24th Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn
| Decision Date | 19 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | 15–1483.,Nos. 15–1478,s. 15–1478 |
| Parties | 24TH SENATORIAL DISTRICT REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE; Kenneth H. Adams, individually and as Chairman of the 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee, Plaintiffs–Appellants, and Daniel Moxley, Intervenor/Plaintiff, v. James B. ALCORN, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Clara Belle Wheeler, in her official capacity as Vice–Chairman of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Singleton B. McAllister, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Virginia Department of Elections; Emmett W. Hanger, Jr., Defendants–Appellees. Republican Party of Virginia, Inc., Amicus Supporting Appellants. Daniel Moxley, Intervenor/Plaintiff–Appellant, 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee; Kenneth H. Adams, individually and as Chairman of the 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee, Plaintiffs, v. James B. Alcorn, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Clara Belle Wheeler, in her official capacity as Vice–Chairman of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Singleton B. McAllister, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Virginia State Board of Elections; Virginia Department of Elections; Emmett W. Hanger, Jr., Defendants–Appellees. Republican Party of Virginia, Inc., Amicus Supporting Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Jeffrey R. Adams, Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, PLC, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellants. Joshua D. Heslinga, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Richard Dean Boyer, Boyer Law Firm, PLLC, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Ullrich, Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, PLC, Staunton, Virginia; John C. Wirth, Nelson, McPherson, Summers & Santos, L.C., Staunton, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, John W. Daniel II, Deputy Attorney General, Kristina Perry Stoney, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anna T. Birkenheier, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees Alcorn, Wheeler, McAllister, and the Virginia Department of Elections; Chris Ashby, Ashby Law PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee Emmett W. Hanger, Jr. Patrick M. McSweeney, McSweeney, Cynkar & Kachouroff, PLLC, Powhatan, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge GREGORY
wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge DIAZ joined. Chief Judge TRAXLER wrote a dissenting opinion.
, Circuit Judge:
The 24th Senatorial District Republican Committee of Virginia and Committee Chairman Kenneth H. Adams (together, the “Committee”), and Plaintiff–Intervenor Daniel Moxley, appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
. For the following reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' and plaintiff-intervenor's complaints and therefore affirm.
Under Virginia law, political parties generally “have the right to determine the method by which a party nomination for a member of ... any statewide office shall be made.” Va.Code Ann. § 24.2–509(A)
. “Notwithstanding” this general rule, the Incumbent Protection Act (the “Act”) provides that “[a] party shall nominate its candidate for election for a General Assembly district where there is only one incumbent of that party for the district by the method designated by that incumbent, or absent any designation by him by the method of nomination determined by the party.” Va.Code Ann. § 24.2–509(B) (emphasis added).
The Republican Party of Virginia (the “Party”) is governed pursuant to its Plan of Organization (the “Plan”), which the Committee acknowledges “is the Party's definitive statement on any matter it addresses.” Pls.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3. According to the Plan, Legislative District Committees (“LDCs”) are unincorporated associations designated pursuant to the Plan that “determine whether candidates for Legislative District public office shall be nominated by Mass Meeting, Party Canvass, Convention or Primary, where permitted to do so under Virginia Law.” J.A. 163. The Committee is the LDC responsible for determining the method of nomination for candidates seeking the Republican nomination for the 24th Senatorial District for the Virginia General Assembly.
In December 2014, the Committee exercised its authority under the Plan and adopted a resolution designating a convention as the method of nominating the Republican candidate for the 24th Senate District seat in the 2015 election. On February 23, 2015, incumbent state senator Emmett Hanger relied on the authority granted to him by the Act and designated a primary as the method of nomination.
The Committee filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1988 against the members of the Virginia State Board of Elections and the Virginia Department of Elections (together, the “Commonwealth”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Committee's complaint alleges that the Act infringes on its First Amendment right to freedom of association by preventing it from determining the method of nomination in contravention of the terms of the Plan.1
Senator Hanger and Moxley, who sought the Party's nomination for Senator Hanger's seat on the 24th District, both moved to intervene. Moxley alleged that the Act violates his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it confers on an incumbent an electoral advantage and invidiously discriminates against him and all other potential challengers to Hanger.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Commonwealth from implementing a primary. Three days before a scheduled hearing on the preliminary injunction, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Committee failed to establish standing because the Plan expressly incorporates Virginia law into its delegation of authority to the LDC.
At the outset of the motion hearing, the district court asked counsel whether there were any “issues of disputed fact.” J.A. 203. Counsel for the Committee responded, “We believe we do not.” The district court heard from both sides on the standing issue and the proper interpretation of the Plan. See J.A. 213–229.
The district court subsequently granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to establish standing, and denying the remaining pending motions as moot, including the motions for preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We review the district court's dismissal for lack of standing de novo. Lee Graham Shopping Center, LLC v. Estate of Kirsch, 777 F.3d 678, 680 (4th Cir.2015)
.
To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) “he has suffered an actual or threatened injury,” (2) “a causal connection between the injury complained of and the challenged action,” and (3) “the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision.” Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir.1997)
. An “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs have the burden of alleging sufficient facts to demonstrate standing. Marshall, 105 F.3d at 906 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) ).
Before we turn to the language of the Plan itself, we address the Committee's argument that the construction of the Plan is a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the dispute and that dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
prior to allowing discovery was premature. In the alternative, the Committee argues that the evidence was insufficient to dismiss at the 12(b)(1) stage, particularly because the proper construction of the Plan was a contested fact. The Committee concedes that it waived a hearing on the motions to dismiss, but nevertheless insists that the district court failed to develop sufficient facts to resolve the jurisdictional issue.
“[A] defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction in one of two ways.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir.2009)
(citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982) ). “First, the defendant may contend that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based.” Id. (citing Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219 ). Alternatively, the defendant may contend “that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint were not true.” Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. In the second scenario, “[a] trial court may then go beyond the allegations of the complaint” and hold an evidentiary hearing to “determine if there are facts to support the jurisdictional allegations.” Id. There is no presumption of truth and the court weighs the evidence presented in a 12(b)(1) hearing to determine jurisdiction. Id. “If, however, the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the facts central to the merits of the complaint, ‘a presumption of truthfulness should attach to the plaintiff's allegations.’ ” Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir.2015) (citing Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193 ). And “the court should resolve the relevant factual disputes only after appropriate discovery.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Committee relies primarily on our decision in Kerns for its argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. However, we have said that the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Correll v. Herring
...Rules and Section 545 (D), and the RNC has not Voluntarily Submitted to Section 545(D)Defendants cite 24th Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn , 820 F.3d 624 (4th Cir.2016) and Marshall v. Meadows , 105 F.3d 904 (4th Cir.1997) for the proposition that, where an alleged injury is cau......
-
Fitzgerald v. Alcorn
..."where permitted to do so under Virginia Law" was the subject of previous litigation, see 24th Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn, 820 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2016) (" 24th Senatorial Committee"), and remains important in this case.The other committee-plaintiff is the 6th Congressional ......
-
Barnett v. United States
...evidentiary hearing to ‘determine if there are facts to support the jurisdictional allegations.’ " 24th Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn , 820 F.3d 624, 629 (4th Cir.2016) (quoting Adams v. Bain , 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982) ). Second, the defendant may contend that the co......
-
Beck v. McDonald
...the merits.II. We review de novo the district court's decision to dismiss for lack of standing. 24th Senatorial Dist. Republican Comm. v. Alcorn , 820 F.3d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 2016). Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies.......