Phillips v. Collings

• Citation: 256 F.3d 843
• Decision Date: 11 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-2176,00-2176
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2001) LARRY PHILLIPS, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, v. CATHY COLLINGS, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. Submitted:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 843

256 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2001)

LARRY PHILLIPS, PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, v. CATHY COLLINGS, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

No. 00-2176

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: April 11, 2001

Filed: July 19, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Bye and Beam, Circuit Judges, and Melloy,¹ District Judge.

Melloy, District Judge

Cathy Collings ("Collings") appeals the district court's² denial of her motion for judgment as a matter of law, and in the alternative, the denial of her motion for a new trial in this civil rights action filed by Larry Phillips ("Phillips"). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1994, Phillips was hired as a social service worker by the State of Missouri in the Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services ("DFS"). Phillips was assigned to the Kansas City office in the foster care division licensing unit, a job that entailed recruiting, interviewing and licensing potential foster parents.

Phillips' immediate supervisor in the Kansas City office was Collings, who in turn was immediately supervised by Rosalyn Wilson ("Wilson"). From the time he was hired in March 1994, until March 1995, Phillips received adequate or complimentary job performance evaluations from his supervisors. In fact, in March of 1995, Collings gave Phillips a positive reference to begin work on a Master's degree in social work through a program offered by the DFS.

In April of 1995, a dispute arose between Collings and Phillips after the two had a conversation about the licensing of foster parents with alternative lifestyles, such as homosexuals, unmarried couples, and persons involved in extramarital affairs. Phillips made clear to Collings that his religious beliefs would not permit him to license certain persons as foster parents, including those living in an openly homosexual relationship. Phillips testified that Collings became visibly defensive and adversarial with him after he made his beliefs known and ultimately complained about the incident to Wilson.

The following day both Collings and Phillips met with Wilson to discuss what had transpired. Phillips explained to Wilson that his religion taught him that "homosexuality was an abomination" and prevented him from approving homosexuals as foster parents. Wilson responded to Phillips that it was brought to her attention that his beliefs were impairing his ability to do his job.

Phillips testified that after these meetings, Collings began ignoring him during staff meetings and became increasingly curt with him during other everyday encounters. Then, in September 1995, Collings authored an evaluation of Phillips and suggested that he be terminated, in part because of his religious views. Specifically Collings wrote in her evaluation:

Mr. Phillips has difficulty accepting [sic] non-discrimination role by requesting not being assigned work that is counter to his religious, moral, or value beliefs. This has been evident because of the requests that he has made in not being assigned any 'alternative lifestyle' studies, and his continued discussion that it is 'illegal' for the agency to license unmarried couples, and homosexuals for foster care licensure.

This draft evaluation was submitted to Wilson and Richard Matt, the Deputy Director of the Children's Division in the DFS. After the evaluation went through revisions and reviews by different people, Collings' original recommendation of termination was changed to "needs improvement." Her once four page evaluation evolved into a 53 page evaluation that criticized virtually every aspect of Phillips' job performance. The evaluation did not follow the traditional format and was the longest evaluation that Phillips had ever received. It also contained extensive "Corrective Action Plans," including remedial training.

Because of the growing conflict with Collings, Phillips sought and was granted a transfer to a separate division of DFS in Independence, Missouri, which became effective January 16, 1996. There Phillips worked as a social worker in the Child Abuse/Neglect Division. It was at this time, while working in a new position under a new supervisor with a new job description, that Phillips received his voluminous performance appraisal from Kansas City.

Phillips was later terminated for reasons unrelated to this appeal.

Phillips brought claims against Collings for religious discrimination and harassment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury found for Phillips on his discrimination claim against Collings but did not reach a verdict on the harrasment claim. The jury awarded $1,500.00 in compensatory damages and $25,000.00 in punitive damages.³ The district court denied Defendant Collings' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial. This is an appeal of the district court's ruling.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

We review a court's grant or denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, using the same standards as the trial court. See Stauch v. City of Columbia Hts., 212 F.3d 425, 429 (8th Cir. 2000). Pursuant to Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 447-48 (2000). In making this determination, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party without making credibility assessments or weighing the evidence. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990); see also Kingserlow v. CMI Corp., 217 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 2000). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-151 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-251 (1986)).

Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the non-movant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. It is "[w]hen the record contains no proof beyond speculation to support the verdict, [that] judgment as a matter of law is appropriate." Kingserlow, 217 F.3d at 1026 (internal quotations omitted).

B.

Collings raises three issues on appeal. First, she claims Phillips failed to establish he suffered an adverse employment action and his discrimination claim therefore fails. Second, she maintains she is entitled to qualified immunity for her actions. Finally, Collings contends that the marshaling instruction for Phillips' § 1983 claim erroneously eliminated the element of intent.

1. Adverse Employment Action

Phillips contends that Collings discriminated against him at work based on his religious beliefs. In order to prevail on this claim, Collings argues Phillips must establish he suffered an adverse employment action. Phillips counters that a claim for discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not require a showing of an adverse employment action and, in the alternative, even were this Court to conclude that such a showing need be made, Collings' actions do in fact rise to the level of adverse employment action. Because we find Collings' actions did constitute an adverse employment action, we need not determine for purposes of this appeal whether discrimination claims premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 require a showing of an adverse employment action.

Collings' challenged actions are the draft evaluation in which she recommended Phillips' termination, in part because of his religious beliefs, and the highly critical revised evaluation, 53 pages in length, that castigated every aspect of Phillips' work performance, imposed remedial training, corrective action plans, and was part of Phillips' personnel file. Collings argues that, as a matter of law, Phillips suffered no adverse employment action because these actions did not materially alter the terms or conditions of his employment.

Proof of an adverse employment action requires a "'tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute a material disadvantage.'" Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)). We have indicated, however, that actions short of termination or decrease in pay may still constitute adverse employment actions. See Bassett v. Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting "a series of retaliatory conduct falling short of discharge or termination can, as a matter of law, constitute an adverse action"); see also Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding reduction of duties, disciplinary action, negative personnel reports, "papering" a file, and employer-required remedial training that adversely affect or undermine employee's position constitute adverse employment action).

A poor performance evaluation, alone, typically does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Spears v. Missouri Dep't. of Corrections and Human Res., 210 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding an evaluation that was changed from "highly successful" to "successful" which "demeaned [plaintiff] in the eyes of her co-workers" is insufficient to transform an unfavorable evaluation into an adverse employment action); see also Enowmbitang v. Seagate Tech. Inc., 148 F.3d 970, 973-74 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding allegations of an unfair poor evaluation are insufficient to state a claim of discrimination where the poor...