Clark v. Pearson, Civ. A. No. 710-62.

Decision Date20 December 1965
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 710-62.
PartiesCharles Patrick CLARK, Plaintiff, v. Drew PEARSON and the Washington Post Company, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Warren E. Magee, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

John Donovan, Washington, D. C., for defendant Drew Pearson.

James H. McGlothlin and Michael S. Horne, Washington, D. C., for defendant The Washington Post Co.

Holtzoff, District Judge.

This action for libel is before the Court on the defendants' motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiff, Charles Patrick Clark, is a lawyer in active practice in Washington, D. C. One of his clients is the Government of Spain, from which he has been in receipt of a large annual retainer. Another client is a group of companies producing natural gas, whom the plaintiff represents in connection with legislative matters. The defendant, Drew Pearson, is a newspaper man, popularly known as a "columnist", who periodically writes articles or "columns" that appear under his own name in numerous newspapers throughout the United States. The defendant, The Washington Post Company, publishes a daily morning newspaper in Washington, D. C., called "The Washington Post".

This action is brought to recover damages for libel claimed to have been contained in a column written by the defendant Pearson and published in The Washington Post on December 1, 1961. In substance the article, after mentioning the plaintiff's profession and his clients, states that in 1949 the plaintiff and a member of the House of Representatives, whose name is given, became very friendly; that at about that time this Congressman reversed the position that he had taken previously in opposition to the "natural gas lobby"; that the Congressman became a champion of Franco and "littered" the Congressional Record with statements favorable to Spain; that he began to receive a series of checks from the plaintiff, which were listed as payments for legal advice in connection with a specific tax matter named in the article. The dates and the amounts of the checks are enumerated. It proceeds to state that the Congressman and the plaintiff were "quizzed" by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that thereafter the Congressman wrote to the plaintiff that his, the Congressman's, law firm was withdrawing from activity in the tax case.

It is claimed in behalf of the plaintiff that this article, in effect, charges him with having committed violations of the criminal law in endeavoring to influence the votes of a Member of Congress by paying him money. On the other hand, counsel for the defendants contend that no such charge is to be implied from the article and that the publication merely suggests at most an impropriety on the part of the Congressman and an activity of the plaintiff, which placed the Congressman in an indiscreet position.

The case was ably and comprehensively presented by counsel for all three parties. The arguments took a wide range and not only comprised a thorough discussion of the issues of fact and law actually involved in this litigation, but included also a plea for drastic changes in the law of libel, in a manner that would radically devitalize and impair the protection that it affords against defamatory publications. In view of this circumstance, it seems appropriate to make a few observations on the basic status of the law of libel in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

The common law sedulously guarantees to every individual various civil rights, such as the right of personal freedom, the right of personal safety, and the right of property. Another civil right safeguarded by the common law is the right to one's reputation. Although it is more intangible and more imponderable than the others, it is equally fundamental and vital, and its protection is equally efficacious and vigorous.

"The purest treasure mortal times afford
Is spotless reputation: that away, Men are but gilded loam or painted clay."1

The current trend in the law is to enhance and augment the protection of individual civil rights. No reason appears for making an exception as to the right to reputation. In fact the law of libel has been fortified by the recent development of the correlative right of privacy, Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., D.C., 78 F.Supp. 305. The high regard accorded to the law of defamation is illustrated by the fact that in England, while trial by jury in civil cases has been largely abrogated since World War II, it is still preserved in its pristine vigor in connection with actions for libel or slander. The explanation given for this distinction is that most civil actions relate only to money, while actions for libel or slander involve honor and reputation, which are to be considered on a higher level.

Nevertheless, no one is accorded the privilege of maintaining a reputation to which he is not entitled. No one is granted a legal right to sail under false colors without molestation. Consequently the law does not afford any protection against the disclosure of truth, no matter how unpalatable or disagreeable it may be; no matter how unnecessary its revelation; and no matter what the motive or purpose of the disclosure may be. Truth of a defamatory statement is always a complete defense to any action for libel or slander.

In this case the defendants interpose four defenses, each of which will be considered separately. The first defense is truth. Counsel for the defendant Pearson discussed separately and in detail each factual item contained in the article and convincingly demonstrated by reference to depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, that each individual statement was true and accurate. This approach, however, is inadequate. An accused publication must be read as a whole. Its content must be considered in its entirety and weighed in connection with its structure, nuances, implications and connotations. Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 293, 39 S.Ct. 448, 63 L.Ed. 987. The proof of truth must be as broad as the alleged defamatory statement. It is not sufficient to take every sentence separately and demonstrate its individual accuracy, detached and wrenched out of its context.

