The Walter Adams

• Decision Date: 21 June 1918
• Docket Number: 1327-1332.
• Citation: 253 F. 20
• Parties: THE WALTER ADAMS. v. PIEDMONT & GEORGES CREEK COAL CO. SEABOARD FISHERIES CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

253 F. 20

THE WALTER ADAMS.

SEABOARD FISHERIES CO. v. PIEDMONT & GEORGES CREEK COAL CO.

Nos. 1327-1332.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

June 21, 1918

Rathbone Gardner, of Providence, R.I., and Philip L. Miller, of New York City (Charles R. Haslam and Gardner, Pirce & Thornley all of Providence, R.I., and Sullivan & Cromwell, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.

John M Woolsey, of New York City, and Frank Healy, of Providence R.I. (Harry D. Thirkield, of New York City, on the brief) for appellee.

Before DODGE, BINGHAM, and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

DODGE Circuit Judge.

Maritime liens, asserted by the libelant company upon each of the vessels proceeded against in these cases, for amounts of coal alleged to have been furnished to them respectively during the fishing season of 1914, have been sustained as valid by the District Court. The claimant appeals from the decrees, contending that upon the facts proved the libelant acquired no maritime lien upon either of said vessels.

There is little or no dispute as to the material facts. They are for the most part sufficiently set forth in the opinion below. The William B. Murray et al., 240 F. 147.

The libelant had no dealings regarding the furnishing of coal with either of the vessels libeled, through their officers in command; nor did any of its dealings with their owner regarding the coal it claims to have furnished relate to coal required at the time for use by either of said vessels, or to either of said vessels as distinguished from the other vessels included with them in a 'fleet' of nineteen fishing steamers in all. Its dealings were only with the then owner of the entire fleet, referred to in the opinion below as the 'Oil Corporation,' which corporation was employing the fleet, in connection with lands and fishing factories belonging to it at Promised Land, on Long Island, in New York, and at Tiverton, R.I., in a manufacturing business. At the two above-named places the vessels of the fleet delivered fish taken on their successive trips, and also coaled for further trips.

The libelant did not deliver any of the coal it claims to have furnished directly to the vessels libeled, or either of them; nor does it appear to have delivered any of said coal to the Oil Corporation directly, either at Promised Land or at Tiverton. The coal for which it claims liens came to those places in five different shipments, on various dates in May, June and July, 1914. Four of said shipments were delivered, as the opinion below states, at Promised Land, and one at Tiverton. But all the shipments came to those places on barges which had taken the coal on board at the libelant's loading piers near New York City, where the libelant had agreed to deliver it under a previous general agreement with the Oil Corporation so to deliver such coal as said corporation might require for its needs at Promised Land and at Tiverton, during said season, at agreed prices per ton; the delivery of all the coal being f.o.b. at said pier. The above facts regarding said shipments from the libelant's piers, not referred to in the opinion below, but appearing from the invoices and bills of lading relating to the shipments, indicate that delivery of all the coal so shipped to the Oil Corporation took place at the libelant's loading piers. In view of them, we do not think it can be taken as proved that the libelant delivered any of said coal to the Oil Corporation, under the above agreement for delivery, either at Promised Land or at Tiverton. But, even if such delivery can be taken as proved, there is no question that the coal included in the five cargoes was put on board the barges by the libelant at its New York piers without any understanding that it, or any definite part of it, was for either of the vessels libeled, or for any particular vessel of the fleet, or that all of it was for the vessels then composing the fleet. The first shipment, indeed, was expressly identified on the invoice as 'coal for factory.' There can be no doubt that, according to the understanding between the parties, some at least of the coal to be furnished would be needed in the factories, and the Oil Corporation was left, so far as any understanding with the libelant was concerned, to use the coal either in the factories or on the vessels of its fleet, as it might subsequently desire.

