Jackson v. DeBruyn
| Decision Date | 28 April 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1809,93-1809 |
| Citation | 25 F.3d 1053 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. Marshall JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. Christian DeBRUYN, ** et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Before CUDAHY, EASTERBROOK and MANION, Circuit Judges.
Marshall Jackson, formerly incarcerated at the Indiana State Farm, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging that his continued confinement on administrative segregation in the prison's Maximum Restraint Unit violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and Jackson appealed. 1
We agree with the district court that nothing in Jackson's complaint suggests that the conditions of his confinement deprived him of the "minimal civilized measures of life's necessities," Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Lunsford v. Bennett, 1994 WL 82662, * 3 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 1994); see Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir.1992), and that Jackson received all the process due him while in administrative segregation. He received thirty-day periodic reviews. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 476 (1983); Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1254-55 (7th Cir.1991). Written explanation for his continued confinement there was not necessary. Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.2d 1036, 1042 n. 2 (7th Cir.1994), citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01 (9th Cir.1986). We accordingly affirm the dismissal of the complaint for the reasons stated by the district court in the attached order. 2 We add that Jackson's effort to recast his claim in equal protection terms fails, because he did not allege any "intentional or purposeful discrimination" on forbidden grounds. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir.1982); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n. 7 (7th Cir.1987).
v.
James Aiken, John Nunn, D. Bruce Jordan, William Lundy,
James Hendrix, Rick Sobalick, Rod Grimes, Gary
Hartsock, Karen Jones, Philip Badger, in
their individual and official
capacities, Defendants.
This cause is before the Court on the plaintiff's complaint, on the defendant's motion to dismiss and on the plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss must be granted and the action dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff Marshall Jackson was until recently an inmate in the Maximum Restraint Unit (the MRU) at the Indiana State Farm (the ISF). He arrived at the ISF on January 7, 1988 and was placed in the MRU as part of the discipline imposed on him at the institution where he was previously confined. Upon completing the period of disciplinary segregation in January 1989, Jackson was retained in the MRU for administrative reasons. He remained there for a considerable period, during which his placement was reviewed at regular intervals. In consequence of this Jackson has brought the present action, contending that his retention in the MRU violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks injunctive relief and damages from officials of the Indiana Department of Correction, the Superintendent of the ISF and numerous other ISF officials. It can be said that he was confined at the Indiana State Farm "until recently" because he has notified the Clerk in other litigation of his transfer to the Indiana State Reformatory.
The defendants have appeared by counsel and seek dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In ruling on that motion, which the plaintiff has opposed, the Court liberally construes the plaintiff's allegations, accepts the allgations of his complaint as true and can dismiss the action at this stage only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint which would entitle him to relief. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466-67 (7th Cir.1991).
The first inquiry in every Section 1983 case is whether there has been the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, for without a predicate constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case under Sec. 1983. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n. 1 (7th Cir.1992), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
The Eighth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon prisoners. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2323 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime for which an inmate was imprisoned, or are totally without penological justification. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). Jackson is well aware of the protections afforded by this provision of the Constitution. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.1992).
The prong of this Amendment which Jackson relies on in the present case is the provision that he is entitled to be free from punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of his crime. In invoking this provision, however, Jackson misperceives the nature of his confinement in the MRU. Segregated detention is not cruel and unusual punishment per se, as long as the conditions of confinement are not foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification. Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir.1984). "As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). "Only deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991), quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). The conditions of the MRU, insofar as this complaint reveals, do not approach this magnitude.
Jackson next asserts a procedural due process claim, based on his prolonged confinement in the MRU without benefit, he claims, of the procedures required by Indiana law. A specific methodology is used in assessing this claim:
We review procedural due process claims in two steps: we determine whether there was a deprivation or interference with a protected liberty or property interest, and then, whether the procedures attendant upon the deprivation or interference were constitutionally sufficient.
Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3584 (February 22, 1993), citing Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Applying this methodology here, therefore, the first question to be addressed is whether Jackson suffered the deprivation of a protected liberty interest by his assignment to the MRU.
Liberty interests may originate in either the Constitution or state law. Castaneda v. Henman, 914 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1085 (1991); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir.1982). In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution itself does not create a liberty interest in remaining out of segregation. According to the Court, "administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration." Id. at 467-68.
The inquiry thus shifts to whether Indiana law creates a liberty interest in remaining in a prison's general population or, what amounts to the same thing, whether a prisoner can be removed from the general population only under limited and specific circumstances. State law creates a protectable liberty interest when it "[places] substantive limitations on official discretion." Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at 1909 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)). This can be done "by establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern official discretion," and "mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met." Id. Thus, in analyzing the question, we must look to the relevant language of the statute or regulation to determine whether it is mandatory, or merely precatory, in nature.
The relevant Indiana statute is Ind.Code 11-10-1-7, which provides that
(a) An offender may be involuntarily segregated from the general population of a facility or program if the department first finds that segregation is necessary for the offender's own physical safety or the physical safety of others.
(b) The department shall review an offender so segregated at least once every thirty (30) days to determine whether the reason for segregation still exists.
In Lokmar Yazid Abdul-Wadood v. Duckworth, 860 F.2d 280, 283 n. 3 (7th Cir.1988), the Court of Appeals examined section (a) of the above statute and held that it "arguably" provides prisoners with a liberty interest in remaining in a prison's general population. In dictum, the majority in Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.1991), found this language to be sufficient to support the creation of a liberty interest.
Were this the only source of authority to segregate inmates, they would...
To continue reading
Request your trial