Anderson v. Russell

Citation247 F.3d 125
Decision Date24 January 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-1430,No. 00-1406,00-1406,00-1430
Parties(4th Cir. 2001) MAJOR MAURICE ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID RUSSELL, Defendant-Appellee, and JOHN DOE, Officer; DAVID MITCHELL, Chief of Police; PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, a Municipal Corporation; EQUITY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; IPC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; DAVID PEARSON; FIRST PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendants. MAJOR MAURICE ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID RUSSELL, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE, Officer; DAVID MITCHELL, Chief of Police; PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, a Municipal Corporation; EQUITY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION; IPC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; DAVID PEARSON; FIRST PROPERTY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendants. Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.

(CA-93-363-DKC)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] COUNSEL: ARGUED: Douglas Alan Datt, GAVETT & DATT, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Heyward Creech, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rhoda S. Barish, GAVETT & DATT, P.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Sean D. Wallace, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Widener joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Major Maurice Anderson brought suit against Officer David Russell,1 claiming violations of 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 and various state laws arising from the alleged use of excessive force incident to Anderson's seizure. Following a jury verdict in favor of Anderson as to his S 1983 claim, the district court granted Russell's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Russell's qualified immunity defense, but it denied his motion with respect to the jury's finding of excessive force. We conclude that Officer Russell acted reasonably in using deadly force to protect himself against a perceived immediate and deadly threat posed by Anderson. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of judgment in favor of Russell, but on different reasoning than that of the district court.

I.
A.

Russell is a Prince George's County police officer. On December 28, 1991, Russell was providing part time security services at Prince George's Plaza mall, along with Officer David Pearson.2

Anderson arrived at the mall at approximately 4:30 in the evening. He had been drinking wine during the day and purchased another bottle of wine at a store in the mall, which he drank while walking around the mall.3 Anderson was wearing a black jacket, which was open. Underneath, he wore three shirts and a sweater. Inside of the shirts, Anderson had tucked a shoe polish container inside an eyeglasses case on his left side by his belt. Anderson also was carrying a portable Walkman radio in his back pocket and was listening to the radio with earphones, which were covered by a hat.

Russell testified that at approximately 6:00 p.m., a mall patron approached Russell and informed him that a man appeared to have a gun under his sweater, pointing to Anderson. Russell spent the next twenty minutes observing Anderson and saw a bulge under Anderson's clothing on his left side near his waist band that Russell believed to be consistent with a handgun, corroborating the citizen's report.

Russell decided to confront Anderson to attempt to discern whether Anderson was armed and, if so, what his intentions were. When Anderson exited the mall, Russell and Pearson followed him.4 Russell and Pearson approached Anderson with their guns drawn and instructed him to raise his hands and get down on his knees. While Anderson initially complied with the order to raise his hands, he later lowered them, without explanation to the officers, in an attempt to reach into his back left pocket to turn off his Walkman radio. Believing Anderson was reaching for the reported weapon, Russell shot Anderson three times. Anderson sustained permanent injuries to his left arm, left thigh, left tibia, and left fibula as a result of the shooting. A later search of Anderson's person and his belongings revealed the presence of the radio and that he was unarmed.

B.

Anderson filed this case in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. After removal of the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the case was tried before a jury.

Russell moved at the close of Anderson's case and again at the conclusion of the presentation of all evidence for judgment as a matter of law as to all claims.5 The district court reserved ruling upon the motion and submitted the claims to the jury for consideration.

With respect to the S 1983 excessive force claim, the district court submitted to the jury the questions of whether Russell had used excessive force against Anderson and, if so, whether Russell was entitled to qualified immunity. The jury found in favor of Anderson on both questions.6

After return of the jury verdict, Russell renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the S 1983 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Russell argued that the district court erred by submitting the questions of excessive force and qualified immunity to the jury because both questions should have been resolved as matters of law. The district court granted Russell's Rule 50(b) motion as to the qualified immunity issue, but it denied the motion as to the excessive force issue. With respect to the excessive force issue, the district court stated, "the evidence is much, much too conflicting on whether, in fact, the circumstances presented as a matter of law made the use of force constitutional." (J.A. at 577.) With respect to the qualified immunity issue, however, the district court held that because Russell's use of force complied with his training, he was entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Anderson appeals the district court's qualified immunity ruling, while Russell appeals the district court's excessive force ruling. We hold that, as a matter of law, Russell's use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that the S 1983 excessive force claim should not have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Russell on Anderson's excessive force claim.7

II.
A.

We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1994). In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law contrary to the jury's findings, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and ask whether "there is substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's findings." Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433 (4th Cir. 1985).

Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force when making an arrest "should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The standard of review is an objective one. Id. at 397. The question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force. Id. A police officer may use deadly force when the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Moreover, "the `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. A reviewing court must make "allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving." Id. at 397. "The court's focus should be on the circumstances at the moment force was used and on the fact that officers on the beat are not often afforded the luxury of armchair reflection." Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

B.

Anderson argues that it was proper for the jury to resolve the issue of excessive force because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Russell had probable cause to believe that Anderson posed a serious threat to Russell. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 150 S.Ct. 1694 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Given the uncontroverted evidence as to what Russell perceived immediately before firing, we do not believe that there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a rational jury to find for Anderson on the issue of excessive force. Accordingly, we hold that Russell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the excessive force claim.

We first note that the evidence conclusively establishes that Russell reasonably perceived Anderson to be armed with a gun. Russell testified that he believed Anderson to be armed based upon a citizen's report that was later corroborated by Russell's own observation of a bulge near Anderson's waistband.8 No evidence was introduced that refuted Russell's testimony regarding the citizen's report or his perception of the bulge.9 Moreover, Anderson concedes that he was carrying an eyeglass case stuffed with shoe polish in the same area in which Russell testified to observing a bulge. Once Russell perceived a bulge consistent with the shape of a gun, he was justified in believing that Anderson was armed and dangerous. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) ("The bulge in the jacket permitted the officer to conclude that Mimms was armed and thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the...

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