State v. Nolton
| Decision Date | 16 July 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 68-331,68-331 |
| Citation | 249 N.E.2d 797,19 Ohio St.2d 133 |
| Parties | , 48 O.O.2d 119 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. NOLTON, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
If in a criminal case the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such that if accepted by the trier of the facts it would constitute a complete defense to all substantive elements of the crime charged, the trier will not be permitted to consider a lesser included offense.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of shooting to wound, as defined by Section 2901.23, Revised Code. 1 The trial court refused defendant's request that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offenses of assault with a dangerous weapon 2 and assault and battery. 3
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as his sole error failure of the trial court to charge the jury as requested. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial. The state prosecuted an appeal in this court.
C. Howard Johnson, Pros. Atty., and Marvin S. Romanoff, Columbus, for appellant.
Henry Clay Scott, Columbus, for appellee.
Under our schema of criminal procedure, every accused enjoys the unqualified right to have the prosecution prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Failing this, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. However, the statutory right (Section 2945.74, Revised Code 4) to have the trier of the facts consider and return a verdict of conviction upon lesser degrees of the crime or lesser included offenses, in lieu of conviction of the principal offense, is subject to the underlying principal that the trier shall not be confronted with the option to reach an unreasonable conclusion. Thus, it has been said that the defendant's 'liberty should not be dickered away by a compromised verdict upon another crime.' State v. Loudermill, 2 Ohio St.2d 79, 81, 206 N.E.2d 198, 200. In turn, the state has an equal interest in guarding against speculative verdicts.
It has also been reiterated down through the cases that where the evidence would support a lesser included offense the jury shall be charged upon and be permitted to return a verdict upon that offense.
This is, perhaps, an unfortunate formula and the source of continuing confusion. For it is obvious that proof which will support a conviction for the principal offense will invariably support a conviction on the lesser. The instant case appears to be a uniquely suitable vehicle to announce a more utilitarian rule.
The crime charged here is shooting with intent to wound. The state proved venue, which was not questioned, and offered evidence sufficient, if believed, to support beyond a reasonable doubt each additional, substantive element of the offense: Shooting, intent and malice. The defendant admitted the act of shooting and that the victim's wounded knee resulted therefrom, but claimed justification by reason of self-defense. He adduced proof, conflicting with that of the state, but sufficient, if believed, to support that defense. Hence, the jury was faced with the task of accepting the evidence of the state or that of the defendant. If it rejected the latter, it could not, of course, be compelled as a matter of law to accept the former. It might refuse to accept part of that also and acquit.
But if, indeed, the jury rejected the claim of self-defense, it would be wholly unrealistic to permit it to conclude that the defendant shot at and wounded his victim without intending so to wound him and was answerable only for a lesser crime.
The formulation of a new rule, therefore, is necessary:
If the evidence adduced on behalf of the defense is such that if accepted by the trier it would constitute a complete defense to all substantive elements of the crime charged, the trier will not be permitted to consider a lesser included offense for the reason that an unreasonable compromise would be invited on the state's evidence.
On the contrary, if the trier could reasonably find against the state and for the accused upon one or more of the elements of the...
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State v. Jenkins
...to be presented with compromise offenses which could not possibly be sustained by the adduced facts." Id. In State v. Nolton (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 133, at 135, 249 N.E.2d 797 , we stated: " * * * [I]f the trier could reasonably find against the state and for the accused upon one or more of ......
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...412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973); State v. Kilby, 50 Ohio St.2d 21, 361 N.E.2d 1336 (1977); State v. Nolton, 19 Ohio St.2d 133, 249 N.E.2d 797 (1969). “To clarify the entire lesser-included-offense analysis, for purposes of R.C. 2945.74: an offense may be a lesser included......
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