Bartkewich v. Billinger

• Citation: 432 Pa. 351,247 A.2d 603
• Parties: Edward BARTKEWICH v. E. K. BILLINGER and William F. Billinger, t/d/b/a Billco, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 12 November 1968
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

247 A.2d 603

432 Pa. 351

Edward BARTKEWICH v. E. K. BILLINGER and William F. Billinger, t/d/b/a Billco, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 12, 1968.

Henry E. Rea, Jr., Brandt, Riester, Brandt & Malone Pittsburgh, for appellants.

Thomas L. Cooper, McArdle & McLaughlin, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS Justice.

This case comes to us after appellee received a jury verdict. Appellant appealed from the denial of its motions for a new trial and for a judgment n.o.v.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to appellee, indicates that appellee, an experienced glass factory worker, was helping to operate a machine built for appellee's employer by appellant. The machine was built to specifications requested by the employer, although appellant retained the right and discretion to install any necessary safety devices. The machine was used to break glass and stack glass strips.

On the day of the accident in question, appellee was working on the west side of the machine while his supervisor operated the controls which were on the east side of the machine. During the operating time, the supervisor departed, leaving appellee alone. Appellee noticed that glass was jamming at a place where it was not unusual for this to occur, and believed that the machine was being damaged. He thus attempted to remove a piece of glass with his hand, but his glove caught in the machinery and he was injured. Appellee had not been given any specific instructions regarding the operation of the machine, or the dangers if any inherent in its use. Wooden sticks were provided, however, to break up glass jams.

Appellee claims, relying on the testimony of expert safety witnesses that the machine that appellant provided was defectively designed in that it did not contain adequate safety features, such as an on-off switch on both sides of the machine, or a barrier or other guard to keep individuals from putting their extremities into the machine. We believe that on these facts, this case was improperly submitted to the jury, and its verdict cannot be allowed to stand.

Both parties agree that this case must be decided under Restatement (2d), Torts § 402 A, ^[1] see Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1964). Appellee argues that appellant's machine, without a device to prevent appellant from reaching into the mechanism, was in a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.' Appellee's main reliance is on Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill.App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966), where a farmer was injured when he reached into an operating cornshucker to remove jammed ears of corn. The court held that the question of whether the lack of a safety screen which would have prevented the farmer from reaching into the machine constituted a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user' was for the jury. Although we believe that Wright is legally indistinguishable from the case before us, we choose to reject its result. ^[2]

There is no question, of course, that the lack of proper safety devices can constitute a defective design for which there may be recovery under § 402 A. See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does A Product Have to Be, 42 Ind.L.J. 301 (1967); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816, 822 (1962). We believe, however, that this rule should only apply to allow recovery where the absence of the safety device caused an accidental injury which was of the type that could be expected from the normal use of the product. Thus in Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961), the manufacturer was held liable for not including outlets or vents which would carry away gasoline or gasoline fumes, thus alleviating the risk of an explosion. Similar are cases which require potentially explosive devices such as coffee urns to have safety valves. See Noel, supra, at 824. Had appellant in this case been hit by a piece of flying glass that was able to strike him because its flight was not blocked by a safety wall, we would have a case analogous to Blitzstein, et al. Likewise, had the farmer in the Wright case cut his foot or arm through an accidental contact with the shucker which was not prevented by a safety screen, he likely would have a valid § 402 A claim. Cf. Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961), in which the jury was permitted to decide whether a power mower which lacked a guard over the rear blades was defectively designed. But cf. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).

The situation in the case before us is not at all like those cited, except of course, for Wright. Here appellee voluntarily did exactly what obviously was dangerous--reached into an operating glass breaking machine. Appellee testified that he reached into the machine because he thought it was being damaged. If he thought the machine was being damaged, what did he think would happen to his hand? It is unfortunate that appellee incurred a serious injury, but we do not believe that appellant was obligated to build a machine that was designed not only to keep glass in, but also to keep people out. Nor do we believe that appellant was required to strategically locate on-off switches around the machine, in the expectation that someone like appellee here, would put himself in an obviously dangerous position by reaching into the moving machine rather than walking around to where he knew the controls were. Appellee's evidence indicated that glass jams were likely to occur at the exact place where this one developed, but that hardly means that the place of the jam necessarily is a place where a switch should be located. The whole point is that there was no need for appellee to be at the spot where the jam occurred to prevent damage to the machine; the switch was easily accessible and would have provided a safe and efficient means of stopping it.

We find the case of Messina v. Clark Equipment Company, 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959), to...