Griffin v. Clemow

• Decision Date: 09 December 1968
• Docket Number: No. 10533,10533
• Citation: 251 A.2d 415,28 Conn.Supp. 109
• Parties: John D. GRIFFIN v. Bice CLEMOW et al.
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

Page 415

251 A.2d 415

28 Conn.Supp. 109

John D. GRIFFIN v. Bice CLEMOW et al.

No. 10533.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Fairfield County at Stamford.

Dec. 9, 1968.

Hirschberg, Pettengill & Strong, Greenwich, for plaintiff.

Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, for defendants.

TEDESCO, Judge.

The plaintiff in his complaint claims that he was libeled when the named defendant wrote the following article in a magazine known as 'Connecticut Life.' 'John David Griffin is woven entirely of his own yarns. But unlike the two legendary characters who fabricated the invisible garment of gold and silver for the King, Griffin woofs on a colorful warp that is unavoidably visible, often at great distances. It is also audible.'

A learned person will recognize the equation with the fraudulent tailros in the well-known fairy tale by Hans Christian Anderson, 'The Emperor's New Cothes.' One less learned, including the writer, has difficulty not only in recalling the above-mentioned fairy tale but also in culling from the passage in 'Connecticut Life' the alleged libelous material. Be that as it may, a complaint has been filed that the defendant depicted the plaintiff as a 'loud mouth, name dropping, bar frequenting liar,' among other things. The latter quotation is a 'translation' by the plaintiff's attorneys from the Andersenesque language to the understandable language of the average juror and jurist.

The defendant interposed five special defenses to each of which the plaintiff demurred.

I

In the first special defense, the defendant alleged that the article was substantially true. The plaintiff argued that 'substantially' meant that the article was partially true and, therefore, the defense was not a good defense. The defendant, however, by alleging that the article was 'substantially' true does not allege that it was partially true. Substantial truth is a basis of the defense of truth. Stow v. Converse, 4 Conn. 17, 33. 'Substance' was accepted by the latest case of libel decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Bartlett v. Flaherty, 155 Conn. 203, 204, 230 A.2d 436.

In Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537, 538, it was stated: 'A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. 'When the truth is so near to the facts as published that fine and shaded distinctions must be drawn and words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain a charge of libel, no legal harm has been don'.' In Stow v. Converse, supra, our Supreme Court said: 'The term substance is used by way of contradistinction, from the letter and form of a charge; and although the latter is not required, the essence is indispensible.' A federal court in Piracci v. Hearst Corporation, D.C., 263 F.Supp. 511, 515, decided that the 'article, as a whole, gives a substantially accurate account of the arrest of the plaintiff.' In a case against Drew Pearson, noted columnist, the court said that 'the account given of the testimony in the newspaper column is substantially true.' Dall v. Pearson, D.C., 246 F.Supp. 812, 813.

II

The second special defense alleged that the article constituted fair comment. The plaintiff demurs by stating that fair comment is only available if the affair is one of public concern and if comment is made in good faith. This is an example of a speaking demurrer. 'A demurrer is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged.' Wexler Construction Co. v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 187, 194, 128 A.2d 540, 543. The demurrer to this defense will fail, in any case, for the reason that if the affair was of public interest, the defendant is allowed fair comment.

It is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that the 'public interest' requirement is fulfilled. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440. Vinvian Kellems, well-known industrialist, sued the California C.I.O. union when the latter charged Miss Kellems with 'treasonable operations' when she took to the public platform and urged the nonpayment of federal income taxes. The court held in that case, Kellems v. California C.I.O. Council, D.C., 68 F.Supp. 277, 278: 'Those, who in public utterances seek to formulate and direct public opinion, have an accompanying responsibility.' The remark, 'treasonable,' was within the field of fair comment.

III

The defendant specially defends by alleging that the article was invited by the plaintiff. The plaintiff demurs by stating that 'consenting to a publication is not a complete, absolute defense to prevent the plaintiff from bringing a libel action.' We have, again, a speaking demurrer. Generally, however, one who invites public judgment is 'in no position to complain if that judgment, opinion,...