Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz

• Decision Date: 07 June 1920
• Docket Number: No. 492,492
• Citation: 64 L.Ed. 993,40 S.Ct. 572,253 U.S. 421
• Parties: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. GRATZ et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

253 U.S. 421

40 S.Ct. 572

64 L.Ed. 993

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

v GRATZ et al.

No. 492.

Argued April 20 and 21, 1920.

Decided June 7, 1920.

Messrs. Huston Thompson, of Washington, D. C., Alexander C. King, of Atlanta, Ga., and Claude R. Porter, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Mr. Thomas F. Magner, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for respondents.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

By an act approved September 26, 1914 (chapter 311, 38 Stat. 717 [Comp. St. §§ 8836a-8836k]), Congress made provision for the Federal Trade Commission and declared its powers.

Section 4 (section 8836d) defines commerce as:

'Commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, or in any territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such territory and another, or between any such territory and any state or foreign nation or between the District of Columbia and any state or territory or foreign nation.'

Section 5 (section 8836e):

'That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common carriers subject to the acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce. Whenever the commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation, has been or is using any unfair method of competition in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respc t, and containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the service of said complaint. The person, partnership, or corporation so complained of shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause why an order should not be entered by the commission requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from the violation of the law so charged in said complaint. * * * If upon such hearing the commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competition in question is prohibited by this act, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts, and shall issue and cause to be served on such person, partnership, or corporation an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition.'

Section 5 further provides that the commission may apply to the designated Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce an order——

'and shall certify and file with its application a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding, including all the testimony taken and the report and order of the commission. Upon such filing of the application and transcript the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, partnership, or corporation and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and the question determined therein, and shall have power to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the commission. The findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive. * * * The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari as provided by section 240 of the Judicial Code. Any party required by such order of the commission to cease and desist from using such method of competition may obtain a review of such order in said Circuit Court of Appeals by filing in the court a written petition praying that the order of the commission be set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith served upon the commission, and thereupon the commission forthwith shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the record as hereinbefore provided. Upon the filing of the transcript the court shall have the same jurisdiction to affirm, set aside, or modify the order of the commission as in the case of an application by the commission for an enforcement of its order, and the findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by testimony, shall in like manner be conclusive.'

Sections 6 and 7 (sections 8836f, 8836g) empower the commission to require reports and compile information concerning corporations; to inquire concerning execution of decrees restraining violations of the anti-trust acts; to investigate alleged violations of such acts; to recommend readjustments of corporate business; to publish information and make reports to Congress; to classify corporations and make rules and regulations; to investigate trade conditions; to act, under orders of the court, as a master in chancery in certain designated circumstances, etc.

Undertaking to proceed under section 5, June 4, 1917, the commission issued a complaint containing two counts against respondents. The first related to unfair methods of competition, and the second charged violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, approved October 15, 1914 (chapter 323, 38 Stat. 730 [Comp. St. § 8835c]). Respondents denied both charges. After taking much testimony the commission held there was no evidence to support the second count; but it ruled that respondents had practiced unfair competition and ordered that they——

'their officers and agents, cease and desist from requiring purchasers of cotton ties to also buy or agree to buy, a proportionate amount of American Manufacturing Company's bagging and fr ther that the respondents cease and desist from refusing to sell cotton ties unless the purchasers buy or agree to buy from them corresponding amounts of American Manufacturing Company's bagging, or any amount of cotton bagging of any kind.'

Upon respondents' petition the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, annulled the commission's order. 258 Fed. 314, 169 C. C. A. 330. It said:

'We think there is no evidence to support any general practice of the respondents to refuse to sell ties unless the purchaser bought at the same time the necessary amount of the American Manufacturning Company's bagging, and that the commission has no jurisdiction to determine the merits of specific individual grievances.'

The challenged order is based solely upon the first count of the complaint which follows:

'Federal Trade Commission v. Anderson Gratz and Benjamin Gratz, Copartners Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of Warren, Jones & Gratz, P. P. Williams, W. H. Fitzhugh, and Alex. Fitzhugh, Copartners Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of P. P. Williams & Co., and Charles O. Elmer.

'The Federal Trade Commission having reason to believe, from a preliminary investigation made by it, that Anderson Gratz and Benjamin Gratz, copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Warren, Jones & Gratz, P. P. Williams, W. H. Fitzhugh, and Alex. Fitzhugh, copartners doing business under the firm name and style of P. P. Williams & Co., and Charles O. Elmer, all of whom are hereinafter referred to as respondents, have been and are using unfair methods of competition in interstate commerce in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the act of Congress approved September 26, 1914, entitled 'An act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define its powers and duties, and for other purposes,' and it appearing that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, issues this complaint, stating its charges in that respect, on information and belief, as follows:

'I.

'Paragraph 1: That the respondents Anderson Gratz and Benjamin Gratz are copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Warren, Jones & Gratz, having their principal office and place of business in the city of St. Louis and state of Missouri, and are engaged in the business of selling, in interstate commerce, either directly to the trade, or through the respondents hereinafter named, steel ties made and used for binding bales of cotton, and which steel ties are manufactured by the Carnegie Steel Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and also selling, in the same manner, jute bagging, used to wrap bales of cotton, and which jute bagging is manufactured by the American Manufacturing Company, of St. Louis, Missouri.

'Paragraph 2: That the respondents P. P. Williams, W. H. Fitzhugh, and Alex. Fitzhugh are copartners doing business under the firm name and style of P. P. Williams & Co., having their principal office and place of business in the city of Vicksburg and state of Mississippi, and the said last-named respondents and the said respondent Charles O. Elmer, who is located and doing business at the city of New Orleans and state of Louisiana, are the selling and distributing agents of the said firm of Warren, Jones & Gratz, and sell and distribute the ties and bagging, manufactured as aforesaid, in interstate commerce, principally to jobbers and dealers, who resell the same to retailers, cotton ginners, and farmers.

'Paragraph 3: That with the purpose, intent, and effect of discouraging and stifling competition in interstate commerce in the sale of such bagging, all of the respondents do now refuse and for more than a year last past have refused, to sell and of such ties unless the prospective purchaser thereof would also buy from them bagging to be used with the number of ties proposed to be bought; that is to say, for each six of such ties proposed to be bought from the respondents the prospective purchaser is required to buy six yards of such bag ing.'

It is unnecessary now to discuss conflicting views concerning validity and meaning of the act creating the commission and effect of the evidence presented. The judgment below must be affirmed, since, in our opinion, the first count of...