State ex rel. Chase v. Hall

• Decision Date: 02 April 1923
• Citation: 250 S.W. 64,297 Mo. 594
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. JOHN F. CHASE et al. v. ROBERT W. HALL, Judge of Circuit Court
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

250 S.W. 64

297 Mo. 594

THE STATE ex rel. JOHN F. CHASE et al. v. ROBERT W. HALL, Judge of Circuit Court

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 2, 1923

Preliminary rule discharged.

Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, Henry Davis, and R. W. Otto Assistant Attorneys-General, for plaintiff.

(1) A court of equity has no jurisdiction over a bill to stay criminal proceedings. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo 425, 449; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616; Old Dominion Telephone Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220; Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 506; Sullvan v San Francisco Gas Co., 148 Cal. 368; Canon City v. Manning, 43 Colo. 144; Paulk v. Sycamore, 104 Ga. 24; Poyer v. Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111; Snouffer v. Tipton, 161 Iowa 223; Brown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737; New Orleans Baseball Co. v. New Orleans, 118 La. 228; Pratt Food Co. v. Bird, 148 Mich. 631; Milton Dairy Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 124 Minn. 239; State v. Southern Railroad, 145 N.C. 495; Wallack v. Society for Reformation of Delinquents, 67 N.Y. 23; State v. Lord, 28 Ore. 498; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Ewing, 241 Pa. St. 581; Kelley v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339; Austin v. Austin City Cemetery Assn., 87 Tex. 330; Flaherty v. Fleming, 58 W.Va. 669; Benz v. Kremer, 142 Wis. 1; Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173; In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516; Dalton Adding Machine Company v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 699. (2) The Marketing Bureau Act imposes only a personal charge upon individuals, partnerships and corporations and can form no basis for a proceeding against their property or business. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425, 449; Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 541; Beach on Injunctions, 574; Sec. 1366, 1368, R.S. 1919; Laws 1921, p. 30. (3) A multiplicity of prosecutions is not a multiplicity of actions. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 449; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 646. (4) A criminal prosecution cannot be restrained by a court of equity even though such prosecution grows out of an unconstitutional statute. State ex rel. v. Woods, 155 Mo. 425; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo.App. 414; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 531; Johnson v. Garrick, 20 N.Y.S. 327; Beach on Injunctions, 574; Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 699. (5) A party threatened with a criminal prosecution for the non-payment of an invalid license tax has three adequate remedies at law; first, he may await arrest and defend on the invalidity of the act; second, after arrest he may in habeas corpus proceedings assert the invalidity of the statute; third, he may pay the license tax under protest and recover it. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616; Kearney v. Laird, 164 Mo.App. 414; Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Virginia 236 U.S. 699. (6) The bill in the circuit court praying for injunctive relief does not allege such facts as to bring the case under any recognized head of equity jurisprudence. Laws (1 Ext. Sess.) 1921, p. 30; State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 448; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 646:

Charles P. Williams, Glendy B. Arnold and Percy Werner, for defendant.

(1) A person's occupation or calling and a lawfully established and going business constitute property rights. Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. St. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39; Clarkson v. Liablan, 178 Mo.App. 708; Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 449. (2) Equity has jurisdiction to prevent by injunction the enforcement of unconstitutional enactments, when necessary for the safeguarding of rights of property. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 37; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342, 355; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223; Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U.S. 100; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Moneyweight Scale Co. v. McBride, 199 Mass. 503; Michigan Salt Works v. Baird, 173 Mich. 655; Huntsworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 670; State v. Cass County, 17 N.D. 285; Spaulding v. McNary, 64 Ore. 491; Allen v. Live Stock Co., 275 F. 5; Hall v. Dunn. 52 Ore. 475; Fearis v. Gafford, 204 S.W. 675; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193; Manufacturers & Merchants Insp. Bureau v. Buech, 181 N.W. 125; Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. St. 253; Clark v. Harford Agricultural & Breeding Assn., 118 Md. 608; Railway Co. v. Conley & Avis, 67 W.Va. 129; Baldwin v. Atlanta, 147 Ga. 28; Zweigart v. Ry. Co., 170 S.W. 1194; Huston v. City, 176 Iowa 455; Star Company v. Brush, 185 App.Div. (N.Y.) 261; Wiseman v. Close, 183 N.Y.S. 353; Wilkie v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 444; Brown v. Nichols, 93 Kan. 737; Mobile v. Orr. 181 Ala. 308; Southern Express Co. v. Ensley, 116 F. 756; New Orleans Baseball Co. v. New Orleans, 118 La. 228; Lee's Summit v. Richter, 217 F. 965. (3) The circuit courts of this State are possessed of full equitable jurisdiction, except so far as expressly limited by statute, and the general test of equity jurisdiction lies in the lack of a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. Sec. 1969, R.S. 1919; Hanson v. Neal 215 Mo. 256, 279; Pocoke v. Peterson, 256 Mo. 501, 519. (4) The allegations of the bill filed in the circuit court, which stand confessed, show that the legal remedy is not "plain, adequate and complete." The property rights of the plaintiffs are injuriously affected by the statute in question if it be held unconstitutional. Pocoke v. Peterson, 256 Mo. 519. (5) Plaintiffs were not bound to comply with the terms of a statute which they believed to be unjust and unconstitutional; nor was the only alternative to ignore the law and subject themselves and employees to criminal prosecutions; they had the right to seek a plain, adequate and complete remedy against official injuries under color of an unconstitutional statute in the courts of equity. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 165; Minneapolis General Electric Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 194 F. 213, 222; Fredenberg v. Whitney, 240 F. 822; White v. Delano, 270 Mo. 16, 28; Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 328; Huntsworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash. 683; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616.

