Latimore, In re

Citation252 A.D.2d 217,683 N.Y.S.2d 526
Parties, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 344 In the Matter of Sonya LATIMORE (admitted as Sonya Whitten Latimore), an attorney and counselor-at-law. Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Sonya Latimore, Esq., Respondent.
Decision Date19 January 1999
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Raymond Vallejo, of counsel (Thomas J. Cahill, Chief Counsel) for petitioner.

Alfredo a Johannes, attorney for respondent.

SULLIVAN, J.P., LERNER, MAZZARELLI, ANDRIAS, SAXE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Sonya Latimore was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on March 28, 1984. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

On January 4, 1996, petitioner Departmental Disciplinary Committee ("Committee") served respondent with a Notice and Statement of Charges alleging that she violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(7) [now (8) ], 9-102(D) and 9-102(E) with respect to two unrelated matters. In the first matter, it is alleged that respondent breached her fiduciary duty as escrow attorney by failing to adequately supervise the escrow account, and by signing several checks in blank while she was out of the country, both of which contributed to her co-signatory's conversion of funds from the account. In the second matter, the Committee alleges that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(8) by persistently failing to exercise supervision over real estate sales persons acting under her real estate broker's license, which persons were engaged in deceptive and fraudulent practices in the sale of Florida real estate.

A Hearing Panel was convened on June 27, August 8, September 26 and December 3, 1996 to receive evidence relating to the charges. The Panel sustained each of the charges in a Report and Recommendation issued November 26, 1997. Written submissions were accepted by the Panel on the issue of sanction, and on July 6, 1998, it recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of six months.

By petition dated July 29, 1998, the Committee seeks an order confirming the Hearing Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and imposing a six-month suspension. Respondent cross-moves to disaffirm the Panel's liability findings, and, alternatively, for a lesser sanction of private reprimand or public censure.

The Panel's findings and conclusions should be confirmed. Regarding the escrow account matter, the record discloses that in March 1992 respondent agreed to act as co-escrow agent with attorney Price, whom she had recently met. Both attorneys' signatures were required for any check drawn on the escrow account and respondent was to receive a fee for her services. In April 1992, before departing on a trip abroad, respondent pre-signed six blank checks from the escrow account and left them with Price. Price converted most of the funds in the account by making several checks payable to "cash." As a result of these allegations, Price was disbarred by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee in the Second Department (see, Matter of Price, 207 A.D.2d 112, 621 N.Y.S.2d 891).

We agree with the Hearing Panel's conclusion that respondent's complete abdication of her responsibilities as a fiduciary to supervise the escrow account, and in providing her co-signatory with pre-signed, blank checks, constituted professional misconduct warranting disciplinary action (see, Matter of Linn, 200 A.D.2d 4, 5, 612 N.Y.S.2d 670; Matter of Pollack, 142 A.D.2d 386, 389, 536 N.Y.S.2d 437). Respondent's actions enabled her co-fiduciary to write out checks from the escrow account to "cash," which is prohibited by DR 9-102(E). 1 As the Panel aptly noted, "[p]re-signing checks on an escrow account that requires two signatures defeats the very purpose of ensuring that the funds are properly disbursed." Respondent also failed to maintain and oversee the required records for all deposits and withdrawals from the account in violation of DR 9-102(D). This conduct plainly contributed to the conversion of the funds (Matter of Linn, supra ). The fact that respondent was unaware of her co-fiduciary's conversion, and pre-signed the check for the client's convenience, does not negate the fact that respondent's conduct was completely inimical to the role of a fiduciary (id.). We further agree that respondent's actions adversely reflect on her fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(8), which, we note, has no scienter requirement.

The charge relating to the failure to supervise sales persons working under her real estate broker's license should also be sustained. Beginning in 1992, respondent was a representative real estate broker and corporate counsel for Florida Management Group Inc. ("FMG") and related entities, which were New York corporations formed to sell land and homes in Florida. The New York State Attorney General's Office commenced an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County...

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