In re the Marriage of Hyatt M. Gibbs

Decision Date09 June 2011
Docket Number2 CA–CV 2010–0172.,Nos. 2 CA–CV 2010–0120,s. 2 CA–CV 2010–0120
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF Hyatt M. GIBBS, Petitioner/Appellee/Cross–Appellant,andLethia A. Gibbs, Respondent/Appellant/Cross–Appellee.Hyatt M. Gibbs, Appellee/Cross–Appellant,v.Lethia A. Gibbs; Vanetta Gibbs, by and through her guardian ad litem, Leigh H. Bernstein, Appellants/Cross–Appellees.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Law Office of Sandra Tedlock By Sandra Tedlock, Tucson, Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee/Cross–Appellant.DeConcini McDonald Yetwin & Lacy, P.C. By Alyce L. Pennington and Sesaly O. Stamps, Tucson, Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant/Cross–Appellee Lethia Gibbs.Fleming & Curti, P.L.C. By Leigh H. Bernstein, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellant/Cross–Appellee Vanetta Gibbs.

OPINION

KELLY, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant Lethia Gibbs appeals the trial court's denial of her petition to reinstate child support for her disabled adult daughter, Vanetta Gibbs.1 Appellee Hyatt Gibbs, Vanetta's father, cross-appeals alleging the court erred in rejecting his arguments that the claim was barred by waiver, laches, and estoppel; in finding that Vanetta “is severely mentally disabled under Arizona law”; in failing to order Lethia to pay half of Vanetta's guardian ad litem fees; and in requiring that he pay half of Lethia's attorney fees. Because we conclude the court erred in ruling Lethia's claim was precluded as res judicata, and in determining Vanetta was not a party, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

Background

¶ 2 We review the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's rulings. Bennett v. Baxter Group, Inc., 223 Ariz. 414, ¶ 2, 224 P.3d 230, 233 (App.2010). Hyatt and Lethia Gibbs were married in 1960. When their marriage was dissolved in 1988, they had one minor child, Vanetta, who was seventeen years old. Because Vanetta had been diagnosed with “learning disabilities” and was behind in school, the dissolution decree provided that Hyatt would continue to pay child support until Vanetta “reach[ed] the age of twenty-two ... marrie[d], die[d], or bec[ame] totally self-supporting, whichever occur[red] first.”

¶ 3 Shortly before Vanetta turned twenty-two, Lethia asked Hyatt to sign an agreement to pay child support for Vanetta after her twenty-second birthday. Hyatt refused, but wrote in a letter to Lethia: “Of course, she needs my continued support, both financial and moral, and she will receive both. But why make this a court action which I will deeply resent and which could easily make her believe she cannot and need not work?” In 1993, after Vanetta turned twenty-two, Hyatt filed a request to modify the 1988 order of assignment to stop child support payments. Hyatt and Lethia reached an agreement (1993 stipulation”) that [Hyatt's] obligation to pay child support ended” when Vanetta reached twenty-two years of age. After the court entered an order terminating Hyatt's child support obligation pursuant to the 1993 stipulation (“stipulated order”), Hyatt continued to make payments directly to Vanetta for several months but then stopped.

¶ 4 In 2005, Lethia filed a motion to reinstate child support for Vanetta and the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent her. By stipulation of the parties, Vanetta underwent independent medical and psychological examinations. Due to continuances and settlement attempts, the motion for child support remained unresolved in January 2010, when Hyatt filed a motion to join Vanetta as an indispensable party. The court granted Hyatt's motion and in April 2010, following a bench trial, it held that “Vanetta [was] severely mentally or physically disabled” and pursuant to A.R.S. § 25–320 “met the statutory requirements for child support.” The court, however, denied Lethia's motion to reinstate child support, determining the stipulated order precluded her claim as res judicata. The court further found “Vanetta is not a party in either proceeding” and did not address her claim for child support. Thereafter, Lethia filed a notice of appeal on behalf of Vanetta and herself and Hyatt filed a cross-appeal.2

Discussion

I. Claim Preclusiona. Preclusive effect of the stipulated order on the child support claim

¶ 5 Lethia and Vanetta argue the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the stipulated order barred their present claim for child support. Although the court rejected Hyatt's argument that Lethia had waived any claim for child support based on the 1993 stipulation, noting that such a waiver is unenforceable if the child's interests are affected adversely, see Mendoza v. Mendoza, 177 Ariz. 603, 605, 870 P.2d 421, 423 (1994), it agreed with Hyatt that Lethia's claim was precluded by res judicata, also known as claim preclusion. The court found that “if [Lethia] believed Vanetta was disabled in 1992–93, she should have litigated that issue at that time,” and that her claim for child support therefore was precluded.

