Riggall v. Washington County Medical Society
Decision Date | 15 November 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 15804.,15804. |
Citation | 249 F.2d 266 |
Parties | Frank RIGGALL, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY; Stanley Applegate, Individually and as President of Washington County Medical Society; Fount Richardson; Friedman Sisco; Ruth Ellis Lesh; and Alfred Hathcock, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
James R. Hale, Fayetteville, Ark., for appellant.
Eugene R. Warren, Little Rock, Ark. (Rex W. Perkins, Fayetteville, Ark., and Bailey, Warren & Bullion, Little Rock, Ark., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and VOGEL and VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, a duly licensed physician and surgeon, brought this action against the defendants to recover treble damages for alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Title 15, U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 12 and 15. We shall refer to the parties as they were designated in the trial court.
Plaintiff was duly licensed as a physician and surgeon by the licensing authorities of the State of Arkansas in 1935 and at and since said time has been practicing his profession in Washington County, Arkansas. The defendant Washington County Medical Society is an unincorporated professional, economic organization and institution with at least thirty-six dues-paying or active members, and the other named defendants are members of the Washington County Medical Society and are also physicians and surgeons. Plaintiff in his complaint alleged that he was a citizen of Arkansas and that the defendants were also citizens of the State of Arkansas; that jurisdiction of the court was dependent upon provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Title 15, U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2, 12 and 15; that he had received various degrees from educational institutions and had thorough training and wide experience in the field of medicine and its practice; that while he was located at Prairie Grove, Arkansas, where he had practiced his profession since 1935, he received, accepted, treated and administered to patients from Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Texas and other states and that had he been a member of the Washington County Medical Society he would in the past have received, accepted, treated and administered to a great many more patients and would in the future receive, accept, treat and administer to a great many more patients than in the past, not only from Arkansas but from many other states; that he was qualified for membership in the society but that notwithstanding such qualifications he had applied for membership in due form on four different occasions; that his applications had been wrongfully, unlawfully, capriciously and arbitrarily rejected, no reason for such rejections being given therefor; that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by appeal to the Arkansas Medicial Society and the American Medical Association but was unable to secure any redress and would in the future be unable to secure any remedy for the injuries suffered by reason of the arbitrary rejection of his applications for membership in the Washington County Medical Society, that the Constitution and By-Laws of the Washington County Medical Society provided that "Every legally registered physician residing and practicing in Washington County who is of good moral and professional standing and who does not support or practice, or claim to practice, any exclusive system of medicine, shall be eligible for membership," and "The Society shall judge of the qualifications of its members, but as it is the only door to the state medical society and the American Medical Association, for physicians within its jurisdiction, every reputable and legally qualified physician of Washington County who does not support, or practice or claim to practice sectarian medicine, or who does not claim to have exclusive or special medicines not available to the general profession, and who adheres carefully to the principles of medical ethics, shall be eligible to membership," and that the Washington County Medical Society was a component member of the Arkansas Medical Society and held a charter from that society, that the Arkansas Medical Society was a constituent member of the American Medical Association; that the American Medical Association is the only medical association or society of national prominence, influence or importance in the United States and that membership in the American Medical Association is of great economic importance and benefit; that because of his denial of membership in the Washington County Medical Society he had been and was prevented from doing a number of enumerated things all of which would be of great economic benefit and importance to him as well as to his patients and the public and society in general, all of which substantially affected trade and commerce between the State of Arkansas and other states, territories and foreign countries, and that the defendants had combined, confederated, and conspired among themselves and with other persons in disregard of the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the Washington County Medical Society not to admit plaintiff to membership in said society and that defendants had stated publicly that they were not required to give plaintiff any reason for refusing or denying him membership. In his prayer he asked for $100,000 damages, that this amount be trebled pursuant to provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, that the defendants be enjoined and restrained from collusive or concerted action in respect to his application for membership, and that mandatory injunction issue commanding the defendant Washington County Medical Society to admit him to full membership. Other specific relief was also demanded.
Defendants filed answer denying that the court had jurisdiction of the cause of action or that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was applicable to the allegations of plaintiff's complaint.
On hearing the court determined that it was without jurisdiction and entered judgment dismissing the complaint.
On this appeal it is urged that the court erred in holding that it was without jurisdiction and that is the sole issue.
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, so far as here pertinent, read as follows:
Section 3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is confined in its operation to territories or the District of Columbia and has no bearing on the issues here presented.
We must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, but not conclusions. Section 1 of the Sherman Act was enacted by Congress pursuant to the commerce clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, vesting in Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. It is to be noted that the...
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