New York Life Insurance Company v. Dick, 15760.

Decision Date07 February 1958
Docket NumberNo. 15760.,15760.
Citation252 F.2d 43
PartiesNEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Blanche DICK, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Norman G. Tenneson, Fargo, N. D., for appellant.

Donald C. Holand, Lisbon, N. D., and Philip B. Vogel, Fargo, N. D., for appellee.

Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH and JOHNSEN, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff (appellee) in an action against the New York Life Insurance Company for double indemnity benefits under policies of life insurance. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy.

William Dick, a North Dakota farmer, forty-seven years of age, while alone with a double-barrel shotgun in the silage shed of his farm on the morning of January 20, 1955, was twice shot by the gun. The first shot severely wounded him on the left side of his chest. The second shot was in the head and killed him instantly.

At the time of his death, William Dick had two policies of life insurance issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, payable to his wife, Blanche Dick, as beneficiary. The policies were in force. Each contained a double indemnity clause. The clause provided that double indemnity should be payable upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured "resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means," but that such indemnity should not be payable if the insured's death resulted from "self-destruction, whether sane or insane."

Blanche Dick, claiming that the shooting was accidental, demanded double indemnity. She brought this action upon that claim. The company in its answer denied that the insured's death was the result of an accident. As an affirmative defense it alleged that his death resulted from self-destruction.

The company paid to Blanche Dick the full face of the policies. The issue whether or not the insured met his death as the result of an accident was tried to a jury. Since the insured's death obviously resulted from means which were both external and violent, the sole issue at the trial was, as a practical matter, whether the death was or was not accidental. At the close of the evidence, the company moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to make the issue one of fact for the jury and that it conclusively showed that the death was suicidal. The motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The company moved that the verdict be set aside and that judgment be entered in its favor in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, or, in the alternative, that it be granted a new trial because of alleged errors of the court during the trial. The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.

The main question for decision is whether there was an adequate evidentiary basis to make the issue whether the insured's death was accidental one of fact for the jury.

The policies in suit are North Dakota contracts, and the applicable substantive law is the law of that State. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188.1

In determining whether the company was entitled to a directed verdict, we must give to the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence, viewed in the aspect most favorable to her. She is not, however, entitled to the benefit of inferences which are unreasonable (Russell v. Turner, 8 Cir., 148 F.2d 562, 565), or which are opposed to the undisputed physical facts. Elzig v. Gudwangen, 8 Cir., 91 F.2d 434, 440 and cases cited.

We find it unnecessary to outline the evidence in complete detail. We have studied it, and the parties are entirely familiar with it. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the insured had no motive to commit suicide; that he was a cheerful man, on excellent terms with his wife, family and friends; that he had no financial worries; that he was 5 feet 7 inches tall, weighed about 165 pounds, and was in good physical condition, except for some prostate trouble which "bothered him a little but it wasn't bad"; that he might have kept his shotgun in the barn, loaded and cocked, because of some past trouble with vicious dogs bothering and killing his sheep; that in the small silage shed between the barn and the silo, where his body was found with the shotgun beside it, there was some silage on the floor which might have caused him to slip and fall; that in the evening of the day preceding his death his attitude and actions were normal, and were the same the following morning when he had breakfast with his wife and fourteen-year-old daughter; that after breakfast he got out the automobile so that his wife could take the daughter to school, and then, with his work clothes on, went about his usual farm chores and fed his cattle in the feed lot adjoining the silage shed; that it was after his wife's return from the school and after she had done her housework and was waiting for him to go with her to a cousin's house to help make bologna, that, about 10:30 A.M., she went to the barn to look for him, and found his body lying on its back on the floor of the silage shed; that she ran to the house and notified his brother and a nephew to come at once; that her husband was a hunter, experienced in the use of firearms, and had had the double-barrel shotgun which caused his death for many years; and that at the time of his death he was wearing rubbers and gloves.

There was evidence that the insured was seldom moody, and then for only brief periods; that he was an able-bodied, strong man; and that nothing he had done or said gave any indication that he contemplated suicide.

The defendant's evidence related largely to the physical facts...

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5 cases
  • Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 18 Mayo 1959
    ...of accidental death continues throughout the trial and has the weight of affirmative evidence. The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, (252 F.2d 43, 46) reviewed the evidence in detail and resolved at least one disputed point in respondent's favor. It found, as 'definitely established by the ......
  • Reserve Mining Company v. Mesabi Iron Company
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • 30 Marzo 1959
    ...8 Cir., 259 F.2d 676, 678; Rosen v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, 8 Cir., 261 F.2d 514, 515, 516; New York Life Insurance Company v. Dick, 8 Cir., 252 F.2d 43, 44. Plaintiff, Reserve Mining Company, a Minnesota corporation, and defendant Mesabi Iron Company, a Delaware corporation, ......
  • National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Graham
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • 16 Abril 1962
    ...New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437, 79 S.Ct. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 935, in which the Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court in 252 F.2d 43. This Court had, in that case, set aside a verdict based upon a finding by a jury that an insured who was shot to death by two successive bla......
  • Collins v. SOUTHERN CENTRAL COMPANY
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas
    • 20 Noviembre 1967
    ...was against both the law and the evidence. 5. The evidence was insufficient to go to the jury." In New York Life Insurance Company v. Dick, (8 Cir.1958) 252 F.2d 43, at page 44, the court said: "In determining whether the company was entitled to a directed verdict, we must give to the plain......
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