Gochee v. Wagner
| Decision Date | 17 November 1931 |
| Parties | GOCHEE v. WAGNER. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Hazen A. Gochee against John A. Wagner. Judgment for plaintiff entered on a verdict directed by the court was affirmed by the Appellate Division (232 App. Div. 401, 250 N. Y. S. 102), and defendant appeals.
Reversed, and complaint dismissed.
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth department.
Edward A. Wolff, of Rome, and George R. Fearon and Henry R. Follett, both of Syracuse, for appellant.
James T. Cross, of Rome, for respondent.
The respondent was the owner of an automobile which he permitted his wife to use in going to and from her work in the city of Rome. His home was a few miles outside of the city. On the night of June 7, 1930, the respondent was at his father's home, about a half mile nearer the city than his own residence. That evening his wife drove his Willys-Knight car to the city to get her mother, and on the way home she stopped at respondent's father's house, and respondent got into the car and sat on the rear seat, intending to ride to his home. His wife was driving the car, and her mother sat on the front seat with her. On the way home an accident occurred in which respondent was injured and his car damaged. This action is to recover the damages for such personal injury and damages to his car.
The learned trial justice submitted questions in writing for the jury to answer. The following was the first question submitted: ‘Was Emma Gochee, the wife of plaintiff, guilty of negligence in the manner in which she drove plaintiff's car, which caused or contributed to the accident?’ The answer was: ‘Yes.’ In answer to other questions, the jury found that the respondent was not negligent, but that the defendant was. The jury fixed the amount of damages, and judgment was entered therefor. The sole question for determination is: Was the negligence of Emma Gochee, respondent's wife, and driver of the car at the time of the accident, imputable to respondent, and did it bar a recovery in this action?
Prior to the enactment of section 282-e of the Highway Law (Laws 1924, c. 534; Consol. Laws, c. 25), the law in this jurisdiction was firmly established that the owner of a vehicle was not liable for negligent injury caused in its operation by another unless at the time it was being used on his business. Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804, 14 A. L. R. 125.
The owner was not liable for the negligence of a person to whom he had loaned his car, whether a member of his family or a stranger, while the car was being used upon the business or pleasure of the borrower. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78, 8 A. L. R. 785.
It was to change this well-established rule that the Legislature enacted section 282-e, now section 59, of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (Consol. Laws, c. 71), for the purpose of making the owner liable for the neglignce of a person legally operating the car with the permission, express or implied, of the owner. Section 59 reads in part: ‘Every owner of a motor vehicle or motor cycle operated upon a public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligencein the operation of such motor vehicle or motor cycle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.’
One who borrows a car of the owner for his own use is a gratuitous (commodatum) bailee. He is not an agent of the owner. He uses the car for his own business or pleasure, and not for any purpose in which the owner is interested. Neither is he a servant of the owner. He is not subject to his direction or control. True it is that, in discussing the effect of section 282-e, it has been said that the borrower occupies the relation of a servant or agent of the owner, and that the owner's liability in case of an injury incurred by the borrower's negligence is the same as it would have been if caused by an agent or servant acting in the owner's business within the scope of his...
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Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co.
...where he is present in the automobile while it is being driven by another, the court reached a contrary conclusion in Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553, stating as the reason for the decision that when the husband enters the car he regains dominion over it and the legal right to ......
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Gorton v. Doty
...rule would seem to be that one who borrows a car for his own use is a gratuitous bailee and not an agent of the owner. ( Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553.) Puryear v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 13 S.W.2d 203, it is held: "In the absence of liability imposed by statute, the owner o......
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Budget Rent-a-Car System, Inc. v. Chappell
...entrustment of the vehicle to an unsafe driver, ownership alone was not enough to establish vicarious liability. See Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553, 553 (1931). By depriving plaintiffs of a cause of action against an automobile's owner, the common law failed to compensate vict......
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Mikelinich v. Caliandro
...operator's negligence imputed to the owner such that the owner was barred from recovering for his or her own damages? In Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553, the Court of Appeals held that the negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle had to be imputed to the owner of the vehicle......
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CHAPTER 14
...as one who “uses the car for his own business or pleasure, and not for any purpose in which the owner is interested.”Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 347, 178 N.E. 553 (1931) overruled byKalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 308 N.E.2d 886 (1973). In common everyday language the term “borrow......