State v. Bradley, 13843
Citation | 163 W.Va. 148,255 S.E.2d 356 |
Decision Date | 29 May 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 13843,13843 |
Parties | STATE of West Virginia v. Richard Gale BRADLEY. |
Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Syllabus by the Court
1. When a criminal defendant requests counsel, it is the duty of those in whose custody he is, to secure counsel for the accused within a reasonable time. In the interim, no interrogation shall be conducted, under any guise or by any artifice. W.Va.Const. Art. 3, § 5 and W.Va.Const. Art. 3, § 14.
2. If after requesting counsel an accused shall recant his request, there is a heavy burden upon the state to prove his waiver of right to counsel.
3. There can be no interrogation of a person accused of committing a crime after he requests counsel, until counsel is provided except that if the suspect recants his request before counsel can be provided with reasonable dispatch, interrogation may be conducted.
John S. Sibray, J. Stephen Max, James M. Sturgeon, Jr., Charleston, for plaintiff in error.
Chauncey H. Browning, Atty. Gen., Pamela Dawn Tarr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for defendant in error.
A Kanawha County Circuit Court jury convicted Richard Gale Bradley of murdering a fellow inmate in the county jail. The only problem with the trial we need probe is the propriety of introduction of testimony by policemen about oral statements made by Bradley that incriminated him in beating and incinerating the inmate.
The killing occurred on the morning of March 29, 1975. That evening, the county sheriff and two of his deputies approached defendant and read an "Interrogation: Advice of Rights" form:
One of the deputies asked him if he understood what had been read to him and he said he did. The deputy then asked him to sign a waiver:
Bradley refused to sign. He requested that he be allowed to speak to William Hazlett, an attorney representing him on another charge. Unsuccessful efforts were made to reach Hazlett and another person defendant wanted to contact, and the sheriffs questioned him no further.
Two days later in the morning, and without any further effort to obtain counsel for Bradley, the two deputies and a Charleston city police detective again read defendant his "rights" and the waiver. He affirmed his understanding, refused to sign the waiver, and asked for a lawyer. No further questioning was conducted. But neither was there effort to get the man a lawyer.
That afternoon two of the officers arrested him, read the warnings which again defendant acknowledged understanding, and thereupon transported him to the office of a justice of the peace where a warrant issued charging him with murder. The justice of the peace also advised him of his right to counsel. The record is silent about his response to this advice.
Later, after returning to the jail, when faced with what the police officers characterized as a group of hostile media employees, he volunteered statements to the police who had him in custody. He prefaced the admissions with vouchments such as,
He refused to give a written statement but the next day again spoke with officers, corroborating what he had told them before.
These oral admissions were not suppressed by the trial court and were used in defendant's trial.
The main argument advanced by the state supporting admission of the remarks made by defendant, is that he waived his Fifth Amendment rights and his right to counsel.
" " " " (Emphasis supplied) (United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 224 (5th Cir. 1970), Cert. den., 397 U.S. 1022, (90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 532) (1970))
Quoted in: United States v. Mix, 446 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1971), and United States v. Daniel, 441 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1971).
This argument fails because it overlooks this defendant's specific requests for counsel at least twice made. And it also overlooks his refusal to sign the waivers proffered to him at least twice.
We would certainly contribute nothing to a logical body of law were we to hold that a man who asks for a lawyer and expressly refuses to sign a waiver of his right to a lawyer, thereby waives that right. "I want a lawyer" does not mean "I do not want a lawyer." "I will not waive my right to a lawyer" does not mean "I waive my right to a lawyer." "No" does not mean "yes."
And our law is clear that once the request for counsel is made, all interrogation that day or later stops, until counsel is provided. We cannot allow a request for counsel to be avoided by minimal...
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