Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin

• Decision Date: 10 January 1928
• Citation: 159 N.E. 863,247 N.Y. 65
• Parties: INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT CO. v. LAVIN et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

247 N.Y. 65

159 N.E. 863

INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT CO.

v.LAVIN et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 10, 1928.

Action by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company against Edward P. Lavin, individually and as president of the Consolidated Railroad Workers' Union of Greater New York, and others. From an order of the Appellate Division (220 App. Div. 830, 222 N. Y. S. 825), affirming an order of the Special Term granting plaintiff's motion for an injunction pendente lite, defendants appeal.

Order reversed, and motion remitted to Special Term.

See, also, 221 App. Div. 794, 223 N. Y. S. 876.Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Robert F. Wagner, and Joseph Force Carter, and Simon H. Rifkind, all of New York City, for appellants.

James L. Quackenbush, Louis S. Carpenter and Albert J. Kenyon, all of New York City, for respondent.

LEHMAN, J.

The plaintiff is a public service corporation. It operates a system of rapid transit railroads in the city of New York consisting of approximately 138 miles of elevated railroad and 244 miles of subway railroad. It is said that it transports over 3,000,000 passengers daily on approximately 9,000 trains. It is evident that the general public of the city of New York is interested in the safe, efficient, and unbroken operation of this great instrument for the transportations of passengers.

In 1916 there was a general strike of the employees operating the subway and elevated lines of the plaintiff. After the strike was ended a voluntary unincorporated association was formed under the name of the ‘Brotherhood of Interborough Rapid Transit Company Employees.’ Substantially the whole body of employees of the plaintiff joined the brotherhood. The members of the vote of the members of the general committee was submitted to and approved by the board of directors of the plaintiff at a meeting held on August 30, 1916. Thereafter the brotherhood prepared a new constitution, which was submitted to and approved by the board of directors of the plaintiff at a meeting held on April 6, 1920. That constitution is now in full force and effect. By its terms the constitution may be amended by a two-thirds voet of the members of the general committee at a regular meeting, provided that certain preliminary formalities have been complied with.

The constitution provides (section 9):

‘The general committee shall be vested with the power at all times to promote the welfare of the members of the brotherhood and of the company by amicable adjustment of all questions as to wages and working conditions that may arise from time to time. Section 10. The decision of the general committee in all controversies between the brotherhood and the company shall be final.’

On June 30th the secretary of the brotherhood sent to Mr. Frank Hedley, the plaintiff's president and general manager, a letter:

‘I am instructed by the general committee to confirm in writing the understanding arrived at at the conference held at our office, Wednesday, June 30th, at which conference it was agreed by the committee on behalf of our members, to allow wages and working conditions to remain ‘as is' for one year beginning July 1, 1926.’

Mr. Hedley acknowledged this communication in a letter dated the same day, stating:

‘I am in receipt of your letter of June 30, 1926, confirming by direction of the general committee, the understanding reached at a conference held at this office on Wednesday, June 30, 1926, to the effect that wages and working conditions would remain as then existing for one year, beginning July 1, 1926. This will confirm such understanding on the part of the management of the company.’

At that time the defendants Lavin, Bark, Phelan, and Walsh were employees of the plaintiff and members of the general committee of the brotherhood. Under the constitution of the brotherhood the employees of the plaintiff company were grouped according to the nature of their work and the place the work was performed. Each group constituted a local of the brotherhood. On July 1, 1926, at the instigation of the defendants Lavin, bark, and Phelan, a meeting of the members of Local No. 7 of the transportation department, consisting of motormen and switchmen employed in the subway division of plaintiff's railroad system, was held. By a vote of 579 against 7 the members rejected a proposal that the wages and working conditions of the plaintiff's employees should remain unchanged. The defendants Lavin, Bank, and Phelan, made speeches at that meeting urging that those present should withdraw from the brotherhood and should form a new organization called by these defendants the Consolidated Railroad Workers' Union of Greater New York. On the following day the defendants Lavin, Bark, and Phelan, purporting to represent the men present at the meeting, delivered to Hedley, plaintiff's president and general manager, a written communication containing a demand for recognition of the Consolidated Railroad Workers of Greater New York and for a wage increase to $1 per hour for motormen and 75 cents per hour for switchmen. It concluded with the words:

‘In the event that the above is not agreed to by you representing the I. R. T. Company by six (6) p. m. Saturday July 3, 1926, these men will cease work at 12.01 a. m. on Tuesday, July 6th, 1926.’

