The Middlesex
| Decision Date | 13 June 1916 |
| Docket Number | 1335,1336,1432.,1043 |
| Parties | THE MIDDLESEX. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Blodgett Jones, Burnham & Bingham, of Boston, Mass., for claimant.
Lewis Adler & Laws, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Frederick Foster and Warner, Stackpole & Bradlee, all of Boston, Mass., for libelant and petitioners Winfield and another.
Lewis Adler & Laws, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Frederick Foster, of Boston, Mass., for libelant.
Blodgett Jones, Burnham & Bingham, of Boston, Mass., for respondent.
Lewis, Adler & Laws, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Frederick Foster, of Boston, Mass., for libelant.
Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham, of Boston, Mass., for respondent.
Frederick Foster and Sawyer, Hardy, Stone & Morrison, all of Boston, Mass., and Lewis, Adler & Laws, of Philadelphia, Pa., for libelant.
Blodgett, Jones, Burnham & Bingham, of Boston, Mass., for respondent.
These cases grow out of a collision between the steamer Middlesex, owned by the Coastwise Transportation Company, and the five-masted schooner George P. Hudson, which occurred on 11th July, 1914, at about 10:20 p.m., on the high seas, at a point about six miles eastward of Pollock Rip Slue lightship. There was a dense fog at the time. The Hudson sank almost immediately; her captain and two of her crew were drowned. The proceedings now before the court are to recover damages for their deaths, and damages for personal injuries received in the collision by two surviving members of the Hudson's crew. The death claims are presented by three separate libels in personam against the owner of the Middlesex; the claims for personal injuries by an intervening petition in the original libel in rem brought against the steamer by the owners of the schooner and her cargo. No claims for loss of property of any sort are now before the court. No fault is charged against either vessel in respect to lights. It is conceded by the claimant that the steamer's speed, which was six or seven knots an hour at least, was excessive, and that she was at fault in respect thereto.
The principal questions are: First, whether the schooner was at fault for excessive speed and failure to give proper warnings of her presence; and, if so, second, whether such fault on the part of the schooner diminishes the damages if otherwise allowable; and, third, in the death cases only, whether damages can be recovered against the steamer for loss of life.
As to the schooner's speed: She was bound north, running free with the wind over her port quarter. All her lower sails and most of her topsails and jibs were set. She was a long vessel, heavily loaded, and deep in the water. It is difficult to form a satisfactory conclusion as to her speed at the time of the accident. Her crew all testify, in substance, that she had little more than good steerageway-- perhaps three or four miles an hour through the water--and this is to some extent corroborated by the nearly unanimous testimony that the wind was light, and by the fact that tackles had been fastened to some of the booms to keep them from swinging in. On the other hand, it is clear that in the two and a half hours preceding the collision the schooner had come a distance of about twelve nautical miles-- an average speed of about five knots. About one knot an hour was due to the favoring tide, so that her speed through the water averaged about four knots. It is contended by the claimant--the argument being based on a reading of the log and an estimate of the time when the reading was made, testified to by Williams, the mate of the schooner--that within the hour preceding the collision she had covered about seven miles. If so, her speed was certainly immoderate. The argument assumes that the distance from the whistling buoy to the point where the reading was made was as indicated by the log. In fact it was that distance, plus the drift of the tide, which would not show on the log. Williams did not take the time when he read the log, and there is the possibility of substantial error on that important point. There is nothing to show any freshening of the wind after that time or any other reason for increased speed in the last hour before the collision.
I am not satisfied, on the evidence, that the schooner was making at the time of the collision more than her average speed for the two and a half hours immediately preceding, i.e., about four knots per hour through the water, and about five knots over the ground; and the question is whether this was excessive. Of course, a sailing vessel cannot stop and reverse like a steamer. Her only method of avoiding obstacles ahead is by a change of course. Below a certain speed, a long, heavily laden vessel like the Hudson loses almost completely her ability to maneuver. She must maintain such speed-- and, under the circumstances here shown, such speed only-- as will enable her to change course effectively if danger arises. The point at which that rate is exceeded by any particular vessel at any given time is a matter of judgment, depending on many things. Even with steamers it is not uniform; much greater differences must be allowed for in sailing vessels. It devolves upon the respondent to establish that the Hudson's speed was immoderate and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Offshore Logistics, Inc v. Tallentire
...... Such conflict of laws problems arose out of collisions between vessels incorporated in different States and between American-flag vessels and those flying the flag of a foreign jurisdiction that in one celebrated case the perplexed court simply denied recovery entirely. See, e.g., The Middlesex, 253 F. 142 (Mass.1916) (where collision on high seas was between two American vessels whose owners resided or were incorporated in different States, recovery could not be had under any of the potentially applicable state statutes). See also Day, supra, at 650-651, and n. 13; Robinson, Wrongful ......
-
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 33081.
......The difficulties inherent in this situation are well illustrated by the decision in The Middlesex, D.C.Mass.1916, 253 F. 142, in which the court concluded that there could be no recovery under any of three possibly applicable state wrongful death statutes. . This decision in The Middlesex in 1916 increased the agitation which had commenced as early as 1899 for a federal statute ......
-
The James McGee
......1910, p. 1907, Sec. 7) provides a remedy for death by negligence; the United. States has accepted no such liability for the negligence of. its officers or agents. While the decisions strike closely. about such a situation, none quite reach it, except The. Middlesex (D.C.) 253 F. 142. For example, a state statute. will cover the death of a member of another ship's crew,. caused by collision upon navigable waters of the United. States, but within the boundaries of the state, when actions. are brought in state courts (Steamboat Co. v. Chase,. 16 Wall. 522, ......
-
Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines
......Crapo v. Allen, D.Mass.1849, 6 Fed.Cas. page 763, No. 3,360; International Nav. Co. v. Lindstrom, 2 Cir., 123 F. 475; Deslions v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 210 U.S. 95, 137, 28 S.Ct. 664, 52 L.Ed. 973, 993; The Middlesex, D.C., 253 F. 142; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S.Ct. 89, 66 L.Ed. 210; United States Shipping Board Emergency F. Corp. v. Greenwald, 2 Cir., 16 F.2d 948; Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 50 S.Ct. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686; Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 53 S.Ct. ......