Waye v. Com., 780848
| Decision Date | 12 January 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 780848,780848 |
| Citation | 219 Va. 683,251 S.E.2d 202 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Alton WAYE v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record |
William L. Wellons, Victoria, Richard J. Bonnie, Charlottesville, for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Marshall Coleman, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Before I'ANSON, C. J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.
In a bifurcated proceeding conducted pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, a jury convicted the defendant, Alton Waye, of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder during the commission of or following rape, Code § 18.2-31(e), and fixed his punishment at death. Code § 18.2-10(a). Following receipt of the report of a probation officer, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court confirmed the jury's verdict and sentenced the defendant to death.
The defendant is here for automatic review of his death sentence. Code § 17-110.1(A). This review has been consolidated with the defendant's appeal from his conviction, and the matter has been given priority on our docket. Code §§ 17-110.1(F), -110.2. The defendant requests, alternatively, that we reverse and remand for trial upon a non-capital offense, that we reverse and remand for a new trial upon the capital murder charge, or that we commute the death sentence to life imprisonment.
The offense in question occurred in Lunenburg County. Upon the defendant's motion, however, a change of venue was ordered, and the case was tried in the Circuit Court of Mecklenburg County.
The evidence shows that the victim, a 61-year-old widow, lived alone in a house located nine-tenths of a mile from a public highway in a rural area of Lunenburg County. The defendant, a 22-year-old factory worker, lived with his father approximately two miles from the victim's home.
In the late afternoon of October 14, 1977, the defendant met a friend, Len Gooden, at a cafe in Kenbridge. After each had consumed several beers, they departed between 7:30 and 8:00 p. m. and obtained a ride to the defendant's home. From there, they embarked, with the defendant driving his own automobile, on a trip to Blackstone to "see a girl named Queenie." Apparently unsuccessful in finding "Queenie," the two men visited other towns in the area. Gooden slept throughout most of the trip, rousing only occasionally as the defendant drove around the countryside.
Between 10:00 and 10:30 p. m., Gooden roused momentarily when the defendant "drove up in the yard" of an unfamiliar house, stated that he "would be right back," and got out of the car. Gooden roused again when the defendant returned and announced that he had "killed the lady."
The defendant drove to his home and told his father that he had "killed a woman." The defendant then telephoned the sheriff's office, reported that he had "killed somebody," and gave his name and directions to his home.
When police officers arrived at the Waye residence, the defendant told them that he had "killed a woman and put her in a bathtub," but that he did not know whom he had killed. Asked where "it" happened, the defendant offered to show the officers where the killing occurred. The defendant accompanied the police officers and directed them to the victim's home. Following the defendant, the officers proceeded through a side door and then upstairs to a bathroom, where they found in the bathtub a woman's nude and mutilated body.
Immediately, the defendant was arrested and advised of "his rights under the Miranda decision." In the police car, the defendant stated that he "did it just like they do on television . . . wiped the knife and everything." He said also, "Man, wait until my friends hear about this."
At the police station, the defendant orally and in writing confessed to killing the victim. In the written confession, he stated that he went to the victim's home and asked to use her telephone. According to the defendant's statement, the victim, clad in a nightgown, admitted him and, without protest, accompanied him to her second floor bedroom. There, they engaged in sexual intercourse, during the course of which he bit her breasts, severing one nipple. Afterward, he struck the victim numerous times in the face with his fists. Then, he went downstairs, found a knife in a kitchen drawer, returned to the bedroom, and stabbed the victim. Dragging the body to the bathroom, he placed it in the bathtub and attempted to cover it with water. Unsuccessful in the attempt, he found a bottle of Clorox and poured the contents over the body. Before leaving the house, he ransacked the interior, took the telephone "off the hook," and turned on the television, hoping to make it appear that "someone had been in and robbed" the victim.
Inspection of the victim's home revealed that it was in shambles. Contents of drawers were strewn about the rooms. The victim's purse had been emptied on a desk. Blood stains appeared both upstairs and downstairs. The murder weapon, a butcher knife, was found on a table beside the victim's bloodsoaked bed.
Scientific evidence established that the victim's body suffered 42 separate stab wounds. The face was battered and bruised beyond recognition. Bite marks appeared on the breasts and buttocks. The hands bore several "defense wounds." The vaginal and anal cavities contained spermatozoa.
In this court, the defendant has raised numerous questions concerning both his conviction and his sentence. These questions relate to pretrial proceedings, incidents of the guilt trial, constitutional challenges to the death penalty statutes, incidents of the penalty trial, and the propriety of the death sentence. The questions will be discussed Seriatim.
The defendant contends that, through a "manipulative procedure" employed by the Commonwealth's Attorney, he was improperly denied a preliminary hearing on the charge of capital murder. He was originally detained, the defendant says, on a non- capital charge of first degree murder, was granted a preliminary hearing on that charge, and was certified to the grand jury. Then, however, the defendant asserts, the Commonwealth's Attorney obtained indictments for both capital murder and first degree murder and proceeded to trial on the capital but not the non-capital offense. This procedure, the defendant maintains, circumvented his statutory right to a preliminary hearing on the charge for which he was ultimately prosecuted.
We disagree with the defendant. Code § 19.2-218 provides that "(n)o person who is Arrested on a charge of felony shall be denied a preliminary hearing . . .." (Emphasis added.) The defendant was not arrested on the charge of capital murder; he was indicted on that charge directly by the grand jury. The procedure employed in obtaining the indictment was not manipulative, and it did not work a denial of any statutory right to which the defendant was entitled. Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 30-31, 129 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1963).
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude for cause a prospective juror, Jessie Winn. On Voir dire, the defendant asserts, Winn evidenced obvious partiality for the testimony of police officers and also displayed a lack of understanding of basic legal concepts, thus raising grave questions concerning his ability to sit impartially as a juror.
Winn was asked on Voir dire whether he thought "a police officer as a witness is entitled to any greater credibility or belief than any other witness just because he is a police officer." When Winn indicated an affirmative belief, the trial judge stated his intention to "disqualify this gentleman." Defense counsel then sought and obtained permission to question Winn further. After several questions concerning his attitude toward the testimony of police officers, Winn stated:
Winn was asked also a number of questions concerning his understanding of presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the alternative punishments available in a capital murder case. After receiving Winn's replies to these inquiries, defense counsel asked the court to exclude him because he "would not be able to sit on a panel and make an intelligent decision." The trial judge refused to exclude Winn, stating that, although Winn appeared "poorly educated," he seemed "to have a basic conviction of what's right and wrong, and he seem(ed) to be entirely fair and honest." Later, the defendant used a peremptory strike to eliminate Winn as a juror.
Whether Winn should have been excluded for cause was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931). Winn's ultimate attitude on the subject of the testimony of police officers was essentially neutral. His responses to the various questions propounded to him, while perhaps not displaying the grasp of a legal technician, satisfactorily indicated that he not only stood indifferent in the cause but also possessed sufficient intelligence to be able to afford the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to exclude Winn for cause.
Pointing out that the trial court excluded for cause three prospective jurors because they voiced objection to imposition of the death penalty, the defendant contends that the use of "death qualifications" questions is improper. Such questioning, the defendant asserts, results in a jury biased in favor of the Commonwealth, thereby violating a defendant's rights to due process and an impartial trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 1
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