Renz v. Renz, 9327
Decision Date | 18 August 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 9327,9327 |
Citation | 256 N.W.2d 883 |
Parties | Bruno RENZ, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Mary Lou RENZ, Evelyn Wuttke, and Emil Wuttke, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Joseph P. Stevens, Minot, for plaintiff and appellee.
A. S. Benson, Benson & Schell, Bottineau, for defendants and appellants.
This case involves the question of whether a stipulation and judgment in a divorce action providing for the sale of property held in joint tenancy and the division of the proceeds severs the joint tenancy even though no sale had been made prior to the death of one of the parties eleven years later. The trial court held that there was a severance, and we affirm its judgment.
Two parcels of land are involved. One was held in joint tenancy by Ernest Renz and Mary Lou Renz, who were divorced in 1962, and the other was held, also in joint tenancy, by Ernest Renz, Mary Lou Renz, Evelyn Wuttke, and Emil Wuttke. The Wuttkes are the parents of Mary Lou Renz.
Ernest Renz died on August 17, 1973. At the time of the divorce, eleven years earlier, he and his wife entered into a stipulation, drawn by her attorney but almost exactly in the words of a memorandum written by Ernest, that the property jointly held by Ernest and Mary Lou Renz was "to be divided equally, less any encumbrance that is against said property as soon as property is sold." It was agreed that the property held by the four persons in joint tenancy "shall be divided so that each party on the deed shall receive one-fourth of the net selling price." The stipulation was approved by the court and made a part of the judgment.
Obviously, the parties contemplated a sale and division of the proceeds within a reasonable time. Instead, they apparently got along with each other very well indeed after the divorce and never got around to selling the property. Now that one of them has died, his sole heir, Bruno Renz, a brother, claims that the property-settlement agreement and judgment severed the joint tenancies and created tenancies in common as between Ernest Renz and Mary Lou Renz as to the one tract, and as between the four owners as to the other tract, and he claims title to the shares belonging to Ernest Renz. Mary Lou Renz, the former wife, and the other joint tenants as to the second tract, assert that the joint tenancies continued until the death of Ernest Renz, whereupon they, as surviving joint tenants, became the owners of the interest of the deceased joint tenant. See Cranston v. Winters, 238 N.W.2d 647 (N.D.1976), and Schlichenmayer v. Luithle, 221 N.W.2d 77 (N.D.1974).
The trial court held that the property-settlement agreement and the judgment severed the joint tenancies, creating tenancies in common, and that Bruno Renz, as heir, inherited the interests of Ernest Renz. We agree.
A few similar cases have been litigated in other jurisdictions, and the courts have held that either the divorce decree or the stipulation of the parties for property settlement prior to the decree, or both, if they provide for a division or sale (even if not completed prior to the death of one party), have the effect of severing the joint tenancy and creating a tenancy in common. Leutgers v. Kasten, 295 Minn. 545, 204 N.W.2d 210 (1973); Snyder v. Snyder, 298 Minn. 43, 212 N.W.2d 869 (1973); Carson v. Ellis, 186 Kan. 112, 348 P.2d 807 (1960); McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal.2d 409, 101 P.2d 690 (1940).
These cases are consistent with others which hold that property jointly held, which is not ordered to be divided in a divorce decree, continues to be held jointly by the divorced parties after the divorce. Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Wis.2d 346, 168 N.W.2d 876 (1969); Witzel v. Witzel, 368 P.2d 103 (Wyo.1963); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal.2d 10, 76 P.2d 160 (1938).
While we agree with the result in the Leutgers, Snyder, Carson, and McDonald cases, supra, and perhaps could end our opinion with that statement, the fact is that the opinions in those cases expound reasons for the conclusions reached in them which are not historically accurate or logically persuasive in this State.
For example, Leutgers and Snyder, supra, refer to a historic policy in Minnesota of the disfavoring of joint tenancies. This conclusion as to public policy is based on a Minnesota statute (M.S.A. § 500.19, subd. 2) providing that all grants and devises to two or more persons "shall be construed to create estates in common, and not in joint tenancy, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy," and upon the abolition of the common-law estate by the entirety. In North Dakota estates by the entirety have never been recognized. See Schimke v. Karlstad, 87 S.D. 349, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973), in which our sister Supreme Court of South Dakota pointed out that such estates did not exist in Dakota Territory, from which both States were formed.
We have a statute which defines "joint tenancy interest" as
". . . one owned by several persons in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants." Sec. 47-02-06, N.D.C.C.
Thus we, too, have a statutory declaration that a conveyance to two or more persons will result in a tenancy in common unless the conveyance expressly declares the tenancy to be a joint tenancy. But we cannot in all honesty construe this statute to be an expression of hostility toward joint tenancy or an expression of public policy against joint tenancy. On the contrary, it appears to us that the statute simply represents a choice by the Legislature of a rule of construction which selects one of two possible interpretations of a provision otherwise ambiguous. We do not believe this creates a public policy against the interpretation not selected. Nor do we find any other expressions of hostility toward joint tenancy in our statutes or court decisions, even though many of our lawyers and judges think there should be such a hostility. On the contrary, North Dakota has legislated to avoid termination of joint tenancies in some ambiguous transactions, as evidenced by Section 47-19-54, N.D.C.C., adopted in 1963, which provides:
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