Robinson v. Prunty
| Decision Date | 17 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,CHIEF,No. 00-55922,HUERTA-GARCI,00-55922 |
| Citation | 249 F.3d 862 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2001) GEORGE H. ROBINSON,, v. KINGSTON W. PRUNTY, WARDEN, CALIPATRIA STATE PRISON, CALIFORNIA; SILVIADEPUTY WARDEN; A. TUTT, CAPTAIN; G.J. JANDA, CORRECTIONAL LIEUTENANT; D.L. FISH, CORRECTIONAL SERGEANT; M.E. ORTIZ, CORRECTIONAL SERGEANT; W. BRUMBAUGH, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; RUBEN R. ROSAS, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; ARMANDO F. VALENZUELA, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michelle A. Des Jardins, Deputy Attorney General, for the defendants-appellants.
George H. Robinson, Crescent City, California, pro se plaintiff-appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California M. James Lorenz, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-98-00676-MJL
Before: Harry Pregerson, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
Pro se prisoner George Robinson filed a 42 U.S.C.§§ 1983 suit against several prison officials and correctional officers (collectively, "the defendants") at the Calipatria State Prison in California, alleging that the operation of integrated exercise yards at Calipatria constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the defendants qualified immunity because there was a triable issue as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk that Robinson would be harmed when he was placed in an integrated yard. We have jurisdiction over the defendants' appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, and we affirm.
George Robinson, an African-American prisoner at the Calipatria State Prison in California, is housed in the Administrative Segregation Unit, a "prison within a prison" that is reserved for inmates who have violated prison rules. Since 1996, Calipatria has followed the California Department of Correction's ("CDC") policy of maintaining racially integrated prison yards. Robinson alleges that there are several race-based gangs at Calipatria. For example, Robinson alleges, the "Surenos" is a prison gang consisting of "foot soldiers for the Mexican Mafia." Robinson further alleges that most white inmates are members of white supremacy gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood or Skinheads. Robinson alleges that at Calipatria, the white gangs have formed an alliance with the Surenos, and that members of these gangs are violently opposed to African-American inmates and MexicanAmerican inmates from Northern California.
Robinson alleges that the Administrative Segregation Unit is viewed as "headquarters" by many prison gangs and that each gang has representatives in the Unit. He claims that he was housed in various Administrative Segregation Units prior to the implementation of the CDC's yard integration policy, and that during that time, the prison officials would not place a Sureno inmate in the exercise yard at the same time as an African-American inmate or a Mexican-American inmate from Northern California for fear that they would attack each other. Robinson also alleges that even though prison yards are no longer segregated by race or gang affiliation, individual prison cells are segregated because it is widely understood that members of different gangs or races would attempt to kill each other solely on the basis of gang membership or race.
Under the current integrated yard policy, Calipatria takes some precautions to prevent altercations between inmates. The district court found that before an inmate may attend the yard, prison officials review the inmate's file to determine whether the inmate has any specific enemies or previous confrontations with other inmates in the Administrative Segregation Unit. Inmates are not assigned to yard groups that contain known enemies, or other inmates with whom they have had previous conflicts. Inmates are divided into integrated yard groups of thirty people or fewer, and are processed in handcuffs into the yard, singly or in pairs. Inmates are searched and scanned with a metal detector when they enter and leave the yard.
This civil rights lawsuit arises from two alleged attacks on Robinson that occurred while he was in the exercise yard. The first attack occurred on May 13, 1996. Robinson claims that as soon as he entered the yard, he was attacked by a Mexican- American inmate, Martinez, who was already in the yard. Robinson alleges that the correctional officers on duty in the yard watched the fight for about five minutes without attempting to stop it. According to Robinson, after about five minutes, one guard ordered the inmates to get down on the ground. Robinson alleges that he was unable to get down on the ground because Martinez belongs to a gang that orders its members to continue fighting until the guards fire shots, so Robinson was forced to continue defending himself. A guard eventually fired wooden blocks at Robinson and Martinez, and another guard threw a grenade that released tear gas. Robinson suffered some injuries from the attack, and he was provided with medical care. Robinson alleges that the guards lied on the incident report by describing the fight as"mutual combat," instead of noting that Martinez attacked Robinson.
The second attack occurred on May 25, 1996. Robinson was the first inmate in the yard. He alleges that before Miranda, a Mexican-American inmate, was released into the yard with him, one guard joked, "Robinson, let the other guy get all the way on the yard before you fight him, you can't rush him at the gate." Another guard asked Robinson if tear gas would bother his asthma, and six other guards laughed at this comment. Robinson alleges that as soon as the guards released Miranda into the yard, Miranda attacked him. The guards fired wooden blocks, one of which struck Robinson in the leg. The guards also threw a tear gas grenade into the yard. Robinson alleges that the guards again falsified the incident report by describing the fight as "mutual combat" instead of noting that Miranda attacked him.
In 1998, Robinson filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 against the defendants alleging that they violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because they were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk that he would be seriously injured when he was placed in the prison yard with Mexican-American inmates. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants because Robinson did not introduce any evidence to support his opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendants, in contrast, presented evidence that they took steps to prevent violence in the yard.
On August 5, 1999, Robinson moved for reconsideration of the district court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants. Robinson attached to his motion videotapes depicting various confrontations between prisoners in the Administrative Segregation prison yard. Robinson attached a declaration explaining that he could not present the videotapes of the attacks against him because they had been destroyed. Robinson also attached numerous incident reports documenting physical confrontations between inmates of different races.
On the basis of this evidence, the district court held that Robinson raised a genuine issue of material fact"concerning whether [Robinson] was imprisoned under conditions posing a `substantial risk of serious harm' and whether prison officials both knew of and disregarded an `excessive risk to [his] health or safety.' " (Quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994)). Accordingly, the district court granted Robinson's motion to reconsider the court's grant of summary judgment, and entered an order permitting Robinson to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claim. The district court's order stated that it would not revisit the issue whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, but that they could renew their motion for summary judgment on this ground at a later time.
The case was then transferred to another judge. The defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because there was a genuine issue of fact whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to Robinson's safety when he was placed in the exercise yard. The district court reasoned that if the defendants were, in fact, deliberately indifferent to this risk, then they could not possibly have believed that they were acting lawfully. If the defendants could not have believed that they were acting lawfully, the district court reasoned, then they are not entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants appeal.
We review de novo the district court's...
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