Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. SOUTHERN PRE. PAT. WKS.
Decision Date | 25 February 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 16460.,16460. |
Citation | 251 F.2d 537 |
Parties | SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY and American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Appellants, v. SOUTHERN PRECISION PATTERN WORKS, Inc., Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James A. Simpson, Reid B. Barnes, Birmingham, Ala. (Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, Ala., Joseph Higgins, Cincinnati, Ohio, John A. Boykin, Jr., Harvey L. Cosper, Walter R. Byars, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel), for appellants.
W. H. Sadler, Jr., Harold F. Herring, Birmingham, Ala. (Sadler & Sadler, Birmingham, Ala of counsel), for appellee.
Before RIVES, JONES and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
The controlling issue is whether the appellants have acquired over the land of the appellee a right of way, easement or other property interest entitled to protection. The appeal is from a final judgment for the defendant, appellee, in an action for a declaration of rights and for an injunction brought by the appellants as plaintiffs. The findings of fact by the district court are not attacked, and in pertinent part are quoted in the margin.1
A right of way, easement or other property interest is claimed by the appellants over the appellees' tract of land under either of two principles, thus stated in appellants' brief:
1. In support of the claimed twenty-year prescriptive right, the appellants invoke the Alabama doctrine of prescription or repose whereby title to real property may be acquired by virtue of possession for twenty years without recognition of adversary rights or admission of liability, and rely upon the following decisions: Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, 61 So. 100; Walker v. Coley, 264 Ala. 492, 88 So.2d 868; Stearnes v. Woodall, 218 Ala. 128, 130, 117 So. 643, 644; Oxford v. Estes, 229 Ala. 606, 611, 158 So. 534.
See, also, West v. West, 252 Ala. 296, 40 So.2d 873; Sellers v. Valenzuela, 249 Ala. 627, 32 So.2d 517; Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Mason, 222 Ala. 38, 130 So. 559; Hill v. Wing, 193 Ala. 312, 69 So. 445; Stewart v. White, 128 Ala. 202, 30 So. 526, 55 L.R.A. 211; Bellview Cemetery Co. v. McEvers, 168 Ala. 535, 53 So. 272; Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683.
The appellants concede that the cases upon which they rely are cases dealing with "area" occupancy, but point out that the cases relied upon by appellee deal with private alleys and private ways of access, and insist that the instant case involves "area" occupancy because, "Obviously, no one else could occupy the space occupied by Appellants' manhole structures and their connecting conduit."
The distinction which appellants seek to draw seems to be open to the Alabama Supreme Court under the facts of the cases which have been decided, but thus far no such distinction has been recognized in that Court's opinions which are couched in general terms referring to a "private easement," or even expressly to "a right of way or other easement" as in Drummond v. Franck, 252 Ala. 474, 41 So.2d 268, 272.3 Further, the Alabama Supreme Court has shown that the rule in Alabama as to the establishment of a private easement differs from that recognized by the majority of American courts, and requires that, "To create such an easement, there must be evidence that the use was adverse to the owner." West v. West, 252 Ala. 296, 40 So.2d 873, 874, 875.4
The opinion in that case refers to an annotation in 170 A.L.R. 770, and that annotation, beginning on page 794, contains an interesting account of the development of the law in Alabama, and emphasizes particularly that in Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683, "the crossing of the property line by the swinging of the blinds was relied on."
It seems to us that appellants' argument would have the tail wag the dog, for, clearly, the "area" occupation of the land by appellants' manholes and connecting conduit could not ripen into a fee title but was a mere incident to the claimed easement. If the easement were abandoned no one would contend that appellants retained title to the "area" occupied.
It is more reasonable, we think, to consider appellants' "area" occupancy simply as one of the circumstances of notoriety from which knowledge of the owner might be presumed.
17A Am.Jur., Easements, § 84, pp. 699, 700. See, also, Drummond v. Franck, supra; 28 C.J.S. Easements § 12.
That circumstance is entitled to little or no weight in establishing a right of way across this unimproved tract of land. See Trump v. McDonnell, 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353; Annotation, 170 A.L.R. 820. The conduit was buried, only the tops of the manholes projected above the surface and those were concealed by the weeds and undergrowth on the property. The district court found that, "The evidence fails to show that the Sloss Company, or its successor in title, had actual knowledge of the existence of the conduit and posts until shortly before the sale of the property to the defendant." It found further:
Clearly, we think, appellants failed to establish title to an easement across appellee's property under the Alabama doctrine of prescription or repose.
2. We come then to the appellants' alternative claim under the doctrine of Roberts v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 158 U.S. 1, 15 S.Ct. 756, 39 L.Ed. 873, and Birmingham Belt Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 150 Ala. 610, 43 So. 819.
As to the exercise of the power of eminent domain by a corporate public utility where no federal constitutional question is presented, state law must of course control; though actually we find nothing contrary to the law of Alabama in the federal case of Roberts v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., supra, when considered in connection with later federal cases, e. g. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U.S. 260, 271, 18 S.Ct. 794, 43 L.Ed. 157; City of New York v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93, 100, 22 S.Ct. 592, 46 L.Ed. 820; Kindred v. Union Pacific R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 596, 597, 32 S.Ct. 780, 56 L.Ed. 1216; Town of Essex v. New England Telegraph Co., 239 U.S. 313, 321, 36 S.Ct. 102, 60 L.Ed. 301; Lacy v. United States, 5 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 223, 225. None of those cases establishes the doctrine contended for by the appellants that, once a utility is in possession of property which it could expropriate by eminent domain, it has acquired a property interest and cannot be ejected.6 Under their facts, each of those cases was clearly based upon an estoppel against an owner who knew that the utility had entered upon his land and permitted the utility, without objection to expend large sums in work upon the property.
Alabama likewise recognizes that the owner's acquiescence may "estop him from ousting the railroad company by ejectment if the latter is then willing to make just compensation." Tombigbee Valley R. Co. v. Loper, 184 Ala. 343, 63 So. 1006. See, also, Southern Ry. Co. v. Hood, 126 Ala. 312, 28 So. 662. That estoppel is the basis of the rule was expressly stated in Patterson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 204 Ala. 453, 86 So. 20:
86 So. at pages 20-21.
Quoted with approval in Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Brown, 215 Ala. 533, 112 So. 131, 132, and in Montgomery v. ...
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