U.S.A. v. Harris & Taylor
| Citation | 255 F.3d 288 |
| Decision Date | 24 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-6224,99-6254,99-6224 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas R. Harris (99-6224); Aaron L. Taylor (99-6254), Defendants-Appellants. Argued: |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga, Nos. 99-00007; 99-00010, R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge.
Perry H. Piper, Gary Hhumble, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Rita C. LaLumia, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES, Chattanooga, Tennessee, David F. Ness, Great Falls, MT, for Defendant-Appellant, Thomas R. Harris.
John E. Eberly, EBERLY LAW FIRM, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellants, Aaron L. Taylor.
Before: BATCHELDER and CLAY, Circuit Judges; POLSTER, District Judge. *
POLSTER, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. CLAY, J. (pp. 13-21), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Defendants Thomas R. Harris and Aaron Taylor appeal from their convictions on charges of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), claiming that the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgments of conviction.
During the summer of 1998, Detective Stephen Hope of the Chattanooga Police Department ("Chattanooga Police") learned from a confidential informant that a person known as "Fat Boy" had been selling crack cocaine from a home located at 1241 Poplar Street in Chattanooga, Tennessee ("the residence"). On August 11, 1998, Detective Hope sent the confidential informant to the residence to make a controlled purchase. The confidential informant purchased one "rock" of crack cocaine from "Fat Boy" on that day. On October 8, 1998, the confidential informant returned to the residence and purchased another "rock" of crack cocaine.
On October 9, 1998, Detective Hope prepared an affidavit containing the following information and presented it to a state court judge:
I, Stephen L. Hope, hereby apply for a search warrant and make oath as follows:
1.I am a sworn Chattanooga Police Officer with the Narcotics Division, where I have been assigned to the Narcotics Division since 1996.
2.That on the [sic] 10-8-98, I received reliable information from an informant I have known for the last five months.
3.The said informant has proven to be reliable after the information said informant provided was independently corroborated by Detective Hope.
4.The said informant has provided information in the past that has lead [sic] to the arrest and conviction of individuals in violation of narcotic laws.
5.The said informant has provided information to other law enforcement officers in the past that has proven to be true and correct when independently corroborated by those other law enforcement officers.
6.The said informant has made several controlled narcotic buys for me in the last five months.
7.That said informant advised me that within the last 72 hours said informant was on the premises of said John Doe (alias), who resides in or occupies and is in possession of the following described premises, to wit; 1241 Poplar Street Court, Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee.. [sic] While there said informant saw legend and/or narcotic drugs including Crack Cocaine, the same being on said premises in the possession of and control of said John Doe (alias).
Wherefore, as such officer acting in performance of my duty in the premises I pray that the Court issue a warrant authorizing the search of the said John Doe (alias) and the premises herein described for said legend and/or narcotic drugs including Crack Cocaine and that such search be made either by day or night.
In addition to filing the affidavit, Detective Hope orally advised the state court judge of the name and identity of the confidential informant and of the fact that the confidential informant had made two controlled buys at the residence. The state court judge issued the search warrant based upon the information presented to him. Later the same day, October 9, 1998, Detective Hope sent the confidential informant back to the residence to attempt another controlled buy. The confidential informant found "Fat Boy" at the residence, but was not successful in purchasing crack cocaine. The Chattanooga Police waited until the next week to execute the search warrant because the confidential informant told Detective Hope that drugs might not be found at the 1241 Poplar Street address over the weekend.
On October 13, 1998, the Chattanooga Police executed the search warrant that had been issued four days earlier. When they arrived at the residence, the police officers knocked on the front door and announced their presence. After receiving no response, the officers entered the residence. Officers caught Defendant Taylor attempting to flee the residence while carrying crack cocaine on his person. A detective found Defendant Harris in a second-floor bathroom, seated on a toilet with a pile of crack cocaine located next to him. The detective did not knock before entering the bathroom, but had shouted, "Police, warrant!" as he proceeded up the stairs to the second floor.
Both defendants filed motions to suppress evidence obtained by police during the search. Taylor's motion to suppress argued that the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not apply because the officer knew or should have known that he did not have probable cause. Harris' motion to suppress argued that the evidence found in the bathroom should be suppressed because the detective violated Harris' legitimate expectation of privacy by entering the bathroom while he was seated on the toilet without first knocking on the closed door and announcing the purpose of entry. Although Harris did not raise lack of probable cause for the search in his motion to suppress, he subsequently joined in the motion filed by Taylor.
Following a joint evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Taylor's motion to suppress. Although the court found that the detective's affidavit "f[ell] a little short of establishing probable cause under the Fourth Amendment," it concluded that the search fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The court also denied Harris' motion to suppress. The court's denial of that motion rested upon its finding that Harris possessed no legitimate expectation of privacy in the bathroom because he was merely a temporary visitor present in the house for the purpose of purchasing or trafficking in crack cocaine.
On August 16, 1999, Taylor and Harris entered conditional guilty pleas, admitting the factual basis for their convictions, but reserving the right to challenge the district court's denial of their motions to suppress. On appeal, both defendants contend that the district court erred in finding that the Leon exception applied. Harris further contends that the trial court erred in finding that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy while using a toilet in the bathroom of the residence.
A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to a mixed standard of review. The factual findings supporting the court's decision must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). The court's final determination as to the reasonableness of the search is, however, a question of law that must be reviewed de novo. Knox County Education Ass'n v. Knox County Board of Education, 130 F.3d 361, 371 (6th Cir. 1998). When reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This Court has defined probable cause as "reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990). A finding of probable cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but rather, "requires 'only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. . . .'" United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244, n.13 (1983)).
In this case, the district court held that the affidavit provided by Detective Hope to the state court judge did not provide a sufficient basis for establishing probable cause for the search. It reached this conclusion after reviewing the decision inUnited States v. Allen, 168 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1999), which concerned the issuance of a search warrant based upon an affidavit quite similar to the one in this case. The affidavit in Allen, prepared by an officer from the same police department as Detective Hope, stated that the officer had learned from a confidential source that a person residing at a certain house was in possession of cocaine. Id. at 296. The officer noted in the affidavit that the informant had previously provided him with reliable information about individuals engaged in criminal activities and that he had known the informant for five years. Id. During a hearing on the warrant, the officer disclosed the name of the informant to the magistrate. Id. at 297. The panel in Allen determined that the warrant failed to establish probable cause.
During the pendency of this appeal, this Court, sitting en banc, reversed the panel decision in Allen relied upon by the district...
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