On July 6th a strike on plaintiff's railroad lines, induced by Lavin, Bark, and Phelan, began and lasted till July 30, 1926, causing a large financial loss to the plaintiff. The four individual defendants were leaders in the strike. After the strike was ended they were not employed by the defendant. By various means they have urged and are urging employees of the plaintiff corporation to become members of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America. They are trying to induce these employees to believe that they will be able to secure better pay and conditions of employment through demands made on their behalf by the Amalgamated Association than under the present system of bargaining by the brotherhood.

The plaintiff has brought this action to secure an injunction which would in effect prohibit the defendants from inducing the plaintiff's employees by lawful or unlawful means from leaving the plaintiff's employ. The complaint also asks damages for past acts. Upon motion by the plaintiff an injunction in broadest terms has been granted pendente lite. Leave to appeal has been granted by the Appellate Division and the question certified:

‘Do the facts pleaded and the facts stated in the moving papers, and the public interest, justify, in the exercise of judicial discretion, an injunction pendente lite as prayed for or any part thereof?’

Some of the ‘facts pleaded and the facts stated in the moving papers' are denied by defendants. Upon a motion for an injunction pendente lite, a substantial denial of a material allegation in the moving papers may become a decisive factor in the exercise of judicial discretion. In view, however, of the form of the question certified, we shall disregard all denials, at least until we have determined whether the allegations contained in the moving papers are in law sufficient to sustain the injunction.

Where there is proof of threatened wrong which the courts have power to enjoin, there may be room for the exercise of a sound judicial discretion in the determination of whether that power should de exercised. If the moving papers show that the defendants have done and are threatening to do acts which constitute a wrongful interference with, and disturbance of the relations existing between the plaintiff and its employees, doubtless the public interest in the safe, efficient and uninterrupted operation of the plaintiff's railway system might be a consideration of some weight in determining whether an injunction should issue. In the recent case of Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130, we have pointed out that the basis of permissible action by the court in labor disputes, as in other situations, is the probability of threatened and unjustified interference with rights of the plaintiff. That basis must be shown even where the public has an interest in the outcome.

The relations of the plaintiff and its employees are based on consent. Each has freedom of contract. The plaintiff has not entered into any contracts with the individual workers which binds the plaintiff to employ them for any definite period. The employees are not bound to continue in the plaintiff's employ longer than they desire. Employment is terminable at the will of either party at a moment's notice. We speak now only of those relations which according to the allegations of the moving papers existed at the time the injunction was granted. We do not pass upon the effect of new arrangements which, the plaintiff's brief suggests, have been made since that time. Possibly they might present other questions than those which may be raised upon the present record.

The oreration of the plaintiff's railway requires a great organization. The affidavits show that it employs about fourteen thousand men. Some of these employees require peculiar skill and training. If they leave the plaintiff's employ it may be difficult for the plaintiff to replace them. If the workers leave simultaneously in large numbers, doubtless this difficulty in finding others to fill their places would interfere, at least for a time, with the operation of plaintiff's railways and cause the plaintiff great loss.

[5] The plaintiff may doubtless determine for itself the conditions of employment upon its railways which will in its opinion best assure its own interests and the interests of the public, provided it can induce sufficient workers to accept these conditions. It may refuse to employ workers who will not accept a condition or make an agreement that they will not join a particular union or combination of workers while in the plaintiff's employ....