Commonwealth v. Haywood

• Decision Date: 28 November 1923
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. HAYWOOD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

247 Mass. 16

141 N.E. 571

COMMONWEALTH

v.HAYWOOD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Nov. 28, 1923.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; F. W. Fosdick, Judge.

Gilman R. Haywood was convicted of incest, and brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.

1. Criminal law k409, 517(3)-Preliminary decision as to competency necessary for confessions, but not for admissions.

Where accused claims that a confession made by him was induced by promises or threats of the arresting officer, he has a right to have a preliminary decision by the judge as to its competency, before it is admitted in evidence for the consideration of the jury; but this right does not exist in case of mere incriminating admissions or declarations of subordinate or independent facts, which may tend, in connection with other facts and circumstances, to prove the defendant's guilt.

2. Criminal law k517(3)-Declarations as to illicit relations not confession and no preliminary hearing necessary.

Where indictment was for incest committed on November 20, 1920, and the time was limited by the commonwealth's bill of particulars to between the 10th and the 25th of November, and this specification was not amended, under G. L. c. 277, s 40, declarations of accused that he had illicit relations with the female before July, 1920, but not thereafter, were not a confession of guilt, and he was not entitled to have a preliminary decision by the judge as to their competency before admission in evidence, on his claim that they were induced by promises or threats.

3. Criminal law k369(8)-Plea of guilty of adultery admissible in prosecution for incest.

In a prosecution for incest, a plea of guilty before a committing magistrate on a charge of adultery with the same female was admissible.

4. Criminal law k517(3)-Plea of guilty of adultery not confession of guilt of incest, requiring preliminary hearing before admission.

A plea of guilty in police court to a complaint charging defendant with committing adultery was not a confession of guilt of incest with such female, so as to require a preliminary hearing before admitting it in evidence, since it covered only the subsidiary elements of carnal knowledge, and did not admit consanquinity.

C. B. Rugg, Asst. Dist. Atty., and E. G. Norman, both of Worcester, for the Commonwealth.

J. M. Hoy, of Boston, for defendant.

DE COURCY, J.

The defendant was convicted on an indictment alleging that he committed incest with his niece, Vina E. Smith, on November 20, 1920. In response to a motion for a bill of particulars the commonwealth had specified the date of the commission of the crime as ‘between the 10th and 25th of November, 1920, and probably on the 20th of November, 1920.’

1. The first exception was to the admission in evidence of certain incriminating statements made by the defendant to one Godley, chief of police. Counsel requested the court to hold a preliminary hearing in the absence of the jury, to determine whether the alleged statements were voluntary, and offered to produce evidence at such hearing that they were induced by promises or threats. The court ruled that the statements were admissions, as distinguished from confessions, and admissible without any preliminary hearing. They were made on July 18, 1921, before the defendant was arrested, and although he inferentially admitted therein that he had intercourse with Vina, he insisted, ‘I had nothing to do with her until about four months after her arriving at my house;’ and ‘it is nearly a year since I had anything to do with her.’

[1] Where the accused claims that a confession made by him was induced by promises or threats of the arresting officer, he has a right to have a preliminary decision by the judge as to its competency before it is admitted in evidence for the consideration of the jury. Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 Mass. 464. This right, however, exists only with reference to a confession, as that word is accurately used in the criminal law; that is, to an acknowledgment by the accused in express words of the truth of the guilty fact charged. It does not exist in case of mere incriminating admissions or declarations of subordinate or independent facts, which may tend in connection with other facts and circumstances to prove the defendant's guilt, but do not constitute an acknowledgment that he is guilty of the precise crime with which he is charged.

‘The distinction between a confession and an admission, as applied in criminal law, is not a technical refinement, but is based upon the substantive differences of the character of the evidence educed from each. A confession is a direct acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused, and by the very force of the definition excludes an admission, which, of itself, as applied in criminal law, is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt, but of itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction.’ Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th Ed.) § 678a.

See, also, Underhill's Criminal Evidence (3d Ed.) § 215. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 243 Mass. 519, 137 N. E. 879;Daniels v. State, 57 Fla. 1, 48 South. 747;Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S. E. 21;People v. Stapleton, 300 Ill. 471, 133 N. E. 224;State v. Cook, 188 Iowa, 655, 176 N. W. 674;Pringle v. State, 108 Miss. 802, 67 South. 455;State v. Lindsey, 26 N. M. 526,194 Pac. 877;State v. Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 Pac. 964.

[2] The declarations in question were not a confession of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, but, on the contrary, were a denial, being assertions that he had nothing to do with Vina E. Smith since July, 1920. The indictment was for incest, committed on November 20, 1920. The time was limited by the commonwealth's bill of particulars...