Coady v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 31 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 98-1311,98-1311
• Citation: 251 F.3d 480
• Parties: (3rd. Cir. 2001) JOSEPH COADY, Appellant v. DONALD T. VAUGHN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 480

251 F.3d 480 (3rd. Cir. 2001)

JOSEPH COADY, Appellant v. DONALD T. VAUGHN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. 98-1311

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued December 10, 1998

Filed May 31, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Nancy Winkelman (Argued), Gillian Thomas, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellant.

Kiersten M. Murray (Argued), John O.J. Shellenberger, Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellees.

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, STAPLETON and WEIS,^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Joseph Coady, a state prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Grater ford, Pennsylvania, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Coady was convicted of rape and indecent assault in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas and sentenced to six to twelve years of imprisonment, effective June 14, 1990. He became eligible for parole on June 14, 1996, the date of expiration of his minimum sentence. On August 19, 1996, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ("PBPP") reviewed his file and denied his application for parole, specifying the following grounds: substance abuse, habitual offender, assaultive instant offense, very high assaultive behavior potential, victim injury, petitioner's need for treatment, failure to benefit from treatment program for sex offenders and substance abuse, and an unfavorable recommendation from the Department of Corrections. On September 16, 1997, the PBPP again reviewed Coady's file and denied his application for many of the same reasons cited in their 1996 decision in addition to his need for continued counseling and treatment and his multiple rape convictions.

Shortly thereafter, Coady filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the PBPP's denial of his parole as a violation of his rights under the United States Constitution. He invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and sought immediate release from prison. A month later, Coady filed an amended petition in which he predicated jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3).

The Magistrate Judge to whom Coady's petition was referred treated it as a Section 2241 petition and recommended that it be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the petition without issuing a certificate of appealability. This timely appeal followed. We appointed counsel to represent Coady, who had previously been proceeding pro se.

I.

Section 2253(c) of Title 28 provides in relevant part:

(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from --

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

Coady maintains that a certificate of appealability is not a prerequisite to our entertaining his appeal. He advances two alternative arguments in support of this proposition: (1) that his petition, which challenges his denial of parole as opposed to his conviction, is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. 2241, and Section 2253(c) does not require a certificate in an appeal from the dismissal or denial of a Section 2241 petition; and (2) that even if his petition is properly brought under Section 2254, rather than Section 2241, Section 2253(c)(1) does not require a certificate because "the detention complained of [in these circumstances does not arise] out of process issued by a state court." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A). Additionally, Coady insists that, even if a certificate were required, he is entitled to have one issued because he has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2).

Respondent maintains that a certificate of appealability is required, that there is no substantial showing of a constitutional violation, and that Coady has, in any event, failed to exhaust his state remedies.

II.

Section 2241 confers jurisdiction on district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus in response to a petition from a state or federal prisoner who "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2241(a) and (c)(3).

Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on district courts to issue "writs of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a).

It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that when two statutes cover the same situation, the more specific statute takes precedence over the more general one. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 657, 137 L. Ed. 2d 917, 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997) ("Ordinarily, where a specific provision conflicts with a general one, the specific governs."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-89, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439, 93 S. Ct. 1827 (1973) (holding that prisoner challenging validity of his confinement on federal constitutional grounds must rely on federal habeas corpus statute, which Congress specifically designed for that purpose, rather than broad language of Section 1983); West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir. 1983). The rationale for this canon is that a general provision should not be applied "when doing so would undermine limitations created by a more specific provision." Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511, 134 L. Ed. 2d 130, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996). In the instant action, both Sections 2241 and 2254 authorize Coady's challenge to the legality of his continued state custody. However, with respect to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners pursuant to Section 2254, Congress has restricted the availability of second and successive petitions through Section 2244(b).¹ Allowing Coady to file the instant petition in federal court pursuant to Section 2241 without reliance on Section 2254 would circumvent this particular restriction in the event that Coady seeks to repetition for habeas relief and would thereby thwart Congressional intent. Thus, applying the "specific governs the general" canon of statutory construction to this action, we hold that Coady must rely on Section 2254 in challenging the execution of his sentence.

Having so concluded, we find it unnecessary to address the validity of the proposition that no certificate of appealability is required in a proceeding initiated under Section 2241. We note only that if Coady is correct in arguing that a certificate is not required in such a proceeding, this would provide an additional reason for holding that Congress has attached restrictions to Section 2254 proceedings that should not be circumvented by permitting a petitioner to go forward under the more general authority conferred by Section 2241.

In reaching our conclusion that Section 2254 is the controlling statute in the circumstances before us, we are not unmindful of the cases which hold that federal prisoners challenging some aspect of the execution of their sentence, such as denial of parole, may proceed under Section 2241. This difference arises from the fact that Section 2255, which like Section 2241 confers habeas corpus jurisdiction over petitions from federal prisoners, is expressly limited to challenges to the validity of the petitioner's sentence.² Thus, Section 2241 is the only statute that confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence. See U.S. v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185-88, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805, 99 S. Ct. 2235 (1979) (holding that Section 2255 authorizes challenges to the lawfulness of a federal sentence, not to the lawfulness of the performance of judgment and sentence); Bennett v. Soto, 850 F.2d 161, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that Section 2255 does not encompass the power to entertain federal prisoner's claim of wrongful revocation of parole); U.S. v. Kennedy, 851 F.2d 689, 691 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) (challenge to parole commission's execution of federal sentence properly challenged under Section 2241); U.S. v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991) (challenge to place of imprisonment, not fact of federal conviction, properly brought under Section 2241); U.S. v. Mares, 868 F.2d 151, 151 (5th Cir. 1989) (claim for credit for time served prior to date of federal sentence must proceed under Section 2241). As we have pointed out, Section 2254, in contrast to Section 2255, confers broad jurisdiction to hear the petition of any state prisoner "in custody in violation of federal law." Thus it is unnecessary to proceed under the more general Section 2241 in order to consider a state prisoner's challenge to the execution of his sentence.

III.

Having concluded that Coady must rely on Section 2254, we turn to Coady's argument that Section 2253(c)(1) does not require a certificate of appealability in a Section 2254 proceeding that challenges the constitutionality of a denial of parole. Noting that Section 2253(c)(1) requires a certificate in a habeas proceeding brought by a state prisoner only where "the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court," Coady asserts that the decision of the parole board he challenges is neither "process" nor "issued by a State court." While this assertion may in fact be true, Coady misunderstands the application of Section 2253(c)(1)(A). Under Section 2253(c)(1)(A), only the "detention complained of" must arise out of process issued by the state court. The state action alleged in the petition to deprive the petitioner of his federal rights need not itself be process issued by a ...