258 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1958), 12191, United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Cook County, Ill.

Docket Nº:12191, 12192.
Citation:258 F.2d 17
Party Name:UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, Appellee, v. 93.970 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN COOK COUNTY, State of ILLINOIS, and Illinois Aircraft Services and Sales Company, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee, Appellant.
Case Date:July 15, 1958
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
 
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258 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1958)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, Appellee,

v.

93.970 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATE IN COOK COUNTY, State of ILLINOIS, and Illinois Aircraft Services and Sales Company, Incorporated, Defendant-Appellee, Appellant.

Nos. 12191, 12192.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

July 15, 1958

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James L. O'Keefe, George W. Lennon, J. Herzl Segal, Leonard R. Hartenfeld, James F. Ashenden, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for 93.970 Acres of Land, etc.

Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Billingsley Hill and Roger P. Marquis, Attys., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert Tieken, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., John Peter Lulinski and Luther D. Swanstrom, Asst. U.S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for the United States.

Before MAJOR, FINNEGAN and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.

MAJOR, Circuit Judge.

This is a condemnation proceeding instituted by the United States to acquire all outstanding rights, if any, which defendant had in premises in Cook County, Illinois, on which was located an airport, under lease from the government. The lease under which defendant occupied the premises was executed May 2, 1947, with certain modifications made February 9, 1948. The lease granted to lessee (defendant) the option of renewing the lease for a period of five years. This the lessee did. Thus, the lease as renewed extended to May 2, 1957. The lease contained a provision which authorized its revocation by the lessor under certain conditions, subsequently discussed. The government sought to exercise this power of revocation, effective September

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27, 1954. Copies of the lease, the amendment thereto and the government's notice of revocation are attached to and made a part of the complaint.

Defendant refused to honor the notice of revocation and vacate the property. On August 10, 1954, it sought in the District Court a declaratory judgment that the revocation was ineffective because the government proposed to use the property for purposes other than those described in the lease as a basis for its right to revoke. The defendants in that action refused to waive immunity and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Thereupon, plaintiff in that action withdrew its complaint. The government instituted the instant action October 6, 1954, and was awarded immediate possession of the premises, with certain reservations not here material. The government by its condemnation action sought to acquire 'all remaining outstanding right, title and interest, if any' of defendant in the property and to ascertain 'just compensation, if any.'

Defendant in its answer to the complaint sought just compensation for the remaining term of the lease, that is, for a period of about 2 1/2 years, or until May 1, 1957. It admitted receiving the notice of revocation but alleged that it was ineffective because it was not made in conformity with the terms of the lease. Defendant's answer also alleged that in filing a condemnation action, instead of ejectment or a similar action, the government elected 'a remedy which is inconsistent with the theory that defendant has no possessory right and therefore implicitly recognizes the existence of a leasehold interest and is precluded as a matter of law from asserting that the lease has been terminated.'

The government moved to strike defendant's answer, and for findings and judgment that defendant was not entitled to possession after September 27, 1954, and was, therefore, entitled to no compensation. The basis for the motion was that the answer set up no valid defense because defendant's tenancy expired by reason of the revocation, notice of which defendant admittedly received, which effectively terminated its interest on September 27, 1954, and for the further reason that the necessity for taking by the government was not a matter for judicial inquiry. Upon denial of this motion, the government moved for summary judgment of no compensation on the basis that there was no issue of fact concerning the lease and its revocation and that as a matter of law the lease was validly revoked prior to commencement of the action. This motion was also denied.

The case was tried before a jury on the issue of compensation. At the inception of the trial the Court ruled that the government could not introduce in evidence or make any reference to the revocation notice, for the reason that it had selected the remedy of condemnation which necessarily acknowledged an outstanding leasehold interest in defendant for the full part of the term remaining, October 6, 1954 to May 1, 1957. Much testimony was offered by each of the parties as to the value of the remaining leasehold interest. It is unnecessary at this point to relate this testimony. It is sufficient to note that the witnesses for the government, based on its interpretation of the lease, testified that the interest sought to be taken had no value and as a result the government was entitled to a finding of no compensation. On the other hand, defendant's witnesses, based on its interpretation of the lease placed various estimates upon the value of defendant's remaining interest in the lease.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the government's motion for a directed verdict of no compensation was denied. Consistent with this ruling and also with that made at the inception of the trial, the Court denied the government's request for the submission to the jury of a form of verdict which would have permitted a possible finding of no compensation. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $25, 000, and on April 16, 1957, judgment was entered in said amount in favor of defendant. After a consideration

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and disposal of various motions the Court, on July 9, 1957, filed findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein it found and concluded that defendant was entitled to an additur of $50, 000 (making a total base award of $75, 000), with interest at 5% from October 6, 1954, the date of taking. On the same date the Court entered what it labeled an 'amended judgment, ' in which it was recited that defendant was entitled to an award of $85, 375.02. It is evident that this judgment included $50, 000, the amount allowed as additur; $25, 000, the amount awarded by the jury, and $10, 375.02, interest on the sum of $75, 000 from the date of taking.

The government has appealed from the so-called amended judgment of July 9, 1957. No mention is made in its notice of appeal of the judgment entered April 16, 1957 (the first judgment). Defendant cross-appealed from the so-called amended judgment of July 9, 1957 (the second judgment) in its favor, on the ground that the Court erred in failing to increase the award to the lowest level of value established by uncontradicted testimony. This so-called uncontradicted testimony refers to that offered by defendant upon its theory of the case, which was that embraced by the trial Court.

We are met at the inception with the important and troublesome contention advanced by defendant that the government, having appealed only from the so-called amended judgment of July 9, 1957, is precluded from here raising any issue other than that relative to the allowance of an additur. More specifically, it is contended that the government by its failure to appeal from the judgment of April 16, 1957, is without right to a review of the issues both of law and fact which were raised and decided in the trial which resulted in that judgment. The importance of this contention is at once apparent because, if sustained, it is decisive of all issues other than that which relates to the Court's allowance of the additur. We have, therefore, up to this point stated only such of the proceedings as we deem essential to bring into focus the instant question.

It is hardly open to doubt but that the first judgment standing alone was final and, therefore, appealable. It is equally certain that the Court, either on its own volition or at the instigation of the parties, possessed the authority within an appropriate time to vacate, modify or amend that judgment. We also think that in determining the question of the finality of the first judgment it should not be confined in a vacuum, separate and apart from the proceedings which followed.

On April 22, 1957, the government filed its motion to vacate the April 16 judgment and prayed that a judgment of no compensation be entered for plaintiff, notwithstanding the jury verdict. On April 24, 1957 (eight days after the entry of the judgment), defendant filed its motion calling attention to the fact that the judgment did not include interest, and prayed 'that the judgment heretofore entered herein be altered or amended' to include interest. On the same date, defendant filed its motion for additur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In this motion defendant prayed 'that the Court substantially increase the jury's verdict by an additur and enter an amended judgment for the amount of such increased award' or, in the alternative, grant defendant a new trial.

Thus, in two respects defendant sought to amend the judgment: first, by the addition of interest and, second, by the allowance of an additur. That the defendant succeeded in both respects is evidenced by the fact that the second judgment included interest and the allowance of an additur. The second judgment also specifically included $25, 000, the amount of the jury award, which had been incorporated in the first judgment. It is not discernible how it can be logically held that there are now two final judgments (defendant's contention requires such a holding). It is certain that defendant would not be entitled to a satisfaction of both judgments. Satisfaction

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of the second would ipso facto satisfy the first. Conversely, satisfaction of the first would entitle the government to a pro tanto credit on the...

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