U.S.A. v. Hussey, Docket No. 00-1528
| Decision Date | 01 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 00-1528 |
| Citation | 254 F.3d 428 |
| Parties | (2nd Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MARC W. HUSSEY, BLAKE W. ALEXANDER, MELVIN LLOYD RICHARDS, FRANK P. ZITKEVITZ, Defendants-Appellants, LAURENCE T. ZITKEVITZ, AGUNLOYE OLAWANDE, aka WANDE, ALEX SHEYFER, ALEXANDER ZALMENENKO, Defendants. (L), 00-1606, 00-1614, 00-1625 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Appellants were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny Chin, Judge) of various offenses, including conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and/or wire fraud. Appellants challenge their convictions and sentences on appeal, arguing, among other things, that the District Court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust under Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Affirmed.
ANTHONY RANDAZZ (Miles Feinstein, on the brief), Clifton, NJ, for Appellant Marc W. Hussey.
ROBERT J. KRAKOW, New York, NY, for Appellant Blake W. Alexander.
DEBORAH A. SCHWARTZ, New York, NY, for Appellant Melvin Lloyd Richards.
JAMES M. BRANDEN (Valerie S. Amsterdam, on the brief), Amsterdam & Branden, New York, NY, for Appellant Frank P. Zitkevitz.
NANCY KESTENBAUM, Assistant United States Attorney (Joanna C. Hendon, Gary Stein, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel; Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, on the brief), United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee United States of America.
Before: CABRANES, STRAUB, and SACK, Circuit Judges.
The question presented here is whether a defendant, who facilitates the commission of a crime by falsely indicating that he legitimately holds a position of trust, can "abuse...a position of trust" within the meaning of Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. We answer in the affirmative and, therefore, affirm.
Appellants Marc Hussey, Blake Alexander, Melvin Richards, and Frank Zitkevitz were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Denny Chin, Judge) of various offenses, including conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and/or wire fraud. Appellants challenge their convictions and sentences on appeal. In a separate summary order filed today, we address appellants' main arguments and affirm the District Court's judgments with respect to all issues raised therein. In this opinion, we address only the challenge of Hussey and Alexander to the District Court's imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the enhancement was proper.
We summarize here only the facts relevant to the sentencing issue discussed below.
In March 1997, Zitkevitz and his brother sought to raise money by selling stock in their private start-up company, Environmental Marketing Concepts ("EMC"). To encourage the sale of the stock, they solicited the help of an unregistered brokerage firm known as O.D. Brown Marketing Corp. ("Brown"). The brokers at Brown, including Alexander, received secret commissions for their sale of EMC stock. Alexander, who received payments of approximately 10 percent of the cash value of the EMC shares sold, never disclosed these commissions to his investors. Indeed, one memorandum used to sell EMC stock falsely stated that the brokers at Brown received no commissions for their sales.
In approximately April 1997, EMC merged with another company to form United Media Group, Inc. ("UMGI"). As before, Alexander received undisclosed commissions for selling shares of UMGI stock. Hussey, who joined Brown in August or September 1997, also received commissions for his sales. The commissions totaled between 10 and 20 percent of the cash value of the shares sold, and were never disclosed to investors.
By the end of 1997, Hussey had sold approximately $30,000 worth of UMGI stock, and Alexander had sold approximately $50,000 worth of EMC stock and $230,000 worth of UMGI stock. Although neither Hussey nor Alexander was a licensed broker, both identified themselves as such when selling stock.
In December 1998, the Government charged Hussey and Alexander, along with others involved in the fraudulent scheme, with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and wire fraud. After a fourteen-day trial, a jury found both Hussey and Alexander guilty of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, and securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §78.
In June and September 2000, the District Court sentenced Hussey principally to 36 months' imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and restitution of $35,237.25; and Alexander principally to 30 months' imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and restitution of $237,630. In determining these sentences,1 the District Court enhanced the base offense levels of both Hussey and Alexander by two under Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust. See U.S.S.G. §3B1.3.2 The District Court applied this enhancement because it found that both defendants had significantly advanced their fraudulent scheme by pretending to be licensed stockbrokers, thereby abusing a position of trust with their investors.
