Evans v. National Bank of Savannah

• Decision Date: 08 December 1919
• Docket Number: No. 67,67
• Citation: 64 L.Ed. 171,251 U.S. 108,40 S.Ct. 58
• Parties: EVANS v. NATIONAL BANK OF SAVANNAH
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

251 U.S. 108

40 S.Ct. 58

64 L.Ed. 171

EVANS

v NATIONAL BANK OF SAVANNAH.

No. 67.

Argued Nov. 11 and 12, 1919.

Decided Dec. 8, 1919.

Mr. Frederick T. Saussy, of Savannah, Ga., for petitioner.

Messrs. Edward S. Elliott and William Garrard, both of Savannah, Ga., for respondent.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The court below rightly construed the pleadings as presenting only one substantial federal question: Did respondent subject itself to the penalties prescribed for taking usury by discounting short-time notes in the ordinary course of business and charging therefor at the rate of eight per centum per annum in advance? And we think it correctly answered that question in the negative.

Respondent is a national bank. Its powers in respect of discounts, whether transactions by it are usurious and the consequent penalties therefor, must be ascertained upon a consideration of the National Bank Act. Act June 3, 1864, c. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101, 108; R. S. § 5133 et seq. (Comp. St. § 9658); Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. Ed. 196; Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555, 558, 25 L. Ed. 212; Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield, 183 U. S. 132, 134, 22 Sup. Ct. 50, 46 L. Ed. 118. Section 8 declares:

'That every association formed pursuant to the provisions of this act * * * may elect and appoint directors, * * * and exercise under this act all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt, by receiving deposits. * * *'

Section 30, printed in the margin,¹ contains regulations presently important in respect of usury. Among other things, it provides:

'That every association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state or territory where the bank is located, and no more. * * *'

All these provisions were carried into sections 5136, 5197, and 5198, Revised Statutes (Comp. St. §§ 9661, 9758, 9759), set out below.²

The National Bank Act establishes a system of general regulations. It adopts usury laws of the states only in so far as they severally fix the rate of interest. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Dearing, supra; National Bank v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 271, 26 L. Ed. 742; Haseltine v. Central Bank of Springfield, supra.

The Georgia Code (1910) contains the following:

'Sec. 3426. What is Lawful Interest. The legal rate of interest shall remain seven per centum per annum, where the rate per cent. is not named in the contract, and any higher rate must be specified in writing, but in no event to exceed eight per cent. per annum.

'Sec. 3427. What is Usury. Usury is the reserving and taking, or contracting to reserve and take, either directly or by indirection, a greater sum for the use of momey than the lawful interest.'

'Sec. 3436. Beyond Eight Per Cent. Interest Forbidden.

It shall not be lawful for any person, company, or corporation to reserve, charge, or take for any loan or advance of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money, any rate of interest greater than eight per centum per annum, either directly or indirectly by way of commission for advances, discount, exchange, or by any contract or contrivance or device whatever.'

Construing these sections, in Loganville Banking Co. v. Forrester (1915) 143 Ga. 302, 305, 84 S. E. 961, 962 (L. R. A. 1915D, 1195), the Georgia Supreme Court held that charges reserved in advance by a state bank at the highest permitted rate of interest on a loan, whether short or long time, constitute usury, and said:

'If the intent be to take only legal interest, a slight and trifling excess, due to mistake or inadvertence, will not taint the transaction with usury. * * * But if the purpose be to take from the money advanced, at the time of the loan, the legal maximum rate of interest, the transaction is an usurious one.'

Earlier opinions by the court express a different view of the same sections. In Mackenzie v. Flannery (1892) 90 Ga. 590, 599, 16 S. E. 710, 713, it is said:

'Nor can we determine, without reference to the evidence, whether the taking of eight per cent. interest in advance by way of discount was usurious. Eight per cent. was legal if agreed upon in writing; * * * and it is well settled that the taking of interest in advance on short loans in the usual and ordinary course of business is not usurious, if the interest reserved does not exceed the legal rate.'

See, also, Union Savings Bank v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 614, 34 S. E. 217; McCall v. Herring, 116 Ga. 235, 243, 42 S. E. 468.

