Gulf Ry Co v. State of Texas
Citation | 246 U.S. 58,62 L.Ed. 574,38 S.Ct. 236 |
Decision Date | 04 March 1918 |
Docket Number | No. 158,158 |
Parties | GULF, C. & S. F. RY. CO. v. STATE OF TEXAS |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Messrs. J. W. Terry, of Galveston, Tex., Alex. Britton and Evans Browne, both of Washington, D. C., A. H. Culwell, of El Paso, Tex., and Robert Dunlap and Gardiner Lathrop, both of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. B. F. Looney and Luther Nickels, both of Austin, Tex., for State of Texas.
This is a suit by the State to compel the defendant railroad, the plaintiff in error, to stop two interstate trains, one numbered 17 and southbound, the other numbered 18 and northbound, at the City of Meridian, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers. Meridian is the County Seat of Bosque County and has a population of 1500. Two other trains of the defendant going each way stopped there daily, but the Railroad Commission of the State found that these were insufficient for the needs of business at that station and made the order that this suit seeks to have carried out. The statute of Texas giving to the Commission power to make such order contains a proviso that 'four trains each way, carrying passengers for hire, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, be required to stop as aforesaid at all county seat stations'—so that the Commission seems to have obeyed a statutory mandate. Art. 6676, (2), Vernon's Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes. Another article, 6672, imposes a penalty of not more than $5,000 for every failure to obey such lawful order, and this suit seeks to recover penalties as well. The trial Court confirmed the finding of the Commission that the present service is insufficient, and the order, and imposed a fine of $22,400, being $100 for each failure to stop. It stated the facts in great detail but it will not be necessary to repeat them here. The Court of Civil Appeals again confirmed the above finding and affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of the State refused to allow a writ of error, declaring itself unable to say that the conclusion of the lower Court was unwarranted as matter of law.
This case does not require quite so critical an examination into the facts as was made in Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 335, 344, 345, 27 Sup. Ct. 90, 51 L. Ed. 209, and Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 330, 334, 335, 28 Sup. Ct. 121, 52 L. Ed. 230, in order to decide whether the judgment of the State Courts and Commission and, it would seem, of the legislature, was wrong. If the reasoning that prevailed with the Court of Civil Appeals were applied to Meridian simply in view of the number of its inhabitants there would be a serious question whether it could be sustained. For the consideration most emphasized was that no sleeping cars were attached to the local trains and that in order to make use of such accommodation on the trains in question passengers had to get in or out at stations from seven or eight to twelve or fifteen miles away. It was thought that when the railroad fur- nished such accommodations to a part of the public it was bound to furnish the same to all others—a very questionable proposition as applied. The other fact relied upon was that passengers not infrequently came on trains 17 and 18 destined for Meridian and had to get out at Morgan or Clifton, the next stations to the north and south. We repeat that whether these facts would justify an intermeddling with interstate trains in favor of a place of this size, merely as such, would be a serious question. But the State Court sustained the order as one required by statute in favor of county seats, up to the number of four trains each way, Sundays excepted. The law is not directed adversely at...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
United States v. Schechter
...do not make fines excessive. Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391, 36 S. Ct. 367, 60 L. Ed. 706; Gulf, Colorado, etc., Ry. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58, 38 S. Ct. 236, 62 L. Ed. 574. I do not overlook the fact that a statute may be obnoxious which imposes penalties so great, or conditions so o......
-
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros
...41 L.Ed. 1064; Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 19 S.Ct. 465, 43 L.Ed. 702; Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 38 S.Ct. 236, 62 L.Ed. 574, where statutes requiring local service no greater than necessary for fair accommodation of local needs were hel......
-
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia State of Ohio v. Same
...State, Lake Shore Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 Sup. Ct. 465, 43 L. Ed. 702; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58, 38 Sup. Ct. 236, 62 L. Ed. 574. I see nothing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a preference to its inhabitants i......
-
Lapinski v. Copacino.
...218 U.S. 563, 31 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed. 1151. See also State v. Miglin, 101 Conn. 8, 12, 125 A. 250. In Gulf, C. etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 38 S.Ct. 236, 62 L.Ed. 574, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 169 S.W. 385, upholding a fine of $22,400 ......