If the libelant can be said to have delivered any of the coal comprised in these five shipments to the Oil Corporation, at Promised Land or at Tiverton, there was still no understanding as to the coal so delivered, or any definite part of it, that it was for either of the vessels libeled, or for all of them, or even for all the vessels in the fleet, as distinguished from the factories; and, except that the coal was understood to be for use in its business as carried on at those places, its ultimate disposition was left as above for determination by the Oil Corporation subsequently to the making of the agreement regarding coal for the season, and subsequently to both its shipments and its delivery.

The five shipments were all charged by the libelant on its books to the Oil Corporation, without any entries charging any of it either to a specific vessel, or to specific vessels, or to the fleet; and they were billed to the Oil Corporation only, without any reference to vessels or fleet. When the first shipment to Promised Land arrived there, it was put into the Oil Corporation's bins, which already contained 1,068 tons previously received and paid for by the Oil Corporation in full, under the same general agreement. The remaining three shipments received at Promised Land were dumped on the same pile, and from the entire pile the Oil Corporation used coal as needed, for all the vessels in its fleet of nineteen, and also for running its boiler plant on shore at that place. The shipment received at Tiverton went upon the Oil Corporation's pier there, and was used by it in part for ten of the vessels belonging to its fleet as they needed it, and in part by its boiler plant on shore at that place. Among the vessels which took on board and used some part of the coal included in the five shipments were the vessels proceeded against in this case.

There was evidence tending to show how much coal each of said vessels took on board at Promised Land out of the entire stock at that place, and how much at Tiverton out of the entire stock there, after the five shipments had been received as above. The District Court determined the quantity of coal subsequently received and used by each vessel libeled, out of the coal included in said shipments, as follows: The respective quantities found to have been taken on board at Promised Land by each of said vessels respectively were reduced by an estimated proportion, being the proportion which the 1,068 tons in the pile at Promised Land, before the first of the above shipments to that place had been added thereto, bore to the whole quantity in said pile, after the coal included in said shipments had been added. To the quantities so ascertained were then added the quantities found to have been taken on board by each vessel libeled at Tiverton.

Whether the libelant has shown itself entitled to maritime liens upon these vessels respectively for the respective amounts of coal thus ascertained is a question to be determined, not between it and the owner at the time of said vessels, but between the libelant and the present claimant, who had nothing to do with the libelant's agreement with the Oil Corporation, nor with ordering, receiving, or using the coal shipped under it as above, and who did not become owner of said vessels until after they had received and used the coal. The Oil Corporation mortgaged its property in 1913, including these vessels, to secure its bonds. A bill to foreclose the mortgage so given had been filed in the same District Court wherein the decree now appealed from was rendered. There was a decree of foreclosure upon said bill, ordering the sale of the mortgaged property, and under it these and the other vessels of the fleet were sold April 24, 1915, before this suit was begun. The claimant was the purchaser of these vessels at the sale. The present libels were afterwards filed against them on June 16, 1915. While the sale did not divest valid maritime liens to which the vessels were subject when sold, the question of the validity of the liens asserted in this suit is, so far as the present claim is concerned, a question as to the validity of secret or unrecorded incumbrances.

As to the libelant's original agreement with the Oil Corporation to furnish it with coal for the season, it was never completely embodied in any written document. It appeared that when this agreement was made there was a balance due for coal from the previous year, and that the Oil Corporation was known to be largely indebted, in view whereof there was an understanding between the parties to the effect that the latter should have a maritime lien for the coal it was to furnish, not for the above five shipments specifically, and upon the Oil Corporation's entire fleet, or such vessels belonging to it as might thereafter use any of the coal, not upon any specific vessels included in it. The District Court found it to have been understood by the parties 'that the law would afford a lien upon the vessels for the coal and that the Coal Company would thus have security,' and also understood that 'a large part of the coal furnished was to be used by vessels of the fleet.' A contract cannot afford the necessary basis for a maritime lien, unless it is maritime in its nature, so as to be cognizable in admiralty; and it is not enough that the contract is maritime as to some of its provisions--it must be maritime in...