Hagelin for President Committee of Kansas v. Graves, 93-3314

• Decision Date: 07 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-3314,93-3314
• Citation: 25 F.3d 956
• Parties: Dr. John HAGELIN FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE OF KANSAS, Dr. John Hagelin, Jessie Nichols, Patricia Robinson, Wanda Fern Kelly, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bill GRAVES, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Kansas, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 956

25 F.3d 956

Dr. John HAGELIN FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE OF KANSAS, Dr. John Hagelin, Jessie Nichols, Patricia Robinson, Wanda Fern Kelly, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Bill GRAVES, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of Kansas, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-3314.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

June 7, 1994.

Jay B. Marcus, Fairfield, IA, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., David C. Wetzler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Topeka, KS, for defendant-appellee.

Before BALDOCK and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, ^** District Judge.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Dr. John Hagelin for President Committee of Kansas, Dr. John Hagelin, Jessie Nichols, Patricia Robinson, and Wanda Fern Kelly appeal from a summary judgment in favor of defendant Bill Graves, the Secretary of State of Kansas. ¹ Plaintiffs Hagelin, Nichols, and Robinson were candidates for national office with the Natural Law Party in 1992, Hagelin for president, Nichols for U.S. senator, Robinson for U.S. representative. Plaintiff Kelly is a registered voter in Kansas who wished to vote for the candidates in the November 1992 general election. Each of the candidates missed the deadline set forth in Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-305(b) for independent candidates to file nomination petitions. This section requires the filing of nomination petitions by the Monday preceding the primary election, which turns out to be about ninety-one days before the general election.

Plaintiffs argue that Kansas's ballot access laws unfairly discriminate against independent candidates by requiring them to submit their nomination petitions ninety-one days before the general election, while the Republican and Democratic parties can place their presidential candidates on the ballot at any time after such candidates are designated. They also contend that the state's interests do not justify the burdens imposed by its laws. We affirm the decision of the district court.

Kansas provides several methods for candidates to have their names placed on the ballot. Candidates who are members of parties whose candidate for governor polled at least 5% of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor in the preceding general election shall be nominated by primary election. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-202(a), (b). Candidates who wish to run in the primary, which is held the first Tuesday in August of even-numbered years, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-203(a), are required to file nominating petitions or a declaration of intent to become a candidate by June 10. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-205(a). Party nominations made by primary election shall be placed on the general ballot, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-301, but no deadline is set forth for submitting these nominations. However, because absentee ballots must be prepared at least twenty days before the election, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-1120, arguably parties must submit the names of their nominees before this deadline.

Candidates of parties whose candidate for governor did not poll at least 5% of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor in the last general election may not use the primary nomination process. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-202(b). Recognized parties that are not authorized to participate in the primary may nominate candidates by means of a delegate or mass convention or caucus of qualified voters. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-302. Certificates of nominations by convention or caucus shall be filed by June 10. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-305(a).

A party may seek official recognition by filing a petition sixty days before the deadline for filing nomination papers and declarations of candidacies, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-302a, which is approximately April 10. These parties apparently may then nominate candidates pursuant to section 25-302.

Finally, all nominations other than party nominations shall be independent nominations. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-303(b). Such nominations may be made by filing petitions signed by at least 5,000 qualified voters, id., by the Monday before the primary election, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-305(b).

Major party candidates wishing to run in the Kansas presidential preference primary election, which is held the first Tuesday in April every four years, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-4501, must file a declaration of intent or petition by the previous February 12, Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-4502(b). Party nominations for presidential electors are made by a delegate or mass convention or caucus of qualified electors. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-301. No time limit is set for such a convention. The Kansas statutory scheme apparently permits presidential candidates, but no others, to have their names placed on the general election ballot if nominated by their party, even if they did not run in the primary.

Candidates who are unable to have their names placed on the ballot through these means still may participate in the election process as write-in candidates. Such candidates must file an affidavit of write-in candidacy by the second Monday before the general election. Kan.Stat.Ann. Sec. 25-305(c)-(e).

The Natural Law Party was formed April 20, 1992, which was too late to file for recognized party status under section 25-302a that year. It began its effort to obtain the necessary nominating petitions for the candidates in late June 1992. On August 3, 1992, the section 25-305(b) filing deadline for independent candidates, the candidates submitted nomination petitions containing less than the required 5,000 signatures. As a consequence, the Secretary of State rejected the petitions. In the next eight days, the candidates obtained enough additional signatures to meet the signature requirement. The Secretary of State rejected these petitions as untimely. The candidates' names did not appear on the ballot in the general election.

In 1992, the Democratic presidential candidate was nominated on or about July 16, 1992, and the Republican candidate on or about August 19, 1992. Consequently, in 1992, independent candidates were required to file nominating petitions before the Republican presidential nominee was known.

Plaintiffs commenced this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, claiming that section 25-305(b) violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Each side moved for summary judgment. The district court held the state's interest in voter education was sufficient to justify the burden the filing deadline imposed on plaintiffs' rights, granted the state's motion and denied plaintiffs' motion.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Because the state failed to submit any materials contradicting plaintiffs' statement of facts in support of their motion for summary judgment, these facts are deemed admitted. Consequently, the sole issue is whether the state was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

While voting is of fundamental constitutional significance, the rights to vote in any manner and to associate for political purposes through the ballot are not absolute. Burdick v. Takushi, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). Rather, the states retain the power to regulate elections, and their election laws invariably will impose some burden on voters. Id.

The question here is whether the burden imposed is unconstitutional. In making this determination, we must weigh

"the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights."

Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)); see also Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 743 (10th Cir.1988).

When a ballot access law severely restricts First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, it must be " 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.' " Burdick, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (quoting Norman v. Reed, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). But when the law imposes only " 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' " upon the constitutional rights of voters, " 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' " the restrictions. Id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569).

We begin our analysis by considering the character and magnitude of the alleged constitutional injury. Ballot access restrictions burden two different, though overlapping, rights: the right of individuals to associate to advance their political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters to cast effective votes. Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.1984). These rights " 'rank among our most precious freedoms.' " Id. (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)). A filing deadline that falls unequally on independent candidates "impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment. It discriminates against those candidates and--of particular importance--against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the existing political parties." Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793-94, 103 S.Ct. at 1572.

Anderson indicated that a March filing deadline for independent presidential candidates imposed a substantial burden on voting and associational rights in part because it precluded the emergence of independent candidates who...