Petitioner maintains the loans in question would have been usurious if made in Georgia by an individual or a state bank and that the same rule applies notwithstanding the lender happened to be a national bank. Respondent insists that the federal act permits it to discount short-time notes, reserving interest in advance at the maximum interest rate allowed by the state law—in this instance, 8 per centum.

In Fleckner v. Bank, 8 Wheat. 338, 349, 354 (5 L. Ed. 631) the charter of the Bank of the United States inhibited it from taking interest 'more than at the rate of six per centum' and plaintiff claimed that by deducting interest at the rate of 6 per centum from the amount of a discounted note, the bank received usury. Replying to that point, this court, through Mr. Justice Story, said:

'If a transaction of this sort is to be deemed usurious, the same principle must apply with equal force to bank discounts, generally, for the practice is believed to be universal; and probably few, if any, charters contain an express provision authorizing, in terms, the deduction of the interest in advance upon making loans or discounts. It has always been supposed that an authority to discount, or make discounts, did, from the very force of the terms, necessarily include an authority to take the interest in advance. And this is not only the settled opinion among professional and commercial men, but stands approved by the soundest principles of legal construction. Indeed, we do not know in what other sense the word 'discount' is to be interpreted. Even in England, where no statute authorizes bankers to make discounts, it has been solemnly adjudged, that the taking of interest in advance by bankers, upon loans, in the ordinary course of business, is not usurious.'

See, also, McCarthy v. First National Bank, 223 U. S. 493, 499, 32 Sup. Ct. 240, 56 L. Ed. 523.

This view has been generally adopted. Many supporting cases are collected in a note to Bank of Newport v. Cook, 60 Ark. 288, 30 S. W. 35, 29 L. R. A. 761, 46 Am. St. Rep. 171, and in 39 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 948 et seq.

'The taking of interest in advance, upon the discount of a note in the usual course of business by a banker, is not usury. This has long been settled, and is not now open for controversy.' Tyler on Usury (1872) p. 155.

'That it is not

usury to discount commercial paper in the ordinary course of business is absolutely settled. This rule of law arose out of custom and does not depend upon statute.' Webb on Usury (1898) § 111.

Associations organized under the National Bank Act are plainly empowered to discount promissory notes in the ordinary course of business. To discount, ex vi termini, implies reservation of interest in advance; and, under the ancient and commonly accepted doctrine, when dealing with short-time paper such a reservation at the highest interest rate allowed by law is not usurious. Recognizing prevailing practice in business and the above stated doctrine concerning usury, we think Congress intended to endow national banks with the power, which banks generally exercise, of discounting notes reserving charges at the highest rate permitted for interest. To carry out this purpose, the National Bank Act provides that associations organized under it may reserve on any discount interest at the rate allowed by the state, and only when there is reservation at a rate greater than the one specified does the transaction become usurious.

The maximum interest rate allowed by the Georgia statute is 8 per centum. That marks the limit which a national bank there located may charge upon discounts; but its right to retain so much arises from federal law. The latter also completely defines what constitutes the taking of usury by a national bank, referring to the state law only to determine the maximum permitted rate.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice PITNEY, with whom concurred Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting.

I agree that in this case but one federal question is properly presented for our consideration, and that is whether the National Bank of Savannah took usury in violation of sections 5197 and 5198, Rev. Stat. U. S. when, in discounting short-term notes in the ordinary course of business at its banking house in the state of Georgia, it knowingly reserved in advance a discount at the rate of 8 per centum per annum, computed upon the face of such notes, when by the laws of Georgia this was not allowed to be done by state banks of issue.

I agree that this question is to be determined by the provisions of section 5197; but, so far as it depends upon ascertaining the local rate of interest, we must determine it according to the law of the state of Georgia, because the cited sections make that law the criterion. It is settled that although the consequences of acceptance of usurious interest by a national bank and the penalties to be enforced are to be determined by the provisions of the National Banking Act, the ascertainment of the rate of interest allowable is to be according to the state law. Farmers', etc., National Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 32, 23 L. Ed. 196; Union National Bank v. Louisville, &c. Railway, 163 U. S. 325, 331, 16 Sup. Ct....