Camp v. Gress

• Decision Date: 02 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 279,279
• Citation: 250 U.S. 308,39 S.Ct. 478,63 L.Ed. 997
• Parties: CAMP et al. v. GRESS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

250 U.S. 308

39 S.Ct. 478

63 L.Ed. 997

CAMP et al.

v GRESS.

No. 279.

Argued March 24 and 25, 1919.

Decided June 2, 1919.

[Syllabus from 308-309 intentionally omitted] Messrs. T. D. Savage and Thomas H. Willcox, both of Norfolk, Va., for petitioners.

Messrs. D. Lawrence Groner, of Norfolk, Va., W. M. Toomer, of Jacksonville, Fla., and Alexander Akerman, of Macon, Ga., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 51 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1101 [Comp. St. § 1033]) declares that (with exceptions not here material)——

'No civil suit shall be brought in any District Court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.'

Resting jurisdiction wholly on diversity of citizenship, Gress, a citizen and resident of Florida, brought, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, this action against P. D. Camp, P. R. Camp, and John M. Camp, alleging them to be citizens of Virginia and residents of that district. One of them, John M., filed a 'plea to jurisdiction,' asking that the suit be dismissed, because he was not a citizen or resident of the district in which it was brought, but a citizen of North Carolina, resident in the Eastern district thereof. P. D. and P. R. Camp filed a separate 'plea to jurisdiction' setting up the same facts, alleging that the cause of action sued on was joint and inseparable, and denying jurisdiction as to themselves also, because there was none as to John M. Camp. The pleas were overruled; the case proceeded to trial; a verdict was rendered against the three defendants; and judgment was entered thereon. Exceptions had been duly taken both by John M. and by P. D. and P. R. Camp to the decision overruling their pleas to the jurisdiction, and by the three defendants to certain ruling at the trial alleged to be erroneous; but the judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (244 Fed. 121, 156 C. C. A. 549). A writ of certiorari was granted by this court (245 U. S. 655, 38 Sup. Ct. 14, 62 L. Ed. 533).

First. The several defendants below, although not citizens of the same state, were all citizens of states other than that of the plaintiff. Hence the diversity of citizenship requisite to federal jurisdiction existed. Sweeney v. Carter Oil Co., 199 U. S. 252, 26 Sup. Ct. 55, 50 L. Ed. 178. The objection of John M. Camp is not to the jurisdiction of a federal court, but to the jurisdiction over him of the court of the particular district; that is, the objection is to the venue. He asserts the personal privilege not to be sued in a district other than that of his residence, since the action is not brought in the district of the plaintiff's residence. If he were a sole defendant, or if none of the defendants resided in the district where suit was brought, the privilege asserted would be supported by the very language of the statute. Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 215 U. S. 501, 30 Sup. Ct. 184, 54 L. Ed. 300. Section 51 of the Judicial Code does not in terms provide for the case where there are several defendants. Does the limitation of jurisdiction to the district of the residence 'of either the plaintiff or the defendant' mean also of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, so that, when the several defendants are not all residents of the district in which they are sued, the nonresident may assert the privilege not to be sued therein? The precise question has not been decided by this court; but the construction already given to this section in analogous cases and to analogous provs ions in other statutes makes it clear that the privilege asserted should be sustained.

Section 51 of the Judicial Code embodies in substance the Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected by Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433 (Comp. St. § 1033). From the passage of the original Judiciary Act September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (Comp. St. § 991), until 1887, suit could be brought not only in the district of defendant's resi dence, but also in any other district in which the defendant was found. The 1887-1888 act accomplished its purpose of restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, in part, by limiting the districts in which suit might be brought to that of the defendant's or of the plaintiff's residence. See In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402. In Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315, 10 Sup. Ct. 303, 33 L. Ed. 635, the question was presented whether this limitation prohibited suit in a district in which some, but not all, of the plaintiffs were resident. The court felt itself controlled largely by the construction which had been given in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch, 267, 2 L. Ed. 435, to a clause of the original Judiciary Act, similar in language and analogous in subject-matter, and had been steadfastly adhered to since. There this court construed the phrase 'where * * * the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state,' as meaning 'that where the interest is joint, each of the persons concerned in that interest must be competent to sue, or liable to be sued, in those courts [courts of the United States].' Adopting a like construction, this court held in Smith v. Lyon, supra, that suit could not be brought in a district in which some, but not all, of the plaintiffs resided. The rule declared in Strawbridge v. Curtiss had been applied indiscriminately to plaintiffs and defendants; and after the decision in Smith v. Lyon it was generally assumed in the lower courts that the rule there applied to plaintiffs must likewise be applied to defendants.¹ Compare Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, 36 L. Ed. 768; Geneva Furniture Co. v. Karpen, 238 U. S. 254, 259, 35 Sup. Ct. 788, 59 L. Ed. 1295. The same assumption appears to have been made in Interior Construction & Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U. S. 217, 16 Sup. Ct. 272, 40 L. Ed. 401, where the question was raised whether the resident defendant could avail himself of the objection that another defendant, who was a nonresident, was not liable to suit therein. And in Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U. S. 357, 364, 365, 31 Sup. Ct. 81, 54 L. Ed. 1069, a like rule was applied; for it was there held that, although an alien defendant could be sued in any district where found, an American citizen joined with him as codefendant could not, without his consent, be sued in a district other than that of his or the plaintiff's residence.

It is said, however, that section 51, if read in connection with section 50 (Comp. St. § 1032) and in the light of their regislative history, shows that it was the intention of Congress to confer jurisdiction over all the defendants found within the district, if one of them resides therein. Section 50,² which embodies without substantial change the Act of February 28, 1839, c. 36, § 1, 5 Stat. 321, makes provision for enforcing a cause of action which exists against several persons, although one of them is neither an inhabitant of nor found within the district in which suit is brought and does not voluntarily appear. It does so by permitting the court to entertain jurisdiction without prejudice to the rights of the party not regularly served nor voluntarily appearing. The argument is that, in order to give effect to the retention in section 50 of the words 'found within the disrict,' we must, although these words were omitted from section 51, hold that, where there are several defendants, the court has jurisdiction of all, if one or more are residents of the district, and the others are found there. The argument overlooks the fact that section 50 is applicable not only to cases in which the venue is dependent upon the residence of a defendant in the district where suit is brought, but also to those cases in which it is dependent upon the residence of the plaintiff. Ordinarily jurisdiction could be obtained in the district of the plaintiff's residence only over nonresidents, because all of the defendants must be nonresidents in order to satisfy the requirement of diversity of citizenship. And as to these there can be personal jurisdiction only so far as found within or voluntarily appearing within the district. To such persons the term 'inhabitants' in section 50 obviously cannot refer. If the provision therein concerning those not 'found' had been omitted, a suit would fail in case any one of those who at common law was a necessary party defendant should not be found therein or voluntarily appear. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed. 158. As the act of 1887-1888 did not restrict jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship in those cases where the venue is determined by the residence of the plaintiff, it was appropriate to retain in the earlier statute (now section 50) the words 'found within the district,' although it had ceased to be operative in cases where the venue is determined by the residence of the defendants.

On the other hand, section 52 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1034) makes it clear that the construction contended for by defendant is unsound. It provides that where a state contains more than one district a suit (not of a local nature) against a single defendant must be brought in the district where he resides, 'but if there are two or more defendants, residing in different districts of the state, it may be brought in either district.' We thus have an express declaration by Congress that under one particular set of circumstances a codefendant may be sued in a district in which he does not reside. 'Expressio unius est exclusio...