State v. Huerta

• Decision Date: 18 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 101,438.,101,438.
• Citation: 247 P.3d 1043,291 Kan. 831
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee,v.Eric F. HUERTA, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

291 Kan. 831

247 P.3d 1043

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Eric F. HUERTA, Appellant.

No. 101,438.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 18, 2011.

[247 P.3d 1044 , 291 Kan. 831]

Syllabus by the Court

1. K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1)'s prohibition of direct appeal jurisdiction over presumptive sentences does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.

2. Defendant's due process challenge to K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1)'s prohibition of direct appeal jurisdiction over presumptive sentences is abandoned.

3. A criminal defendant's allegation of constitutional infirmity in an individual presumptive sentence does not make the sentence amenable to direct appeal under K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1).

Richard Ney, of Ney, Adams & Sylvester, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.David Lowden, assistant district attorney, argued the cause for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BEIER, J.:

This case arises on petition for review from the Court of Appeals' dismissal of defendant Eric Huerta's sentencing appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the authority of K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1). Huerta challenges the constitutionality of this statute, arguing for reversal and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of each of his issues on the merits.

Huerta was sentenced to consecutive presumptive sentences totaling 372 months' imprisonment after his guilty pleas in two multiple-felony cases. He argued in his brief to the Court of Appeals that the State violated due process by presenting false information during his sentencing hearing, that his sentence was disproportionate to his co-defendant's sentence, and that the State impermissibly urged the sentencing judge to rely on his post-arrest silence. Given the dismissal of Huerta's appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of any of Huerta's arguments. The Court of Appeals also denied Huerta's motion to reinstate his appeal.

In his petition for review to this court, Huerta argued that the dismissal under K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1) violated due process and equal protection. He also asserted that, when a sentencing appeal relies on a constitutional argument, as at least two of his issues do, even a sentence that falls within a presumptive grid box is not truly “presumptive.” Huerta cited our decision in State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 190 P.3d 207 (2008), to support this last position; he also cited State v. Dillon, 44 Kan.App.2d 1138, 244 P.3d 680 (2010), during oral argument before this court.

Constitutional questions such as those posed by Huerta here raise issues of law, and this court's review is unlimited. Johnson, 286 Kan. at 842, 190 P.3d 207 (construction of Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act [KSGA], determination of constitutionality of provisions questions of law). Moreover, this case requires us to interpret K.S.A. 21–4721(c).

“When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule governing our interpretation is that ‘the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted.’ State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts ‘need not resort to statutory construction.’ In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, ‘[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.’ State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004).” Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 754–55, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).

This court has further stated:

“Where a statute's language is subject to multiple interpretations, however, a reviewing court ‘may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. [Citation omitted.]’ Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100–01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000). Generally, courts should construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent behind a particular statutory provision ‘from a general consideration of the entire act. Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citation omitted.]’ in rE marriage oF ross, 245 kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases that require statutory construction, ‘courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia.’ Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975).” Bremby, 286 Kan. at 754–55, 189 P.3d 494.

The Statute at Issue

K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1) states: “On appeal from a judgment or conviction entered for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, the appellate court shall not review: (1) Any sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime.” K.S.A. 21–4703(q) defines “presumptive sentence” as “the sentence provided in a grid block for an offender classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime severity ranking of the current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history.”

Equal Protection

Huerta contends that K.S.A. 21–4721(c)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and he provides two examples to demonstrate.

First, Huerta argues, under K.S.A. 21–4721(e)(1), a defendant could appeal a departure sentence resulting from partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive— e.g., a sentencing court imposes an upward departure on an African–American defendant because of racial prejudice. But K.S.A. 21–4721 would not permit an appellate court to review the imposition of a presumptive sentence, even if the sentence is based on that same racial bias. Huerta contends that there is no rational basis to permit an appellate court to review a departure sentence based on partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive while denying it the opportunity to review a presumptive sentence resulting from the same partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive.

Second, Huerta argues that this court has reviewed a claim that consecutive presumptive misdemeanor sentences were disproportionate and violated the Eighth Amendment. He cites State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, 346–47, 144 P.3d 729 (2006), in which we applied an abuse of discretion standard when the appellant complained not that a statute was unconstitutional, but that his particular sentence was unconstitutional. Huerta asserts that there is no rational basis to prohibit review of a constitutional challenge to consecutive presumptive felony sentences.

Our first step in equal protection analysis is determination of whether the legislative classification at issue results in arguably indistinguishable classes of individuals being treated differently. Only if there is a differential treatment of similarly situated individuals is the Equal Protection Clause implicated. State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 248, 210 P.3d 635 (2009) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 [1985] [guiding principle of equal protection analysis is that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike]; Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, 72, 199 P.3d 1251 [2009]; State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 652, 101 P.3d 1257 [2004] ). This court has recognized that it is the burden of the party raising an equal protection complaint to demonstrate that he or she is similarly situated to others treated differently. Salas, 289 Kan. at 249, 210 P.3d 635.

Unless a party meets his or her “similarly situated” burden, we do not move to our second step in equal protection analysis, i.e., determination of the nature of the rights affected by the classification and thus the level of scrutiny applied: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis. Salas, 289 Kan. at 248–49, 210 P.3d 635. We note, however, that this court has applied the rational basis test to an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a criminal statute. State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 651–52, 101 P.3d 1257 (2004). If a litigant has not demonstrated himself or herself to be similarly situated to those in a favored group, we also do not move to the last step of equal protection analysis, i.e., application of the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine whether a classification passes muster. Salas, 289 Kan. at 249, 210 P.3d 635.

A preliminary note is necessary before we turn to whether Huerta is similarly situated to defendants permitted under K.S.A. 21–4721(e)(1) to challenge departure sentences as the products of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive.

Defendants such as Huerta used to be permitted to appeal on the same grounds as those subject to departure sentences. A 1995 statutory amendment altered the language of K.S.A. 21–4721(e)(1). See K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21–4721(e)(1); State v. Flores, 268 Kan. 657, 658, 999 P.2d 919 (2000). Before the amendment, Kansas appellate courts also reviewed presumptive sentences for partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive. See, e.g., State v. Windom, 23 Kan.App.2d 429, 430–31, 932 P.2d 1019, rev. denied 262 Kan. 969 (1997); State v. Clark, 21 Kan.App.2d 697, 699–700, 907 P.2d 898 (1995), rev. denied 259 Kan. 928 (1996); State v. Bost, 21 Kan.App.2d 560, 571–72, 903 P.2d 160 (1995)...