Ball v. Amc Entertainment, Inc.

Decision Date24 February 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 00-867(GK).,CIV.A. 00-867(GK).
Citation246 F.Supp.2d 17
PartiesKevin BALL, et al. Plaintiffs, v. AMC ENTERTAINMENT, INC. et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Thomas J. Simeone, Simeone & Miller, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs. Steven John Fellman, David K. Monroe, William Francis Krebs, Galland, Kharasch, Greenberg, Fellman & Swirsky, P.C., Washington, DC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KESSLER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are deaf and hard of hearing individuals residing in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.1 They bring this class action against movie theater operators AMC Entertainment, Inc. ("AMC"), and Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corp. ("Loews"). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violate the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (1992), by failing to provide them with the reasonable accommodations necessary for full and equal enjoyment of Defendants' services through implementation of captioning and other interpretive aids.2 This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, submission of Amicus Curiae, the January 22, 2003, Motions Hearing, and the entire record herein, for the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

I. Background3

In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA to remedy the "serious and pervasive" problem of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).

After thoroughly investigating the problem, Congress concluded that there was a "compelling need to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals and integrate them "into the economic and social mainstream of American life." S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 20 (1989); H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, at 50 (1990). To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, including public accommodations.4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 ("Title III"). Title III of the ADA states that

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

While the ADA set out broad principles for the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities, Congress assigned to the Attorney General the specific duty and power to interpret that statute and set standards for enforcement and compliance of Title III of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).5 Congress also directed the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board ("ATBC Board") to issue "minimum guidelines" for Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12204(a). Those guidelines—the ATBC Board's ADA Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG")—do not have any binding effect of their own, but instead help shape the Attorney General's regulations, which must be "consistent" with the ADAAG. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c).

Plaintiffs, who have a disability recognized by the ADA,6 argue that Defendants' failure to provide reasonable accommodations for deaf patrons desiring to see first run movies7 shown in Defendants' movie theaters violates the ADA. Because Defendants' movie theaters are places of public accommodation under the ADA,8 Plaintiffs argue that such accommodations are required by the Act and would not result in a change of Defendants' services or an undue burden upon Defendants. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks an injunction requiring Defendants "to implement the captions and other interpretive aids" necessary to comply with the ADA, which "includes but is not limited to: (a) open captioning devices and (b) closed captioning devices, such as rear window captioning." Compl. at p. 7 and H 15.9

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment will be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits or declarations, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the movant has met this burden, a court must consider all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1135 (D.C.Cir.1985).

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that the ADA and its implementing regulations do not require Defendants' movie theaters to show movies captioned using rear window captioning ("RWC")10 because: 1) requiring exhibition of captioned movies is explicitly precluded by the Act and DOJ regulations, 2) exhibition of RWC-compatible movies would change the nature or mix of the goods or services Defendants offer,11 and 3) installation of RWC equipment in Defendants' movie theaters would be unduly burdensome. In making these arguments, Defendants rely primarily on a Department of Justice ("DOJ") regulation for implementing Title III, which states that

A public accommodation shall take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.

28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a) (1992) (emphasis added). In opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,12 Plaintiffs argue that cost-efficient technology exists to allow deaf persons to attend first run movies without fundamentally altering the nature of movies or resulting in undue burden upon Defendant Theaters.13

A. Requiring Exhibition of Closed Captioned Films, Including RWC, Is Not Explicitly Excluded by the ADA or Its Implementing Regulations.

Defendants argue that requiring them to show closed captioned films at their movie theaters is explicitly precluded by the ADA and its implementing regulations. As this is an argument of statutory interpretation, the court must begin with the plain language of the statute. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 474, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). Where the language is clear, that is the end of judicial inquiry "in all but the most extraordinary circumstances." Id., 505 U.S. at 474, 112 S.Ct. 2589. However, when the intent of Congress is not clear from the language itself, the court may "look to the general purpose of Congress in enacting the statute and to its legislative history for helpful clues... [and] must avoid an interpretation that undermines congressional purpose considered as a whole." U.S. v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940)).

The Act itself contains no explicit language regarding captioning in movie theaters, so Defendants rely on statements from the House Committee Report to support their argument that closed captioning of films at their movie theaters is explicitly precluded by the ADA. The Report states that "[o]pen-captioning...of feature films playing in movie theatres, is not required by this legislation." H.R. Rep. No. 101-458(11), at 108 (1990).

According to Defendants, this single statement from the House Committee Report signals unambiguous legislative intent that captioning in movie theaters is not required, but their reliance on the Report is misplaced. As our Court of Appeals recently stated, "reviewing legislative history is like looking over a crowd and picking out your friends," Community Care Foundation v. Thompson, 318 F.3d 219 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Defendants have only one friend in this particular crowd. The Report fully recognized that technological advances might impose additional ADA requirements on public accommodations in the future, stating that:

The Committee wishes to make it clear that technological advances can be expected to further enhance options for making meaningful and effective opportunities available to individuals with disabilities. Such advances may require public accommodations to provide auxiliary aids and services in the future which today would not be required because they would be held to impose undue burdens on such entities. Indeed, the Committee intends that the types of accommodation and services provided ... [under the ADA] should keep pace with the rapidly changing technology of the times.

H.R. Rep. 101-485(11), at 108 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (remanding a recent ADA action for the determination of whether new, improved technology—not available when earlier, similar cases were decided—existed that would permit diabetic drivers to operate a vehicle safely).

When the ADA was signed into law in 1990, only open-captioning of theatrical films was in use at that time and there were not yet any systems available for providing closed captions in theaters.14 Regardless of the House Committee Report's statement concerning open captioning of films, Congress explicitly anticipated the situation presented in this case. Therefore, the isolated statement that open captioning of...

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