Brown State of Maryland

Decision Date12 March 1827
PartiesBROWN and Others, Plaintiffs in Error, against The STATE OF MARYLAND, Defendant in Error
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Mr. Meredith, for the plaintiffs in error, contended, that the law in question was an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of Maryland. He did not deny the existence of such a power. As a necessary incident to sovereignty, it belonged to the several States before the adoption of the constitution, and it still belongs to them, subject, however, to the restrictions imposed upon its exercise by the paramount authority of that instrument. With regard to these restrictions, he did not mean to contend, that the general grant contained in the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, vested in the national government any thing more than a concurrent power of taxation. He admitted the rule of construction, that a grant of power to Congress does not, of itself, imply a prohibition of its exercise by the States. The powers granted to the general government are never to be considered as exclusive, unless they are made so in express terms, or unless, from the nature of the power itself, its concurrent exercise must necessarily produce direct repugnancy or incompatibility. But he argued, that this was by no means the inevitable result from a concorrent exercise of the taxing power, because its peculiar nature rendered it often capable of being exercised by different authorities at the same time, and even upon the same subject, without actual collision or interference.

The restrictions which he had alluded to, were to be found in other provisions of the constitution; and they were both express and implied. The former were all comprised in the tenth section of the first article, by which the States are prohibited, unless with the consent of Congress, from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws; and are, also, without such consent, forbidden to impose any duty upon tonnage. The effect of this prohibition, coupled with the general grant of the taxing power before referred to, is to vest in the national government an exclusive right to the commercial imposts of the country. With the exception of these, however, the power to lay and collect taxes is a concurrent power.

But, like all the other concurrent powers of the States, this power of taxation is subject, in its exercise, to that general implied restriction which necessarily results from the supreme and paramount authority of the Union. This is a vital principle of the political system, and its direct operation is to restrain the States from the exercise of any power repugnant to, or incompatible with, the constitution, or the constitutional laws of the national government. By which is to be understood, not merely a repugnancy growing out of a concurrent exercise of the same power by Congress and a State legislature, but that which may arise from the exercise of one power by a State, with reference to a different power, whether exclusive or concurrent, express or implied, residing in the general government.

Having stated and illustrated these as the constitutional limits of the taxing power of the States, he insisted, that they had been transgressed by the legislative act under consideration. The second section comprises all the provisions of the law which are material to the question. The true construction of this section is somewhat doubtful; upon any interpretation, however, it prohibits the importer from selling the imported merchandise without having first taken out a license to do so, for which he is required to pay a stipulated tax.

The question then is, whether this is such a law as the legislature of Maryland have a right to pass. Under colour of a license law, he contended that this statute was a palpable evasion of the express restriction upon the States to 'lay duties on imports;' an indirect attempt to do that which the constitution has explicitly inhibited. And he said this, because he thought it might be clearly shown, that a law, laying a tax on the importer for the privilege of selling the merchandise he has himself imported, which is this law, and this case, is equivalent, in all substantial respects, to a duty on imports, since, with a few slight and unimportant differences, it answers all the purposes, and produces all the effects of a concurrent power in the States to impose such a duty.

What are the apparent differences between this and a tax directly on imports? It may be said, in the first place, that the one is a tax for the privilege of bringing the foreign article into the country, and the other a tax for the privilege of selling it after it is so brought in. But these privileges are indissolubly connected; the right to sell is a necessary incident to the right of importing. The grant of a privilege to import would be of no value, unless it implies a right to sell. Prohibit sale, and importation necessarily ceases. He maintained that, on a fair and just construction of the whole revenue system, the implication was irresistible. That the duties exacted by the general government were paid, not for the privilege to import simply, but for the privilege of importing foreign commodities, and using them in the way of merchandise, might be incontestably proved, by showing that no goods were dutiable, unless imported with the intention, and for the purpose of traffic. With this view, he referred to various provisions of the act of March, 1799, (ch. 128. s. 30. 32. 45, 46. 60. and 107.) and to the case of the Concord.a This is the principle, also, of the English law of customs, from which our system is mainly borrowed.b It was likewise worthy of remark, that the legislation of Maryland, upon this subject, before the adoption of the constitution, was in strict accordance with the same principle, and carried it so far as to permit the merchant to try the market by an actual sale, and paying the duties only on the portion sold, to export the residue free of duty.c There is, then, no difference in this respect between these two modes of taxation.

It may be said that these taxes are payable at different times; in the one case, at the time of importation, in the other, at the time of sale. But if they are both paid substantially for the same privilege, surely this is not a material difference. It is a matter that simply concerns the safety, certainty, and convenience of collection; but it gives no distinctive character to the law. In point of fact, however, the duty imposed by the revenue system is not payable, except it is less than fifty dollars, until after the importation.

A third apparent difference may be said to consist in this: that the import duty is a charge upon the goods, the license upon the person; but the one is as much a charge upon the goods as the other, if by that is meant an increase of their actual cost. The import duty is, however, a personal charge upon the importer; it is not the bond that alone makes him personally liable; without having given a bond, he is still answerable for the duties.d

These are the only differences in the operation of the two taxes, and they are apparent, but not substantial; they are the disguise thrown about the law to elude detection. The true test, however, is, to consider the effect of this law upon the exclusive grant to the general government, to raise revenue from imposts. The reasons for such a grant are obvious. The objects committed by the constitution to the general government are of immense magnitude, and require corresponding means. Of all species of taxation, that upon imports is most fruitful and least oppressive. It is sound policy, therefore, to cherish and extend this branch of the public revenue; because, whenever it fails, other modes of taxation must necessarily be resorted to of a more odious and oppressive nature. Now, the consequence of the right claimed by this law on the part of Maryland, is, to place this branch of the public revenue completely in her power; as entirely so, as if she had constitutionally a concurrent right to tax imports. It is to enable her, at her pleasure, by means of license laws, to annihilate, as it regards her own territory, the commercial revenues of the country. What is to prevent her from prohibiting altogether the importation of foreign merchandise into any of her ports? It is only to increase the price of the license until the commodity will no longer bear the burden, and...

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