On appeal, Hussey and Alexander argue, among other things, that the District Court erred in applying this sentencing enhancement because they did not "hold" positions of trust within the meaning of Section 3B1.3. To support this argument, they rely on United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1994), where we held that an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust is directed at those who "legitimately occupy positions of public or private trust." Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
We write to clarify the scope of Section 3B1.3 and our holding in Echevarria.
Section 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant "abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." U.S.S.G. §3B1.3 (1998). Whether a defendant occupies a "position of trust" within the meaning of this provision is viewed from the perspective of the victim, and is a question of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1998). Whether a defendant abused a position of trust in a manner that "significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense" is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. See United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 227 (2d Cir. 2001).
We have held that a stockbroker occupies a "position of trust" within the meaning of Section 3B1.3 if his victim entrusts him with discretionary authority. See Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 227-28. Hussey and Alexander argue, however, that this holding extends only to those who are actually licensed stockbrokers, and not to those who merely pretend to be licensed stockbrokers. They contend that such a result is required by United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1994), where we held that a person "holds" a position of trust within the meaning of Section 3B1.3 only where he "legitimately" occupies that position. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
In Echevarria, we reviewed the sentence of a defendant who misrepresented himself as a licensed physician to insurance companies and low-income "patients," among others, and submitted claims for medical services that were never provided or were fraudulently provided. The defendant was convicted of committing fraud on the insurance companies, and the district court enhanced his sentence under Section 3B1.3 for abuse of a position of trust. We vacated the defendant's sentence, holding "that Section 3B1.3 is reserved for those who legitimately occupy, rather than pretend to occupy, a position of trust." Id. at 181. As a basis for this conclusion, we noted that the commentary to Section 3B1.3 suggested that the enhancement was reserved for those who actually "hold[ ]" a position of public and private trust; accordingly, an imposter who merely pretends to hold a position falls outside the scope of Section 3B1.3. See id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, application note 1 (1993)).
We also held that the two-level enhancement was improper because it was "duplicative of the underlying fraud for which [the defendant] was convicted." Id. As we explained, "[t]he core of the offenses of which [the defendant in Echevarria] was convicted...was his misrepresentation that he was a qualified physician," and "[h]is underlying convictions addressed, and punished, that misrepresentation." Id. Accordingly, we concluded that the two-level enhancement was inappropriate because it duplicated the punishment imposed for the underlying conviction. See id.
Hussey and Alexander argue that Echevarria requires us to vacate their sentences. They contend that they, like the defendant in Echevarria, did not legitimately hold a position of trust when they committed their crimes; accordingly, they did not "abuse...a position of trust" within the meaning of Section 3B1.3. We disagree.
The instant case is distinguishable from Echevarria for two reasons. First and more importantly, whereas the defendant in Echevarria did not create the impression that he stood in a fiduciary relationship with his principal victims-the defrauded insurance companies-Hussey and Alexander created such an impression, and in fact enjoyed a relationship of trust, with their victims-the defrauded investors. See United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (). The principal victims in Echevarria were not...
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False statements and false claims.
...or government agency are subject to two-level increase over base offense level or increase to level ten); see United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding enhancement of sentence where defendants misrepresented themselves as members of a licensed stock brokerage comp......
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False statements and false claims.
...or government agency are subject to two-level increase over base offense level or increase to level ten); see United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428, 432(2d Cir. 2001)(upholding enhancement of sentence where defendants misrepresented themselves as members of a licensed stock brokerage compan......
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False statements and false claims.
...or government agency are subject to two-level increase over base offense level or increase to level ten); see United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding enhancement of sentence where defendants misrepresented themselves as members of a licensed stock brokerage comp......
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False statements and false claims.
...or government agency are subject to two-level increase over base offense level or increase to level ten); see United States v. Hussey, 254 F.3d 428,432 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding enhancement of sentence where defendants misrepresented themselves as members of a licensed stock brokerage compa......