation of the Act.

C. Plaintiff Action Against CSX and UTU; CSX and UTU Counterclaims

On March 7, 1994, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action, alleging that the PLB decision should be set aside, that the UTU breached its duty of fair representation, and that CSX breached the labor agreement. Plaintiff attached a transcript copy of the executive session tapes as Exhibit A to his complaint. On April 25, 1994, the UTU filed a counterclaim, alleging that Plaintiff violated the Act by taping the executive session and subsequently disclosing and using the illegally intercepted communications. On May 4, 1994, CSX also filed a counterclaim under the Act.

Also on May 4, 1994, CSX filed a motion to strike Exhibit A from Plaintiff's complaint, or, in the alternative, to seal the exhibit. On May 18, 1994, the district court held a case management conference, at which Plaintiff agreed to withdraw Exhibit A from his complaint.

Subsequently, both UTU and CSX filed motions for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff filed responses pro se. On February 16, 1995, new counsel made an appearance on behalf of Plaintiff. Counsel filed supplemental briefs in opposition to the motions for summary judgment.

On January 28, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of UTU and CSX as to Plaintiff's claims. The district court held that the PLB award should not be set aside under the limited standard of review governing arbitration awards under the RLA. The district court also found no material facts in dispute to support a claim that the UTU had breached its duty of fair representation.

On March 30, 1998, the district court conducted a bench trial on the UTU and CSX counterclaims under the Act. The district court found that Plaintiff was not credible and had intentionally recorded the executive session and then distributed the illegal interception in violation of the Act. The district court awarded $130,000 and $120,000 in statutory damages to UTU and CSX respectively, in connection with thirteen violations committed by Plaintiff under the Act. The district court also found that Plaintiff's violations were willful, wanton and reckless, and thereby awarded UTU and CSX $50,000 each in punitive damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b), as well as finding UTU and CSX entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under § 2520(b).

UTU and CSX filed motions for attorneys' fees. On September 9, 1998, two days before the date set for the hearing on attorneys' fees, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the UTU and CSX requests. The district court determined that Plaintiff's response was not timely. On September 11, 1998, the district court held a hearing on attorneys' fees, which Plaintiff failed to attend. On September 25, 1998, the district court awarded CSX $25,874.31 in fees and costs. On October 8, 1998, the district court awarded UTU $60,434.43 in fees and costs. On October 28, 1998, Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, appealing from the district court's awards of summary judgment, statutory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Defendants.

II. Substantive History

Plaintiff is employed by CSX, a Virginia corporation, and is a member of UTU, an unincorporated labor organization headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio. In October of 1989, UTU and CSX negotiated a new labor agreement which included a provision for the contribution of thirty shares of CSX common stock into the retirement plan account of train service employees who satisfied the eligibility rules under the labor agreement.

In 1991, Plaintiff held both train and engine service seniority with CSX. As of November 30, 1991, Plaintiff was employed in engine service, but not train service, which Elswick interpreted as precluding Plaintiff's eligibility for the CSX stock distribution under the labor agreement.

The ...

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