DAVID E. BLAIR, J. Ragland, J., not sitting.

OPINION

In Banc.

Prohibition.

DAVID E. BLAIR, J.

-- This is an original proceeding in prohibition against respondent (referred to in the caption as defendant) as one of the judges of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to prevent him from entertaining jurisdiction of or trying a suit brought by certain commission merchants against the members of the State Board of Agriculture, the State Marketing Commissioner and one of his deputies and the prosecuting attorney of the city of St. Louis (relators in this proceeding and referred to as plaintiffs in the caption) to enjoin criminal prosecutions against such commission men for violation of certain provisions of the State Marketing Bureau Act, enacted at the first extra session of the Fifty-first General Assembly, said act being found at page 29 of the acts of such session.

It is contended by relators that no property rights are involved and, therefore, that an action will not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions under the act; that respondent has exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the injunction suit and issuing a temporary injunction. This is the sole question for determination.

A brief study of the Marketing Bureau Act is essential to an understanding of the question at issue. An act was passed at the regular session of the Fifty-first General Assembly (Laws 1921, p. 139) creating a state marketing bureau within the department of agriculture and in charge of a state marketing commissioner appointed by the commissioner of agriculture. A department of agriculture was created by another act passed at the same session. [Laws, 1921, p. 125.] The latter act was referred to the people under the provisions of Section 57 Article IV, of the Constitution (subsequently failing of approval), and at the first extra session of the same General Assembly the Marketing Bureau Act previously enacted was repealed and a new law enacted in lieu thereof. [Laws 1921, First Extra Session, p. 129.]

The latter act (here under consideration) provides for the appointment of a state marketing commissioner by the State Board of Agriculture (or its successor at law) by the consent of the Governor. Sections 12146a to 12146g cover the relationship between the marketing bureau and commission merchants. In brief, these sections provide for licensing such merchants; payment of a fee therefor, based on annual gross volume of sales; giving of bond by the commission men for the faithful accounting and payment to consignors of the proceeds of all farm products sold; inquisitorial powers on the part of the marketing bureau and holding of hearings upon complaints or in investigations; power to refuse and to revoke licenses to transact business upon specified grounds; court review of decisions and orders of the marketing bureau and the making of rules and regulations. Said act defines offenses on the part of commission merchants, including doing a commission business without a license, with penalties therefor, denoted as misdemeanors, with a fine of not less than fifty dollars and not exceeding five hundred dollars for each offense.

The general rule is that injunction will not lie to prevent prosecution for the violation of the provisions of a criminal statute. [State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425, l. c. 449, 56 S.W. 474; Merchants Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, l. c. 646, 111 S.W. 565, and cases cited in brief of plaintiffs.]

But prosecutions for violation of a criminal statute may be enjoined where the remedy is not adequate and such prosecutions would work irreparable injury. [Merchants Exchange v. Knott, supra, foot page 64; State ex rel. v Wood, supra, l. c. 447.]. It therefore remains to determine whether plaintiffs in the injunction suit have brought themselves within...