Triangle Film Corporation v. Artcraft Pictures Corporation

• Decision Date: 04 March 1918
• Docket Number: 180.
• Citation: 250 F. 981
• Parties: TRIANGLE FILM CORPORATION v. ARTCRAFT PICTURES CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

250 F. 981

TRIANGLE FILM CORPORATION v. ARTCRAFT PICTURES CORPORATION.

No. 180.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 4, 1918

An employé held not to have violated his contract by leaving the employment, where the contract was conditioned that he should work under a certain person, who afterwards lawfully severed his relations with the employer.

Appeal from an order denying the plaintiff's motion for an injunction pendente lite. The jurisdiction of the court depended upon diverse citizenship. The plaintiff is a Virginia corporation engaged in manufacturing, distributing and exhibiting moving pictures, and on the 26th day of March 1917, entered into a contract with one William S. Hart, of Los Angeles, Cal. By this contract the plaintiff engaged Hart as an actor, to perform in motion picture productions 'which are to be manufactured by the employer under the supervision of Thomas H. Ince. ' Hart accepted the employment 'under the supervision of the said Thomas H Ince. ' The contract recited that it was intended to be superseded by one in more elaborate form, and both parties acknowledged that Hart could not be replaced. It concluded as follows: 'This contract is made upon the condition and with the understanding that the employe will be supervised in his acting and work hereunder by Thomas H. Ince. ' On the day mentioned Ince was in the employ of the plaintiff as manufacturing producer at its studio in Culver City, Cal., and held an interest in its stock, but on June 12, 1917, he sold out all this interest and severed his relations with it. Hart, upon learning these facts, terminated his relations with the plaintiff, and both Hart and Ince went into the employ of the defendant. It may be assumed that the defendant offered to take Hart in, and, indeed, that it persuaded him to accept. It may also be assumed that the defendant knew of the contract between the plaintiff and Hart. Ince, however, violated no contract between himself and the plaintiff in selling out his stock interests in it, or terminating his relations, nor is there undisputed evidence that, having done so, he attempted to dissuade Hart from continuing in the plaintiff's employ.

Alfred S. Barnard and Walter N. Seligsberg, both of New York City, for appellant.

Elek John Ludvigh, of New York City (Harold M. Pitman, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before ROGERS and HOUGH, Circuit Judges, and LEARNED HAND, District judge.

LEARNED HAND, District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

This case depends either on Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, or upon a strangely misconceived extension of that doctrine Lumley v. Gye, supra, a wholesome and widely accepted case we not only accept on principle, but we should in any case be bound to treat it as law upon authority. Bitterman v. L. & N.R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 205, 28 Sup.Ct. 91, 52 L.Ed. 171, 12 Ann.Cas. 693; Angle v Chic., etc., R.R., 151 U.S. 1, 14 Sup.Ct. 240, 38 L.Ed 55. And in that aspect the case stands upon the question whether Hart violated his contract. He so clearly did not that we hardly feel justified in any discussion of the question. He had in substance stipulated that his term should not last beyond Ince's connection with the plaintiff, and no one suggests that Ince had no right to sell out his interest and leave. Assuming, then, that the defendant did induce him to leave, it did not run counter to the...