The meaning of the article must first be determined, that is whether it charges violations of the criminal law, as claimed by the plaintiff, or whether it has a more innocent significance as contended by the defendants. If the former construction is to be attached to the publication, then proof of truth must comprehend a showing of criminality. While in a civil suit for libel, the truth of a charge of a crime need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, as in a criminal prosecution, it must, nevertheless, be shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In that event the proof adduced by counsel for the defendant Pearson at this hearing would not be broad enough to constitute a complete justification. If the more innocent interpretation is to be placed on the article, the proof of truth may be sufficient. It follows hence that the first step to be taken is to determine what the article means. The Court is of the opinion that it is susceptible of either one of the two meanings attributed to it by the parties.

If an accused publication is unambiguous, its construction is a question of law for the Court. If, however, it is capable of two or more meanings, then the issue must be determined by the jury. It becomes the function of the jury to decide what the publication would mean to the ordinary man in the street, i. e., the average reader. In the case at bar this question, for the reasons stated, must be left to the jury, Washington Post Company v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 293, 39 S.Ct. 448. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Vaughan, 107 U.S. App.D.C. 343, 346, 278 F.2d 23, 26, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit said:

"Where the meaning of the words of the publication is in dispute, an issue of fact arises and must be determined by the jury."

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held to the same effect in Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 663.

The instant case is distinguishable in principle from Dall v. Pearson, D.C., 246 F.Supp. 812, in which this Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In the Dall case the publication was unambiguous and the data submitted in support of the defense of truth completely demonstrated its accuracy.

The second defense adduced by the defendants is that the plaintiff consented to the publication. The basis for this contention is that the plaintiff extended to the defendant Pearson, or his representative, an opportunity to inspect his records, including cancelled checks and other documents, and that the factual data contained in the accused article were in fact obtained from the defendant's own file. At this stage of the litigation, the defense of consent has not been sufficiently made out. If the article should be construed by the jury as charging criminality, there was obviously no consent to its publication.

The third defense is a rather intriguing contention that the law of libel should be modified so as to grant immunity for publications of the type involved in this case, and to abrogate and destroy a large portion of the protection now accorded to persons who have been unjustly defamed. The starting point of this argument is found in two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In the light of counsel's plea, they require detailed analysis. In undertaking it, we must resist a common temptation to read a judicial opinion as though it were a chapter in a treatise, and as though the text of the opinion expounded the law. We must adhere to the analytical process by which the common law grew from precedent to precedent. A judicial decision must be studied in connection with the salient facts on which it turned and must be limited to them. A rule of law that the case enunciates or applies must then be distilled by this method. While...

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10 cases
  • Curtis Publishing Co v. Butts Associated Press v. Walker
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1967
    ...officials or whether it has a longer reach. Compare, e.g., Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alaska), with Clark v. Pearson, D.C., 248 F.Supp. 188.1 The resolution of the uncertainty in this area of libel actions requires, at bottom, some further exploration and clarificati......
  • Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and Cable, Civ. A. No. 83-0944.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • February 28, 1985
    ...demonstrate its individual accuracy, detached and wrenched out of context.'" Id. at 493, 448 A.2d at 15-16 (quoting Clark v. Pearson, 248 F.Supp. 188, 191 (D.D.C.1965)). I have already determined that the broadcast can reasonably be construed as implying that Officer Coughlin was involved i......
  • Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Company
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 21, 1966
    ...(Tex.Civ.App.1965), an opinion with no citation of New York Times. Negative implications also appear to be present in Clark v. Pearson, 248 F.Supp. 188, 195 (D.D.C.1965), and in Harper v. National Review, Inc., 33 L.W. 2341 (N.Y.Sup.1964), aff'd 263 N. Y.S.2d 292 (App.Div.1965). There are, ......
  • Dunlap v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    • July 2, 1982
    ...... and wrenched out of context." Clark v. Pearson, . 248 F.Supp. 188, 191 (D.D.C.1965). . . -III-. . . ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Protecting Free Speech in a Post-Sullivan World.
    • United States
    • Federal Communications Law Journal Vol. 75 No. 1, January 2023
    • January 1, 2023
    ...(134.) Id. at 134. (135.) Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964)). (136.) Id. (citing Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 194 (D.D.C. 1965) (stating that Sullivan only applied to "officials in the high echelons")). See id. at 134 n.1 for the Court's list of lo......

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