Walker, Jr. v. Bain, s. 99-2001

Citation257 F.3d 660,2001 WL 823612
Decision Date16 March 2001
Docket NumberNos. 99-2001,99-2349,99-2004,s. 99-2001
Parties(6th Cir. 2001) William H. Walker, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant (99-2004), v. Thomas Bain, Guard; Janice Metzger, Defendants-Appellants (99-2001/2349)/Cross-Appellees, Thomas Birkette, Warden, Defendant, United States of America, Intervenor. Argued:
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit, No. 95-76273, Paul J. Komives, Magistrate Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Deric J. Bomar, DYKEMA GOSSETT, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.

Linda M. Olivieri, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.

John C. Hoyle, Daniel Kaplan, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.

Todd R. Marti, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS LITIGATION SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.

Before: KEITH, NORRIS, and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges.

KEITH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORRIS, J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 23-33), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellee William Walker, a Michigan state prisoner, brought suit against corrections officers claiming First Amendment retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury returned a verdict in Walker's favor in part, setting damages of $426. Upon Walker's motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the magistrate judge held that the attorney fee cap set forth in § 803(d)(2) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), violated Equal Protection. The court subsequently granted in part Walker's motion for attorney fees in the amount of $34,493.72. Defendants appeal from these two orders. Walker cross-appeals the denial of his motion for new trial. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the order ruling that §1997e(d)(2) is unconstitutional,VACATE the order granting in part Walker's motion for attorney fees, REMAND for a redetermination of fees under the PLRA, and AFFIRM the denial of Walker's motion for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History

Walker, an inmate, serves as a "jailhouse lawyer"at Standish Maximum Correctional Facility ("Standish"). In addition to handling his own legal matters, Walker assists other Standish inmates in connection with their legal matters. Walker routinely filed grievances against correction officers, and assisted other inmates in filing and handling grievances.

On April 4, 1995, in retaliation for his filing of grievances, defendants-appellants Thomas Bain and Janice Metzger, Standish correction officers, performed a "shake down" of Walker's cell, and improperly confiscated documents and personal property.

At that time, Walker was preparing for several cases, and had documents in stacks in various places in his cell.

Prior to April 4, 1995, Walker requested grievance forms from, and filed grievances against, both Bain and Metzger. Walker testified that Bain often delayed in providing him with grievance forms, and would provide only one form when he requested several. Walker reported Bain's conduct to Bain's superior officer, who ordered Bain to provide Walker with the number of grievance forms he requested.

On the date of the unlawful retaliatory incident, Metzger asked Walker if he wanted to take a shower, and he responded that he did. Subsequently, Bain came to Walker's cell and the two had a disagreement over whether Walker would be permitted to shower. When Bain indicated that Walker would not be taking a shower, Walker requested a grievance form so that he could report Bain's conduct. Bain stated that he was tired of grievances, and he and Metzger escorted Walker to the shower. Walker testified that Bain indicated that he would teach Walker a lesson about filing grievances.

While Walker was using the shower, Bain and Metzger searched his cell. Bain and Metzger left Walker's cell with a large plastic bag containing documents.

Bain and Metzger escorted Walker back to his cell after his shower. Upon his return, Walker surmised that his cell had been the subject of a "shake down." He called for another corrections officer to view the condition of his cell, and requested that photographs and a video be taken of his cell. Walker's request was denied, and Walker was ordered into his cell. When he entered his cell, Walker's wrists were handcuffed behind his back, and a leather strap was attached to the handcuffs. After the cell door had closed, Walker's hands and arms went through the food slot on the door in such a manner as to cause minor scrapes and cuts to Walker's hands and wrists. The prison nurse treated Walker's abrasions later that evening. Walker subsequently determined that many of his legal documents were missing.

B. Procedural History

On May 30, 1995, Walker filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Bain and Metzger. Walker asserted retaliation claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants.

Walker's § 1983 claims against defendants survived a motion to dismiss and three motions for summary judgment. Walker began filing motions for appointment of counsel on September 20, 1995. The district court finally appointed counsel on March 10, 1997, after the effective date of the PLRA. On July 21, 1998, the district court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Paul Komives for all further proceedings and entry of judgment with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

A jury trial began on October 13, 1998, and concluded on October 20, 1998. The court submitted the case to the jury on special interrogatories, and the jury returned its answers on October 20, 1998. The court entered judgment in favor of defendants on February 26, 1999. Walker moved to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) on March 12, 1998, based on an intervening change of controlling law. On April 23, 1999, the court granted Walker's motion, and ordered entry of an amended judgment in favor of Walker and against defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $1.00, and in favor of Walker and against Bain and Metzger in the amounts of $300.00 and $125.00, respectively. Walker filed a motion for partial new trial on May 7, 1999. The court denied Walker's motion in an order dated August 3, 1999. Walker filed an appeal from the court's order denying his motion for a partial new trial.

On May 7, 1999, as a partially successful civil rights litigant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Walker filed a motion for attorney fees seeking $36,046.25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Defendants filed a response arguing that, pursuant to § 803(d)(2) of the PLRA, Walker was entitled to a fee of only $629.00. Walker filed a reply brief arguing that the PLRA attorney fee cap was unconstitutional both on vagueness and Equal Protection grounds. In an order dated August 3, 1999, Magistrate Judge Komives held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, but that it did violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Walker v. Bain, 65 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599-605 (E.D. Mich. 1999). The court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration on August 30, 1999. See id. at 606-10. Defendants filed a timely appeal from the order of the court.

On October 18, 1999, the court granted Walker's motion for attorney fees in part, and ordered defendants to pay Walker's reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $34,493.72. Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal from the court's order granting in part Walker's motion for attorney fees. We consolidated the three appeals taken from the magistrate's final orders.

We permitted the United States to intervene pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2403 to defend the constitutionality of the PLRA. The Attorney General of the State of Ohio participated on appeal as amicus curiae, urging the constitutionality of PLRA.

II. DISCUSSION
A. The PLRA Fee Cap

The PLRA contains various provisions that were intended to discourage prisoners from filing claims that are unlikely to succeed. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596 (1998). Among the many new changes relating to prisoner civil rights suits, the PLRA modifies the application of 42U.S.C. § 1988 1 to prevailing prisoners by providing stringent limitations on both the availability and the amount of attorney fee awards. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). The PLRA's attorney fee provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. §1997e(d), which provides:

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that--

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under [42 U.S.C. § 1988]; and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.

(3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-appointed counsel.

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