Hampton v. Dillard Department Stores

• Decision Date: 24 April 2001
• Docket Number: 98-3261,98-3306,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,Nos. 98-3011,s. 98-3011
• Citation: 247 F.3d 1091
• Parties: (10th Cir. 2001) PAULA DARLENE HAMPTON, PLAINTIFF, DEMETRIA COOPER,, v. DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.,, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, AMICUS CURIAE. Paula Darlene Hampton, Plaintiff-Appellee, Demetria Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Amicus Curiae. Paula Darlene Hampton, Plaintiff-Appellee, Demetria Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., Defendant-Appellant,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1091

247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001)

PAULA DARLENE HAMPTON, PLAINTIFF, DEMETRIA COOPER, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DILLARD DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, AMICUS CURIAE.

Paula Darlene Hampton, Plaintiff-Appellee, Demetria Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Amicus Curiae.

Paula Darlene Hampton, Plaintiff-Appellee, Demetria Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., Defendant-Appellant,

Nos. 98-3011, 98-3261, 98-3306

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

April 24, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D.C. No. 97-CV-2182-KHV)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Arthur A. Benson II (Jamie Kathryn Lansford, Jane McQueeny, Gregg Lombardi, and Aften P. McKinney, with him on the briefs) of Arthur Benson & Associates, Kansas City, Missouri, for Cooper and Hampton.

Jack L. Whitacre and Elaine Drodge Koch of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne Llp, Kansas City, Missouri, for Dillard Department Stores.

Julie M. Williamson, Duncan R. Butts, Eric Fisher, Jonathan Goldberg and Ann C. Kiley of McKenna & Cuneo, L.L.P., Denver, Colorado, submitted a brief for Amicus Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law.

Before Henry, Anderson and Lucero, Circuit Judges.

Henry, Circuit Judge

Paula Darlene Hampton filed suit against Dillard Department Stores, Inc. (Dillard's), claiming that the company had unlawfully interfered with her right to make and enforce a contract in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. A jury awarded her compensatory and punitive damages based on its findings that (1) Ms. Hampton "was entitled to a free cologne sample as a benefit or privilege of her purchase on April 5, 1996," Aplt's App. vol. 1, at 147 (verdict form from phase one of trial); (2) Dillard's "intentionally interfered with [her] ability to receive a free cologne sample," id.; and (3) Ms. Hampton's "race was a motivating factor in [Dillard's] conduct on April 5, 1996." Id. at 160 (verdict form from phase two of trial). Dillard's thereafter filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied. Dillard's now appeals, raising various objections to the district court's denial of its motion.

We review the district court's denial of Dillard's motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, "applying the same legal standard as the district court." Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2000). A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law "only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support the opposing party's position." Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2000). It is important to note that, "[i]n reviewing the record, we will not weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate [only] if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a claim under the controlling law. We consider the evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom, in favor of the non-moving party." Brown, 227 F.3d at 1285 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, Dillard's has a high hurdle to overcome. The focus of Dillard's appeal is on three questions: (1) whether the fragrance coupon was in fact a benefit of Ms. Hampton's purchase; (2) whether there was indeed intentional interference with Ms. Hampton's redemption of the coupon; and (3) whether the interference was in the end based on racial discrimination. We agree with the district court that these are questions of fact, not law, see, e.g., Hampton v. Dillard's Dep't Stores, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1265 (D. Kan. 1998) (noting that the issue of discrimination is a question of fact), and the jury made explicit findings as to each. On appellate review, we cannot challenge the jury's findings of fact; instead, we may only ask whether there was a "legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [Ms. Hampton]" on each fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). Because there was such a basis, we must affirm the district court's order.

I. BACKGROUND

The following material facts are taken from the district court's orders below and from the trial transcript. These facts are undisputed, or where disputed, are taken, as we are required to take them, in the light most favorable to Ms. Hampton. We shall first briefly summarize the facts in this case, while we reserve a more detailed description of the evidence for later discussion of specific issues raised by the parties.

On April 5, 1996, Ms. Hampton and her niece, Demetria Cooper, both African-Americans, were shopping for an Easter outfit for Ms. Cooper's one-year-old son in the Dillard's children's department in Overland Park, Kansas. The plaintiffs had four children with them: Ms. Cooper's son, Ms. Hampton's eight-month-old and seven-year-old daughters, and her elder daughter's friend.

