Educadores PuertorriquenOs En v. Hernandez, Civ. 01-2702(JAG).
| Decision Date | 27 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 01-2702(JAG).,Civ. 01-2702(JAG). |
| Citation | 257 F.Supp.2d 446 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | EDUCADORES PUERTORRIQUEŃOS EN ACCION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Cesar Rey HERNANDEZ, et al., Defendants. |
Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, F.R. Gonzalez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Rafael Escalera-Rodriguez, Beatriz Annexy-Guevara, Reichard & Escalera, San Juan, PR, Maria Santiago-De-Vidal, Dept. of Justice, Federal Litigation Division, San Juan, PR, Eileen Landron-Guardiola, Eduardo Vera-Ramirez, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Educadores Puertorriqueños en Accion ("EPA"), an employee association of the Puerto Rico Department of Education ("DE"), Carmen R. Castillo-Rodriguez, Angel A. Marti-Lopez, Elsie Atresino-Martinez, Luis Cores-Babilonia, Eranio Collazo-Ocasio, Santos M. Mercado Sorrentini, Angel A. Valentin Feliciano, Wilfredo Soto-Gonzales, Angel Marrero-Colon, and Griselle Hernandez-Batallar (collectively, "plaintiffs") brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cesar Rey Hernandez, ("Rey"), Secretary of the DE, and other DE employees, (collectively, "defendants") for political discrimination under the First Amendment and for due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim that Rey declared their personnel transactions null and void in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Rey moved to dismiss, arguing that he was merely complying with state law. He further contends that the transactions took place during the electoral prohibition period, during which government agencies and municipalities may not make personnel movements such as appointments, promotions, demotions, employee category changes, and transfers. Rey also claims that since the transactions were illegal, plaintiffs lacked any property rights over their positions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs, who are members of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), the past administration, work as career supervisors within the DE. (Docket No. 1 at 10, 11.) Following the Puerto Rico general elections on November 7, 2000, the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") became the new administration in power.
In or about December 2000, the DE appointed plaintiffs to new positions within the Department, such as Assistant Superintendent III.2 (Id. at 2-3, 9.) These appointments occurred during the pre-and post-electoral prohibition established in Section 4.7 of the Puerto Rico Public Service Personnel Act, 3 P.R. Laws Ann. § 1337. (Id. at 12.) This statute states that "during the period before and after elections, the authorities shall abstain from making any movement of personnel involving areas essential to the merit principle, such as appointments, promotions, demotions, transfers, and changes in the category of the employees." 3 P.R. Laws Ann § 1337. This prohibition applies "two (2) months before and two (2) months after General Elections are held in Puerto Rico." Id.
In or about November 2001, plaintiffs received letters signed by Rey stating that the appointments made during the prohibition period were illegal. As a result, Rey informed plaintiffs that the DE would return them to their previous positions.3 (Docket No. 1 at 12-13.)
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming that defendants actions were a pretext to discriminate against them on the basis of their political affiliation, in violation of their First Amendment rights. (Id, at 12.) Furthermore, plaintiffs claim that since they had a property right over their new positions, Rey violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id, at 17.)
On June 11, 2002, Rey filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for political discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rey argued that plaintiffs did not meet the heightened pleading standard requirement set forth in Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72-74 (1st Cir.1998). (Docket No. 15 at 8-9.) Additionally, Rey claimed that even if plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of political discrimination, he would have declared the transactions null and void in any event, because they were illegal. (Id. at 9.) As a corollary, Rey argued that because the personnel transactions were illegal, plaintiffs lacked a property right over their new positions. (Id at 12.)
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996).
When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).
To prevail in a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived them of their federal constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities. See, e.g., Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir.1996). It is well-established that political discrimination restrains freedom of belief and association core activities protected by the First Amendment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 354, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); Padilla-Garcia v. Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2000).
To prevail on their political discrimination claim, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating: 1) that they engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; and 2) that this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment decision affecting them. See ML Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Padilla-Garcia, 212 F.3d at 74. To meet this burden, plaintiffs must show that there is a causal connection linking Rey's conduct to their political beliefs. See LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 662 (1st Cir.1996). Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a finding of political discrimination. Estrada-Izquierdo v. Aponte-Roque, 850 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir.1988); Kercado Melendez v. Aponte Roque, 829 F.2d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 1987); Martinez Catala v. Guzman Cardona, 971 F.Supp. 641 (D.P.R.1997). Plaintiffs, nonetheless, must make a fact-specific showing that a causal connection exists between the adverse treatment and their political affiliation. Aviles-Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 5 (1st Cir.1992); Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 58.
Once plaintiffs establish their prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants, who must establish that they would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiffs' political beliefs, see Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, or that plaintiffs held a position for which party affiliation was a proper credential for continued employment. Martinez Catala, 971 F.Supp. at 648-49 (citing Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287); De Choudens v. Government Dev. Bank of P.R, 801 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1986). If defendants can show that they would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiffs' political affiliation, plaintiffs' claim must fail. See Padilla-Garcia, 212 F.3d at 78.
Plaintiffs claim they are members of the NPP, and that Rey is a member of the opposition party, the PDP. The fact that plaintiffs and defendants are of competing political persuasions may be probative of discriminatory animus. See Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir.1993). This fact alone, however, is not sufficient for a finding of discriminatory motive. Estrada-Izquierdo, 850 F.2d at 15. "[M]erely juxtaposing the fact of one's [political affiliation] with an instance of discrimination is insufficient to state a claim." The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989).
Plaintiffs claim that Rey's sole motive in declaring null and void the personnel transactions was political discrimination and persecution. (Docket No. 1 at 12, 17, 19.) Aside from the claim of different political affiliations, however, the Complaint lacks sufficient facts to support a conclusion that Rey's sole aim in invalidating the personnel changes was to discriminate against plaintiffs.
For example, plaintiffs claim that Rey favored PDP activists when appointing employees, (Docket No. 1 at 19), but they do not specify who the appointed employees were, to what position were they appointed, or under what circumstances did he do so. Plaintiffs also claim that defendants were obsessed with persecuting anyone identified with the past NPP administration. (Id.) They, however, do not explain how exactly this persecution took place.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514. An essential element of any adverse employment action based on...
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Educadores Puertorriquenos v. Hernandez
...for failure to state an actionable claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the district court obliged. See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Rey Hernández, 257 F.Supp.2d 446 (D.P.R.2003). In reaching its decision, the court applied "the heightened pleading requirement established by the Fir......