State v. Beaty

• Decision Date: 28 March 1887
• Citation: 25 Mo.App. 214
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. STEPHEN BEATY, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

25 Mo.App. 214

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. STEPHEN BEATY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City.

March 28, 1887

APPEAL from Cooper Circuit Court, HON. E. L. EDWARDS, Judge.

Affirmed.

The case is stated in the opinion.

W. G PENDLETON, for the appellant.

I. Upon the trial in the circuit court, the state offered evidence to impeach the character of defendant (who testified in his own behalf), by showing that in the community where he lived he sustained a bad reputation for honesty; and, upon this point introduced, among other witnesses, one J. E. Wear, who, upon direct examination, testified to defendant's bad reputation in said regard. Upon re-direct examination the court permitted the state to ask this witness this question " Do you remember of his (defendant's) stealing a set of harness from an Englishman, up in that neighborhood?" To this question defendant objected, for the reason that the same was leading, incompetent and illegal, and the court overruled the objection, to which action of the court defendant excepted at the time. The witness, in answer to said question, replied: " I am not right positive, but I think I did hear about that."

II. The circuit court erred in allowing the witness, Wear, to testify as above on re-direct examination. While the law seems to be settled by the case of the State v. Clinton (67 Mo. 380), that a defendant offering himself as a witness may be impeached as any other witness, the rule as to the method of impeachment remains unaltered. " Only evidence of a general character is allowed for that purpose, and specific charges cannot be preferred, as the witness is not presumed to be prepared to repel such attacks." Seymour v. Farrell, 51 Mo. 95; State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113. The testimony of Wear, on re-direct examination, was a direct violation of this rule; for which cause we ask that the judgment be reversed.

No brief for the respondent.

PHILIPS P. J.

The defendant was tried, on information, and convicted for petit larceny. On the trial, the defendant testified in his own behalf. The state thereupon introduced evidence tending to impeach the character of defendant for general dishonesty, etc. The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence, on the ground that he had not put his general character in issue by offering any evidence as to it. This objection must be overruled, as it has been directly determined against defendant's contention. State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380.

It is next assigned for error that the court permitted the state, over the objection of defendant, to inquire into special instances of crimes imputed to defendant. The rule is well settled that in such inquiry only evidence of the general reputation is permissible. Specific instances of offences cannot be gone into. Seymour v. Farrell, 51 Mo. 95; State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113.

The embarrassment in the way of defendant availing himself of this objection as error, is the fact that the record discloses that he himself opened up, in the first instance, this objectionable inquiry. On the cross-examination of the witness Harlan, introduced by the state, the defendant asked him if he ever knew of defendant stealing anything before, and obtained a favorable answer thereto. Then, on cross-examination of the witness Wear, the defendant again asked if he had ever known of defendant being arrested before this? The answer was, " not for stealing, but he had been arrested three times before this." The state then asked if he had known or heard of defendant stealing a set of harness from one English, in that neighborhood? The witness answered, in substance, that he heard of it.

There is no question but that this line of inquiry was improper and had it been opened by the state, against defendant's objection, it would have been error for which the judgment should be reversed. But the important...