Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Charlton

Decision Date09 November 1917
Docket Number1554.
PartiesCHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. v. CHARLTON. [a1]
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

William Leigh Williams, of Norfolk, Va., for plaintiff in error.

John Winston Read, of Newport News, Va., for defendant in error.

Before PRITCHARD and KNAPP, Circuit Judges, and CONNOR, District Judge.

PRITCHARD Circuit Judge.

This action was instituted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia by the administratrix of James H. Charlton, deceased, against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company under the act of Congress known as the Employers' Liability Act (Act April 22, 1908, c 149, 35 Stat. 65 (Comp. St. 1916, Secs. 8657-8665)) to recover damages on account of the death of James H. Charlton. There was a verdict and judgment for $12,000 in favor of the defendant in error in the court below. The plaintiff in error excepted to the refusal of the court below to grant certain instructions and to direct a verdict in its favor. The case comes here on writ of error.

In the course of this opinion defendant in error will be referred to as plaintiff, and the plaintiff in error as defendant; such being the relative positions of the parties in the court below.

On the night of the 5th of September, 1915, plaintiff's intestate was engaged as a brakeman by the defendant on its yards at Newport News, Va., and while thus employed he was crushed between two cars, and as a result of his injuries he died soon thereafter. It is conceded that at the time of the accident both the defendant and deceased were engaged in interstate commerce.

It appears that just prior to the accident an engine to which four cars were attached left the main track and moved to track No. 9, going in the direction of a single car standing still upon that track for the purpose of coupling the head car of the four cars to the standing car. It was the duty of Charlton to give the proper signals and to assist in making this coupling. As the moving cars approached the standing car it appears that he was riding upon the ladder step of the car next to the standing car.

C. M Cox, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he was the engineer in charge of the train at the time the injury occurred; that after leaving the lead track he moved on until he received the stop signal, that the cars struck at the first impact, and that he received this signal from some one riding on the sill step of the head car. It was shown by another witness that Charlton was riding on the sill step or ladder step. It further appears that the engine and the cars attached to the engine did not move after this signal was given until after Charlton was hurt. When the cars attached to the engine came into contact with the single car they failed to couple by the impact, and the standing car was pushed a distance of four or five feet away from the cars to which the engine was attached.

Witness Albright when asked what they were endeavoring to do said:

'We are going to back up to car No. 5. When the car upon which Charlton and I were struck, it knocked the car a distance of about four or five feet. They did not couple. Then he (Charlton) comes down to open the knuckle, and the car rolled back and caught him.'

A little later on in his testimony this witness said:

'I don't know whether he went to open this knuckle or to fix it.'

It appears that there was a very slight grade at this point, and, while Charlton was engaged in attempting to adjust the knuckle, the solitary car rolled back and caught him, causing the injuries from which he died the following day.

It further appears that at the point where Charlton received his injuries the track was straight. It is not shown why the deceased went in between the cars. The witness Albright further testified that he was riding on the same car with the deceased, and that immediately after the cars came together he went to see what had happened, and found that deceased had been hurt. He also stated that he found the knuckle closed at that time; that if the knuckle had been open the cars would have coupled automatically. This witness also testified as follows:

'Q. State whether or not, Albright, these cars coupled automatically when they came together. A. Does it do it? Q. Do they? A. Yes, they couple all right if the knuckle is open. Q. If the coupler is in proper condition it couples automatically without the brakeman doing anything? A. Well, if it is on a straight track, you do not have to regulate it provided one of the knuckles is open.'

John Morgan Hazelwood, a witness for defendant, among other things, testified that he was a car inspector for the defendant company. He further testified as follows:

'I remember hearing of Mr. Charlton being killed, and soon thereafter, somewhere about 12:30 o'clock, four cars were brought to the lower yard and Conductor Massie pointed out two cars he said Charlton was mashed between. The conductor took the cars loose, separating them, and I inspected them, examined the drawheads, lock pins, the lift levers and all the parts, and made a memorandum at the time of my inspection, which I have with me. Examining that memorandum, I state that I found all the parts of these cars in perfect condition at the time I inspected them. * * * You can cut cars loose or you can throw open the knuckles by using the lever without going in between the cars. The couplers on these two cars are standard construction, ordinarily used in railroading, known as M.C.B. Standard-- Master Car Builders' Standard.'

It further appears that the accident occurred between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening, and, as we have stated, an examination of the appliances was made about 12:30 that night. Furthermore, it appears from the evidence that on a straight track there is no coupler known that will couple from impact where both of the knuckles are closed.

It is earnestly contended by counsel for plaintiff that section 2 of what is known as the 'Safety Appliance Act' of March 2, 1893, requires the railroad to equip all cars with couplers which will automatically couple by impact; that this duty is positive; that any failure on the part of a railroad to properly equip its cars with automatic couplers renders it liable to the penalty prescribed by law, and that whenever one is injured on account of a failure of the railroads to equip their cars with automatic couplers, the question should be submitted to a jury with the view of having it determine as to whether such cars had been equipped in compliance with the statute; and that where the Safety Appliance Act is violated the questions of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are immaterial under section 2 of the act, and also that the failure of an appliance to act is in itself sufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The section to which we have just referred is as follows:

'Sec. 2. (Automatic Couplers)-- That on and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.'

The defendant insists that the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute is erroneous; that, while it was the purpose of Congress to require railroads to furnish an appliance to couple cars together which would couple automatically by impact, Congress did not thereby intend to provide that, where the knuckles of a coupler by the motion of the train or otherwise should be closed, this of itself would be sufficient to render the railroad liable for a failure to comply with the statute, provided the appliance furnished was in perfect working order, which, of course, would include, among other things, the lever on the side of the car by which a closed knuckle could be opened without requiring an employe to jeopardize his life by going between the cars to adjust the knuckle.

Among other things the defendant requested the court to give the jury the following instruction:

'The court instructs the jury if they believe from the evidence that the cars between which the decedent, Charlton, was caught were each provided with standard automatic couplers which would couple by impact when the knuckles were open, and were...

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  • Donnell v. Elgin Ry Co
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    ...25 S.Ct. 158, 161, 162, 49 L.Ed. 363. See also United States v. Southern R. Co., D.C. 1905, 135 F. 122, 127; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Charlton, 4 Cir., 1917, 247 F. 34, 40; Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Linehan, 8 Cir., 1933, 66 F.2d 373, 377; Penn v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 7 Cir., 19......
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    ...Appliance Act and the sole proximate cause of his injuries. Talbert v. Railway, 314 Mo. 352; Gilbert v. Railway, 128 F. 529; C. & O. Railway v. Charleton, 247 F. 34; Charleton v. Railway, 267 F. 988; State ex v. Ellison, 271 Mo. 463; Nelson v. Railway, 246 U.S. 253; Great Northern Ry. v. Wi......
  • Talbert v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company
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    • 21 Mayo 1926
    ... ... Because in going there he violated ... Section 2 of the Safety Appliance Act. Gilbert v ... Railroad, 128 F. 535; C. & O. Ry. v. Charlton, ... 247 F. 34. Because he violated defendant's rule ... Francis v. Railroad, 110 Mo. 395; Flack v. Ry ... Co., 285 Mo. 49; Great Northern ... ends of the cars to couple or uncouple them unless compelled ... to do so by necessity." ...          See ... also Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Charleton, 247 F ...          If we ... read the Safety Appliance Act into the petition it must be ... held that the ... ...
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