Shortly after they entered the store, Tom Wilson, a Dillard's security officer, noticed them. He observed them for more than fifteen minutes. Mr. Wilson testified that he paid close attention to the party, in part, because they had a stroller with them, because Ms. Cooper had a rolled-up dark cloth item in her hand, and because Ms. Cooper kept looking up at the ceiling and glancing around, as if to check to see if she was being watched. Because his suspicions were aroused, he asked fellow employee Pam Fitzgerel to continue the surveillance in a fitting room in the children's department, where the plaintiffs were trying clothing on Ms. Cooper's one-year-old son. At trial, Ms. Fitzgerel testified that Ms. Cooper was holding a rolled-up cloth item in the fitting room; that she later saw an item under Ms. Cooper's jacket; and that, believing the item to be store merchandise, she contacted Mr. Wilson and told him that she was positive that Ms. Cooper had put something under her coat.

The group left the fitting room and Ms. Hampton proceeded to purchase an outfit for Ms. Cooper's son from the salesclerk in the children's department. When she did so, the sales associate gave Ms. Hampton and Ms. Cooper each a coupon that was redeemable at the fragrance counter for cologne samples. The shopping group then proceeded on to the fragrance counter, which is located where the Dillard's store ends and opens into the Oak Park Mall, to redeem their fragrance coupons.

While the women were in the process of redeeming their coupons and while the women were in a conversation with fragrance consultant Betty Chouteau, Mr. Wilson interrupted them. Referring to Ms. Cooper, he advised Ms. Hampton that "the... black female had been observed placing something in her coat." Aple's Supp. App. at 121 (Dillard's Security Report, dated Apr. 5, 1996). He asked to look inside the Dillard's bag carried by Ms. Hampton, took the bag, and emptied the contents on the fragrance counter. Mr. Wilson checked the items against the receipt and determined that they corresponded. Ms. Chouteau testified that she perceived it to be "a rather embarrassing situation" for the women and, upon Mr. Wilson's intervention, she "turned and started talking to other people." Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 624 (testimony of Ms. Chouteau).

While Mr. Wilson was matching up items to the receipt, Ms. Hampton became visibly upset and told Mr. Wilson that, as a regular customer of Dillard's, she did not appreciate being accused of shoplifting and she did not deserve to be treated this way. Mr. Wilson told her to calm down or he would call the Overland Park police and have her removed from the store. Ms. Hampton asked Mr. Wilson his name and the location of the customer service counter. She then proceeded to the customer service counter and had no more contact with Mr. Wilson. The encounter with Mr. Wilson lasted approximately five minutes. Ms. Hampton and Ms. Cooper subsequently filed suit against Dillard's, alleging false imprisonment under Kansas law and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

A. Procedural History

Ms. Hampton and Ms. Cooper based their state tort claims on their detention by Mr. Wilson. They based their § 1981 claims on the observation and detention by Mr. Wilson and on the store's disparate security practices of "arresting or detaining African-American shoppers at a significantly greater rate than it arrests or detains white shoppers." Aplt's App. vol. 1, at 5 (complaint). They alleged that their "detention was a part of this pattern or practice." Id.

Following the close of discovery, Dillard's moved for summary judgment on both claims. The district court granted Dillard's summary judgment on the state tort claims and on most of the § 1981 claims. The only § 1981 claim that the district court allowed to proceed to trial was the claim that Dillard's interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to redeem the perfume sample.

The district court noted, however, that whether Ms. Cooper's coupon claim was actionable remained in doubt, as the coupon was not received by Ms. Cooper as the result of a purchase but as a benefit of Ms. Hampton's purchase. The court ordered Ms. Cooper to show cause why her claims should survive in the absence of any purchase made by her. The court subsequently rejected Ms. Cooper's contention that, as a third- party beneficiary of the sale to Ms. Hampton, her § 1981 claim should survive, and the court in turn dismissed Ms. Cooper's remaining claim on the day before trial.

Noting that our § 1981 jurisprudence requires that the action interfered with must be based on a contract, see Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (requiring actual loss of a contract interest for a § 1981 claim for interference with the...