Bond v. Floyd
Decision Date | 10 February 1966 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 9895. |
Citation | 251 F. Supp. 333 |
Parties | Julian BOND, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mrs. Arel Keyes, for themselves jointly and severally, and for all other similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. James "Sloppy" FLOYD et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Howard Moore, Jr., Morris Brown, Charles Morgan, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., Melvin L. Wulf, New York City, for plaintiffs.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., State of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants.
Before TUTTLE and BELL, Circuit Judges, and MORGAN, District Judge.
Mr. Bond, one of the plaintiffs in this matter and a Negro, was refused his seat as a member of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Georgia. He was a Representative-elect, having been duly elected by the voters of House District No. 136 for the session of the General Assembly commencing January 10, 1966. This was a special election for a one year term made necessary by the reapportionment decision of this court. Toombs v. Fortson, N.D., Ga., 1965, 241 F.Supp. 65.
On the first day of the session, at which time Mr. Bond and other members of the House were to take the oath of office, Mr. Bond was asked to step aside because of challenges to his qualifications having been filed by seventy-five of the two-hundred-five members of the House. After the other members were sworn, including seven Negro representatives, petitions protesting the seating of Representative-Elect Bond were referred by the Speaker of the House to a special committee designated to hear the contest. This committee, after a hearing, recommended that he not be seated. This recommendation was accepted by the House and he was denied his seat by a vote of one hundred eighty-four to twelve.
Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes, the other plaintiffs, seek along with Mr. Bond to represent the citizens and voters of House District No. 136 as a class, and it is affirmatively alleged that they are Negro citizens of House District No. 136 and that they are registered voters. They allege that there are common questions of law and fact affecting the civil rights of Negroes to vote and to have members of their race represent them in the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia. It is undisputed that Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes are residents of the district, but it is also undisputed that Dr. King is not registered to vote in the district but in the House District No. 132.
The defendants are the Speaker of the House, the Speaker Pro-Tem, several members of the House representing the membership, certain officers of the House, and the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia. Jurisdiction for declaratory and injunctive relief is asserted under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4), and 2201; and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971(d), 1983, and 1988. Three-Judge District Court jurisdiction was premised on 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 by a claim that the provision of the Georgia Constitution which permits the members of the House to judge the qualifications of its members, and House Rule 61 which embodies the same provision are unconstitutionally vague, or were unconstitutionally administered with respect to Mr. Bond.
The additional causes of action set forth in the complaint were refined by briefs into claims that Mr. Bond was barred from membership because he was a Negro; that the action of the House denied him his First Amendment right to free speech; that he was denied procedural due process as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that he was denied substantive due process in that there was no rational basis for the action of the House; that the House resolution barring Mr. Bond constituted an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder; and that the House action deprived the residents of the House District No. 136 of a republican form of government, equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right as Negroes under the Fifteenth Amendment to vote. The prayer is that defendants be enjoined from excluding Mr. Bond from membership in the House.
The defendants, by motion, have denied the jurisdiction of the court. Additionally, in the alternative, they have moved to dismiss Dr. King and Mrs. Keyes as plaintiffs. They have also answered the complaint. It was stipulated that a final judgment might be rendered on the pleadings, the stipulated facts and such other evidence as was introduced on the hearing of this matter. We thus proceed to final disposition.
The facts which gave rise to the challenge to Mr. Bond stem from a statement issued on January 6, 1966 by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, an organization active in the civil rights field. Mr. Bond is and was Communications Director of this organization. After the statement was issued, Mr. Bond, upon inquiry, advised the news media that he supported the statement in its entirety. He added that he admired the courage of persons who burned their draft cards; that he was a pacifist who was eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in the war in Viet Nam for any reason that they might choose; and said that as a second class citizen he did not feel that he should be required to support the war in Viet Nam.
The SNCC statement follows in full:
On the same day a newspaper reporter asked Mr. Bond for his views on the subject of the burning of draft cards. He stated that he would not burn his own but admired the courage of those who did.
During a taped interview with a representative of the media, Mr. Bond, after endorsing the SNCC statement was asked why he endorsed it, and his answer was as follows:
"Why, I endorse it, first, because I like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that war and any other war and eager and anxious to encourage people not to participate in it for any reason that they choose; and secondly, I agree with this statement because of the reason set forth in it—because I think it is sorta hypocritical for us to maintain that we are fighting for liberty in other places and we are not...
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...Art. VI of the United States Constitution, clearly mandates this conclusion. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra at 582; Bond v. Floyd, 251 F.Supp. 333, 340 (N.D.Ga., three-judge court), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 116, 87 S.Ct. 339, 17 L.Ed.2d 235 (1966). Finally, we must reject t......
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