State v. Lucero
| Decision Date | 17 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 54375.,54375. |
| Parties | The STATE of Nevada, Appellant,v.Arthur Louis LUCERO, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Richard A. Gammick, District Attorney, and Gary H. Hatlestad, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Washoe County, for Appellant.Jennifer L. Lunt, Alternate Public Defender, and Mary Pat Barry, Deputy Alternate Public Defender, Washoe County, for Respondent.BEFORE DOUGLAS, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.
A conviction for level-three trafficking in a controlled substance results in a mandatory minimum prison term of 10 years pursuant to NRS 453.3385(3), unless the defendant renders substantial assistance to law enforcement pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2). Under the substantial-assistance exception, the district court has discretion to reduce or suspend the mandatory minimum sentence if it determines that the defendant rendered substantial assistance. In this appeal, we consider whether the district court has the authority to reduce the 10–year minimum sentence prescribed by NRS 453.3385 when revoking probation pursuant to NRS 176A.630 for a defendant who previously received a suspended sentence because he rendered substantial assistance. We conclude that the phrase “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute” in NRS 176A.630, which limits the extent to which a district court can reduce the term of imprisonment upon revocation of probation, is ambiguous when applied to NRS 453.3385 in cases where a defendant has rendered substantial assistance. Because the general rules of statutory construction do not resolve that ambiguity, we apply the rule of lenity and conclude that the district court had the authority to reduce the defendant's sentence after it revoked his probation.
In 2007, the State charged respondent Arthur Lucero with one count of level-three trafficking in a controlled substance, in violation of NRS 453.3385(3), and in January 2008, he pleaded guilty to that charge. The district court sentenced Lucero to life in prison with eligibility for parole after 10 years, but the court suspended his sentence, placing him on probation for up to 60 months pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2) because he provided “substantial assistance” to law enforcement.
Several months later, Lucero violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing pursuant to Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980), 1 the district court revoked his probation. Lucero's counsel requested a lesser sentence than the sentence originally imposed by the district court because of the prior finding of substantial assistance. After revoking his probation, the district court reduced Lucero's original sentence to 180 months with eligibility for parole after 24 months.
The State then filed a motion to correct the new sentence, which it asserted was an illegal sentence. The State argued that allowing parole eligibility in less than 10 years violated the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence found in NRS 453.3385(3). It also argued that NRS 453.3405(2), which allows a sentence reduction for “substantial assistance,” is limited to original sentences imposed by the district court, not subsequent probation revocation proceedings. Permitting such a sentence reduction at the time probation is being revoked, the State argued, would allow district courts to resentence probation violators on lesser charges than those of their original convictions. Lucero countered that the applicable sentencing statute contains an exception to the minimum sentencing requirements for defendants who provided substantial assistance to the State. Thus, he argued, the controlling sentencing statute at the time of probation revocation authorized the district court to reduce sentences below the statutory 10–year minimum.
The district court ultimately found that it had authority to reduce Lucero's sentence at the time of probation revocation pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2), and it denied the State's motion to correct the sentence. The State now appeals.
NRS 453.3385 prescribes the mandatory prison sentence for trafficking in certain controlled substances unless, under NRS 453.3405(2), the defendant has “rendered substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any offense.” In such event, the district court has discretion to “reduce or suspend” the mandatory prison sentence imposed for a drug trafficking violation. NRS 453.3405(2). The State and Lucero agree that the substantial-assistance provision applied at the time Lucero was originally sentenced, giving the district court the discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum by reducing or suspending his sentence. In its original sentence, the district court chose not to reduce the statutorily mandated minimum sentence for a level-three trafficking offense of 10 years, but instead imposed the minimum sentence and suspended it for 60 months.
When a defendant's probation is revoked, NRS 176A.630(5) precludes the court from sentencing him or her to prison for a term “less than the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute.” In this appeal, we must determine whether the “minimum term of imprisonment” after revocation of Lucero's level-three trafficking sentence includes consideration of substantial assistance rendered under NRS 453.3405(2). Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that the district court can consider substantial assistance rendered by a defendant in setting the minimum term of imprisonment after probation revocation.
Standard of review and statutory interpretation
Challenges to a district court's discretionary modification of a sentence after a probation revocation hearing are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Kirkpatrick v. State, 122 Nev. 846, 848, 137 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2006). However, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004). Whether the substantial-assistance provision of NRS 453.3405(2) applies after the district court revokes probation is a matter of statutory interpretation.
When interpreting a statute, legislative intent “is the controlling factor.” Robert E. v. Justice Court, 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983). The starting point for determining legislative intent is the statute's plain meaning; when a statute “is clear on its face, a court can not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.” Id.; see also Catanio, 120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.3d at 590 (). But when “the statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations,” the statute is ambiguous, and we may then look beyond the statute in determining legislative intent. Catanio, 120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.3d at 590. To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative history and construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with reason and public policy. Great Basin Water Network v. State Eng'r, 126 Nev. ––––, ––––, 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010); see also Moore v. State, 122 Nev. 27, 32, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006) (); Robert E., 99 Nev. at 445–48, 664 P.2d at 959–61 (). With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we turn first to the statutory language to determine whether NRS 176A.630(5) is plain or ambiguous. In doing so, we must examine its language in conjunction with that of NRS 453.3385 and 453.3405(2) when a district court revokes the probation of a drug trafficker who provided substantial assistance.
The “minimum term of imprisonment” referred to in NRS 176A.630(5) is ambiguous
Pursuant to NRS 176A.630(5), a district court may modify a defendant's sentence after it revokes probation, but “[t]he court shall not make the term of imprisonment less than the minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute.” The applicable penal statute for Lucero's trafficking offense is NRS 453.3385. NRS 453.3385 provides the statutory minimum penalty, unless otherwise authorized by “the provisions of NRS 453.011 to 453.552, inclusive.” NRS 453.3405(2) grants the district court the authority to “reduce or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of NRS 453.3385, 453.339 or 453.3395 if the court finds that the convicted person rendered substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of any offense.”
The State and Lucero agree on appeal, as they stipulated in the district court, that Lucero provided substantial assistance and was eligible for a reduced or suspended sentence pursuant to NRS 453.3405(2) when the district court originally sentenced him. Accordingly, the district court sentenced Lucero to life with parole eligibility after a minimum of 10 years, and chose to suspend his sentence, placing him on probation for up to 60 months.
The State contends that after probation is revoked pursuant to NRS 176A.630(5), the “minimum term of imprisonment prescribed by the applicable penal statute” does not include the substantial-assistance provision in NRS 453.3405(2) for two reasons. First, it argues that the “applicable penal statute” to which NRS 176A.630(5) refers is NRS 453.3385(3). This subsection provides the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for a level-three trafficking offense but does not refer to the substantial-assistance provision. Second, the State argues that the “or” between “reduce or suspend” in NRS 453.3405(2) (emphasis added) gives the district court one opportunity to impose a lenient sentence on a defendant who renders substantial assistance to the investigation or prosecution of other crimes. Thus, according to the State's interpretation...
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