State v. Crampton, 68-533

Decision Date11 June 1969
Docket NumberNo. 68-533,68-533
Citation18 Ohio St.2d 182,248 N.E.2d 614
Parties, 47 O.O.2d 394 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. CRAMPTON, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A person accused of murder in the first degree is not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial where veniremen are excused for cause from serving as jurors because their opinions preclude them from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death. (Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776; Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433; and State v. Pruett, 18 Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605, followed.)

2. It is not error to sustain an objection to a hypothetical question calling for an answer based upon an improper test for legal insanity. (State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St.2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293, approved and followed.)

3. An accused is not deprived of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination by a procedure under which the jury, which determines an accused to be guilty of first degree murder, is authorized to determine whether mercy should be recommended so that the penalty should not be death.

4. The punishment of death for the crime of murder in the first degree where the jury does not recommend mercy, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

5. The punishment of death for first degree murder, where the jury does not recommend mercy, does not deprive a person of due process or equal protection of the laws.

Defendant was indicted for first degree murder in the killing of his wife on January 17, 1967. After pleading not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, he was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree and did not recommend mercy. After defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled, the court sentenced defendant to death in the electric chair.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The cause is before this court upon appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Harry Friberg, Pros. Atty., Melvin L. Resnick and Alice L. Robie, Toledo, for appellee.

John J. Callahan and Gerald S. Lubitsky, Toledo, for appellant.

TAFT, Chief Justice.

Defendant's first contention is that a person accused of murder in the first degree is denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when veniremen are excused for cause from serving as jurors because their opinions preclude them from finding the accused guilty of an offense punishable with death.

Our decision in State v. Pruett (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 167, 248 N.E.2d 605 and the reasons stated in the opinions in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 433; Boulden v. Holman (1969), 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 and State v. Pruett, supra, require us to reject this contention. *

Defendant further complains about the charge of the court with respect to insanity.

It may be noted that the state also objected to this charge. Apparently, this charge on insanity was substantially the same as the charge given on that subject in State v. Keaton (1967), 9 Ohio App.2d 139, 223 N.E.2d 631, with the addition at the end thereof of the substance of what is stated in paragraph fifteen of the syllabus of State v. Frohner (1948), 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.E.2d 868, and in paragraph four of the syllabus of State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E.2d 439, both of which syllabi paragraphs were followed in paragraph one of the syllabus of State v. Staten (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293. As the opinion in the Keaton case recognized, and as we recognized in footnote 5 of State v. Staten, supra, the charge in the Keaton case was too favorable to the accused. In our opinion, therefore, the defendant in the instant case could not have been prejudiced by the charge given on insanity.

Defendant also complains because the court sustained objections to certain hypothetical questions propounded to a Doctor Neverauskas.

On November 4, 1966 this doctor had been assigned as staff physician for defendant, who had been previously admitted because of his drug addiction to Toledo State Hospital on an order of detention of the Probate Court of Lucas County.

This doctor testified as to his examination of defendant, his admitting diagnosis and the treatment prescribed for defendant at the hospital.

Defendant's counsel propounded to this doctor a hypothetical question with respect to defendant, premised upon evidence theretofore presented, and then asked the doctor's opinion as to whether or not the mind of the defendant was 'deranged or diseased to such an extent that the alleged criminal act was the product of defendant's deranged or diseased mind.'

Two of the grounds for objection to this question were (1) that the witness had not been qualified as an expert and (2) that the question was not based upon the proper test for determining legal insanity.

It may reasonably be inferred from the record that the trial court sustained the objection on the first ground.

It is not necessary for us to consider whether the objection was properly sustained on that ground. Even if we assume that the witness had been properly qualified as an expert, it is obvious that the question and the proffered affirmative answer are based upon the so-called Durham test for legal insanity. (See Durham v. United States (1954), 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430, which test was rejected by this court in State v. Staten, supra (18 Ohio St.2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293). Hence, there was no error in sustaining the objection to that question.

Thereafter, other hypothetical questions were asked of Doctor Neverauskas, and his answers were proffered. We disregard the fact that the proffered answers were not responsive to the questions. To the extent that those answers might support defendant's insanity defense under the law of this state, those answers were to the effect that, because of defendant's excessive use of drugs (i. e., amphetomines), defendant was unable to restrain himself from doing what he knew he was doing and from what he knew was wrong.

However, this doctor had already testified that, if this defendant (who had been his patient) excessively used such drugs, he would be unable to so restrain himself.

Hence, we are of the opinion that defendant was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial court to permit Doctor Neverauskas to answer those hypothetical questions.

This conclusion is fortified by the fact that another expert called by defendant testified as Doctor Neverauskas would have testified in answer to those hypothetical questions.

Thus, we conclude that, where an expert witness has testified that excessive use of certain drugs would prevent an accused who had recently been his patient from restraining himself from doing a criminal act, it is not prejudicial error to sustain an objection to a hypothetical question calling for the opinion of the same witness as to whether such use would prevent the accused from restraining himself from doing that same act.

Defendant next contends that Section 2901.01, Revised Code, providing that anyone...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Gautha v. California Crampton v. Ohio
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1971
    ... 402 U.S. 183 ... 91 S.Ct. 1454 ... 28 L.Ed.2d 711 ... Dennis Councle McGAUTHA, Petitioner, ... State of CALIFORNIA. James Edward CRAMPTON, Petitioner, v. State of OHIO ... Nos. 203, 204 ... Argued Nov. 9, 1970 ... Decided May 3, 1971 ... ...
  • State v. Mercer
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 11, 1981
  • McGautha v. California
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1971
    ...sentence upon him, and the court imposed the death sentence.7 Crampton's appeals through the Ohio courts were unavailing. 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N. E. 2d 614 (1969).II Before proceeding to a consideration of the issues before us, it is important to recognize and underscore the nature of ou......
  • Brown v. Lash
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • September 30, 1970
    ...(1963), 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. 7 (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776. 8 State v. Crampton (1969), 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248 N.E.2d 614, cert. granted, 398 U.S. 936, 90 S.Ct. 1847, 26 L.Ed.2d 268; People v. McGautha (1969), 70 Cal.2d 770, 452 P.2d 650, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT