Pugsley v. Sellmeyer

Decision Date09 April 1923
Docket Number(No. 295.)
Citation250 S.W. 538
PartiesPUGSLEY v. SELLMEYER et al.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; W. W. Bandy, Judge.

Petition for Mandamus by Pearl Pugsley against F. J. Sellmeyer and others. From an order denying the prayer of the petition, and dismissing the petition, the petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

C. O. Raley, of Corning, and J. N. Moore, of Danville, Ill., for appellant.

M. P. Huddleston, of Paragould, for appellees.

SMITH, J.

Appellant alleged and proved that she was a resident of school district No. 11 of Clay county, of school age, and that in September, 1921, she enrolled as a pupil in that school. On the opening day of school N. E. Hicks, the principal, read certain rules which had been adopted by the board of directors, and announced that observance thereof would be required by all pupils who attended the school. Among these rules was one numbered 3 which reads as follows:

"The wearing of transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses or any style of clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is prohibited."

Appellant infringed this rule by the use of talcum powder, and the teacher required her to wash it off and told her not to return again with it on her face. A day or two later she returned and offered herself as a pupil; but admission was denied her on the ground that she was infringing the rule by the continued use of talcum powder. She refused to submit to or to obey the rule, and was denied admission to the school.

Thereafter Miss Pugsley filed a petition setting out the facts stated, and prayed that a writ of mandamus issue requiring the directors of the school and the principal thereof to admit her as a pupil, notwithstanding her refusal to obey the rule set out above.

The case was submitted on its merits, and the court heard testimony supporting the allegations of the petition for mandamus and made findings of fact and a declaration of law.

The court found the law to be that the rule was arbitrary and unreasonable, and one which the petitioner was not required to observe as a condition upon which she might attend the school; but the court found the fact to be:

"That the evidence fails to show that the expulsion of Miss Pugsley by defendant Hicks was done under the direction or authority of the school board or that his action in the matter was ever approved of or ratified by the board of directors."

Upon this finding the fact the court denied the prayer of the petition for mandamus and dismissed the petition; and this appeal is from that order.

Appellant admits that after the principal denied her admission except upon the condition that she remove the talcum powder, and discontinue its use, she did not appeal to any member of the board of directors; but the undisputed testimony shows that the board of directors adopted the rule and directed the principal to enforce it, and the secretary of the board, who was also a member thereof, testified as a witness, and his testimony makes it perfectly clear that any appeal to them would have been unavailing, for he stated unequivocally that the board regarded its breach as a challenge of their authority, and that under the circumstances its rescission or cancellation would have been subversive of all discipline in the school.

Under the circumstances the law did not impose upon the petitioner the duty of doing the unavailing thing of applying to the directors for admission; so that, while she was never expelled, she was, in fact, denied admission to the school, and this exclusion was tantamount to expulsion. Monette Road Imp. Dist. v. Dudley, 144 Ark. 169, 222 S. W. 59.

In the case of State ex rel. Black v. Board Directors School Dist. No. 16 (Ark.) 242 S. W. 545, petitioners sought by mandamus to compel the directors of the school district to allow them to attend school. Those petitioners had not been expelled, but had been excluded; and, while the action of the directors was approved and mandamus denied, we recognized mandamus as the appropriate remedy to obtain the relief sought. We there held that the educational interests and school affairs in each school district in the state are placed by statute under the control and management of the school directors, and that to effectively exercise this authority a broad discretion must be accorded them, and in that connection it was said:

"In defining the authority conferred upon the board, this court took occasion to say in the case of Maddox et al. v. Neal et al., 45 Ark. 121, 55 Am. Rep. 540, that, while their authority is not without limit, yet `a wide range of discretion is vested in these boards by the statute in the matter of government and details of conducting the common schools.' Courts will not interfere in matters of detail and government of schools unless the officers refuse to perform a clear, plain duty, or unless they unreasonably and arbitrarily exercise the discretionary authority conferred upon them. We think the correct rule was laid down in the case of John A. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N. E. 864. It was said by Mr. Justice Knowlton, in rendering the opinion in that case, that, `under the law, the school committee "has the general charge and superintendence of all the public schools in the town." * * * The management...

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