¶ 6 “The doctrine of res judicata will preclude a claim when a former judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action.” Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, ¶ 7, 977 P.2d 776, 779 (1999). We review a trial court's findings of fact for abuse of discretion and reverse only when clearly erroneous. Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, ¶ 21, 212 P.3d 842, 848 (App.2009). But we ‘draw our own legal conclusions from [the] facts found or implied in the judgment.’ See id., quoting McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d 300, 302 (App.2002); see also Wilmot v. Wilmot, 203 Ariz. 565, ¶ 10, 58 P.3d 507, 510–11 (2002) (trial court's interpretation and conclusions of law reviewed de novo). Even when the technical requirements for preclusion based on a former adjudication are met, the court should not apply preclusion principles ‘where there is some overriding consideration of fairness to a litigant,’ as determined by the particular case's circumstances. See Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, ¶ 28, 63 P.3d 1029, 1035 (2003), quoting Ferris v. Hawkins, 135 Ariz. 329, 331, 660 P.2d 1256, 1258 (App.1983).

¶ 7 We first consider whether Lethia's claim for reinstatement of child support for Vanetta meets the requirements for claim preclusion. It is undisputed that a stipulated order was entered in 1993 ending Hyatt's obligation to pay child support for Vanetta. That order is preclusive only as to issues that were or could have been presented at that time. Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, ¶ 4, 189 P.3d 1102, 1104 (App.2008). It was entered after the parties stipulated Hyatt had no continuing obligation to pay child support, presumably because the dissolution decree did not require his support after Vanetta had reached the age of twenty-two. But the stipulated order did not address the issues of whether Vanetta suffered from disabilities, whether such disabilities were severe, or whether she had the ability to support herself. If Hyatt is correct that Lethia could have raised these issues in 1993, Lethia's claim for child support based on Vanetta's disabilities could be subject to preclusion.3 But assuming arguendo the severity of Vanetta's disabilities could have been determined in 1993, we must consider whether the doctrine of claim preclusion should be applied in the child support context under the circumstances present here.

¶ 8 Claim preclusion is a judicially created doctrine. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 223, 599 P.2d 175, 179 (1979). That doctrine, however, is not “rigidly applied ... ‘when [it] ... would contravene an overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice.’ Smith v. CIGNA HealthPlan of Ariz., 203 Ariz. 173, ¶ 21, 52 P.3d 205, 211 (App.2002), quoting Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971). Moreover, Arizona's child support statutes provide that support may be modified even after the entry of a final order upon a showing of substantial and continuing changed circumstances. A.R.S. § 25–327(A); Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, ¶ 6, 975 P.2d 108, 110–11 (1999). When evaluating whether such a modification is appropriate, “the primary, paramount and controlling consideration is the welfare of the child [ ].” Evans v. Evans, 17 Ariz.App. 323, 325, 497 P.2d 830, 832 (1972).

¶ 9 Section 25–320 also gives the trial court jurisdiction to order, in its discretion, support of a disabled child to continue past the age of majority. 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 139, § 2. The statute provides that [e]ven if a child is over the age of majority when a petition is filed or at the time of the final decree, the court may order support to continue past the age of majority[,] if certain conditions are met. And we have concluded the plain language of § 25–320 permits the court to order support for a disabled adult child even if there is no such order in place before the child reaches the age of majority. Gersten v. Gersten, 223 Ariz. 99, ¶ 26 & n. 12, 219 P.3d 309, 317–18 & n. 12 (App.2009).

¶ 10 To interpret a statute we first look to the language therein and give the words used their plain meaning, unless context demands otherwise. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, ¶ 71, 105 P.3d 1163, 1178 (2005). We interpret statutes with the goal of ‘fulfill[ing] the intent of the legislature.’ Zamora v. Reinstein, 185 Ariz. 272, 275, 915 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1996), quoting State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993).

¶ 11 In Mendoza, we determined § 25–320 “allow[ed] the court to order support for a disabled child to continue past the age of majority, even if the court acquired jurisdiction after the child was no longer a minor.” 177 Ariz. at 605, 870 P.2d at 423. We concluded this provision reflected an “intent to broaden the scope of the court's...

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