State v. Williams
| Decision Date | 15 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,263.,32,263. |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,v.Terry WILLIAMS, Defendant–Respondent. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.Jacqueline Cooper, Chief Public Defender, Eleanor Brogan, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
{1} We granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits an under-clothing search as part of a search incident to arrest when the arresting officer has reason to suspect that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband under his or her clothing. The State appeals the holding of the Court of Appeals that the roadside search of Defendant Terry Williams, incident to his arrest on an outstanding felony warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. We adopt and apply the reasonableness factors articulated in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an under-clothing search and the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals' opinion is reversed.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested on an outstanding felony warrant. The Second Judicial District Court held a suppression hearing at which both the arresting officer and Defendant testified. The district court ruled from the bench that it found the officer's testimony credible. Because this Court defers “to the district court's review of the testimony and other evidence presented,” State v. Leyva, 2011–NMSC–009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861, unless otherwise noted, the factual background presented below is drawn from the testimony of the arresting officer at the suppression hearing.
{3} The traffic stop occurred in Albuquerque, on University near Gibson, across the street from a church parking lot. As the officer who conducted the stop approached the vehicle, he saw through the open window that Defendant's hands were removed from the steering wheel and his shoulders were moving as if he were “fumbling around” with an object. Based on his ten years of training and experience, the officer found these actions to be consistent with concealing contraband or searching for a weapon. After obtaining Defendant's information and running a background check, the officer confirmed that an outstanding felony arrest warrant existed for Defendant.
{4} A female backup officer arrived at the scene of the stop. The arresting officer asked Defendant to exit the vehicle; when Defendant did so, his pants were unzipped and his belt unbuckled. Pursuant to the warrant, Defendant was placed under arrest and handcuffed. Defendant was placed between the two police cars parked bumper-to-bumper on the side of University, with the female officer standing between the two cars, facing away from Defendant, and Defendant standing between the two officers. The arresting officer patted Defendant down incident to the arrest, and then shook the waistband of Defendant's pants. The officer pulled the waistband of Defendant's pants and underpants outward six to eight inches, looked down, and saw a plastic bag underneath Defendant's underpants. The officer, with a gloved hand, reached down and removed the bag; the bag's contents later tested positive as illegal substances.
{5} The female officer did not observe the search of Defendant. Although Defendant testified that the search occurred on a busy street, there was no testimony by either the officer or Defendant that any other individual, such as a pedestrian or passing driver, could see underneath Defendant's clothing.
{6} The district court concluded that the search of Defendant was a lawful search incident to arrest and denied the suppression motion. Defendant entered a plea of no contest to trafficking by possession with intent to distribute, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.
{7} To the Court of Appeals, Defendant alleged four points of error: (1) that the underclothing search incident to his arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution; (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) that his plea agreement was not entered into knowingly or voluntarily; and (4) that his plea should be withdrawn and his case should proceed to trial. State v. Williams, 2010–NMCA–030, ¶ 5, 148 N.M. 160, 231 P.3d 616. The Court of Appeals determined that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and did not reach Defendant's other issues. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21. Judge Fry dissented on the grounds that Defendant had not preserved the argument that the search was unreasonable, but, if the issue was preserved, then the search did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because the officer had developed reasonable suspicion that Defendant had concealed a weapon in his pants and the search was limited in scope. Id. ¶ 30.
II. DISCUSSIONA. Standard of Review
{8} The review of a denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. Leyva, 2011–NMSC–009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. We review the factual basis of the court's ruling for substantial evidence, deferring to the district court's view of the evidence. Id. When, as here, there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law, we “draw all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of the district court's ruling.” State v. Jason L., 2000–NMSC–018, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. Our review of the legal conclusions of the district court, however, is de novo. State v. Rowell, 2008–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95. “Warrantless seizures are presumed to be unreasonable and the State bears the burden of proving reasonableness.” Id. ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Preservation
{9} Under Rule 12–216(A) NMRA, “[t]o preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked[.]” In his pro se motion to suppress, on which we commend Defendant, Defendant argued that the search under his clothing violated the Fourth Amendment. Although the parties did not, as noted by Judge Fry in her dissent, “focus on the reasonableness of the search” at the suppression hearing, Williams, 2010–NMCA–030, ¶ 31, 148 N.M. 160, 231 P.3d 616, Defendant's motion to suppress properly preserved the Fourth Amendment argument. See State v. Javier M., 2001–NMSC–030, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1.
C. Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of Under–Clothing Searches
{10} The Fourth Amendment requires all searches and seizures be executed in a reasonable manner. See Leyva, 2011–NMSC–009, ¶ 9, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Reasonableness depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Penn. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is well established that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when an officer conducts a warrantless pat-down incident to arrest to ensure officer safety and prevent the destruction of evidence, and Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of the initial pat-down he received. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Rowell, 2008–NMSC–041, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95. It is undisputed, however, that the search in this case extended beyond a pat-down of Defendant's outer clothing. When a more invasive search is conducted, it is not presumed to be reasonable simply because it occurs incident to an arrest. See Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 361 (4th Cir.2001); United States v. Scott, 987 A.2d 1180, 1195 (D.C.2010).
{11} To guide the reasonableness analysis of more intrusive searches, such as the underclothing search that occurred in this case, courts review the factors articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell: “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (). See, e.g., Amaechi, 237 F.3d at 361; Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393–94 (10th Cir.1984); Scott, 987 A.2d at 1195; State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 861 A.2d 62, 71 (2004); People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 856 N.Y.S.2d 540, 886 N.E.2d 162, 166 (2008); State v. Battle, 688 S.E.2d 805, 812 (N.C.Ct.App.2010). We approve the Court of Appeals' incorporation of the Bell factors into New Mexico jurisprudence to consider whether the search of Defendant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Williams, 2010–NMCA–030, ¶ 12, 148 N.M. 160, 231 P.3d 616.
{12} Before discussing the Bell factors in the context of Defendant's search, we resolve the question of the minimum quantum of suspicion required to justify an under-clothing search conducted incident to an arrest.1 Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed directly the question of the level of proof necessary to justify a search more intrusive than a pat-down,2 the weight of authority supports a requirement of reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or contraband underneath his or her clothing before an under-clothing search is conducted. See State v. Jenkins, 82 Conn.App. 111, 842 A.2d 1148, 1156 (2004) (); Scott, 987 A.2d at 1196–97 (...
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